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Abstract
This thesis analyses the fundamental causes of economic growth in Latin America.
Growth determinants can be distinguished between proximate and fundamental. Vari-
ables such as technology, investments in human and physical capital are considered
to be proximate growth determinants. Better technology and greater accumulation of
capital are related to greater growth, but in order to fully understand what causes
growth, we need to explain why some countries invest more in technology and capital
than others. This requires the analysis of more fundamental sources of growth. The
focus of this thesis lies on institutions as fundamental cause of Latin American growth.
The reasons for this are provided in Chapter 2. In particular, three different analyses
show the relevance of institutions for the region’s growth. First, a qualitative analysis
that replicates Glaeser et al.’s work [2004] shows that institutions are more fundamen-
tal than human capital. Second, in a Barro-regression applied to a Latin American
panel data, institutional variables are statistically significant. Finally, institutions are
also crucial in explaining episodes of rapid growth in the region. However, even if fun-
damental, institutions are endogenous to the growth process (i.e. these improve with
higher levels of income), and we need to explain what determines the character of these
institutions. The rest of the thesis unveils how Latin American institutions originate
and evolve. Chapter 3 analyses the colonial origins of institutions. The results show
that, although some colonial factors have affected the evolution of institutions in Latin
America, they are not the ones typically highlighted in the literature (e.g. European
settler mortality). The origins of Latin American institutions are better explained by
British colonial rule and colonial resource endowments. There is also no evidence that
current institutions reflect early ones (there is weak correlation between early and cur-
rent institutions). Chapter 4 takes up this challenge by examining how institutions
have evolved since independence. The evolution of Latin American institutions is ex-
plained by using a two equation model for the interrelationship between inequality and
institutions. The results show that inequality is an outcome of the colonial resource
endowment, and that the discovery of oil and gas negatively affects the evolution of
political institutions in the region. Finally, there is a bilateral causality between in-
equality and institutions in Latin America: poor institutional quality results in higher
degree of inequality and institutions are negatively affected by inequality so that these
two variables reinforce each other.
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1. Introduction
This thesis is concerned with what explains growth in Latin America and the Caribbean1.
Economic growth has important implications on a country’s development (e.g. helps to
reduce poverty, improves living standards), therefore understanding its determinants
has been an important part of the research agenda in economics.
The literature distinguishes between proximate and fundamental causes of growth.
Proximate causes are immediate factors responsible for the functioning of the growth
process and can be seen as mechanisms that enable growth. Fundamental (or ulti-
mate) causes refer to the conditions that led to a given growth outcome and explain
why certain mechanisms are favoured. Early studies on growth find that technological
progress and accumulation of human and physical capital are the main variables to ex-
plain differences in growth paths across countries. However, these are considered only
proximate causes of growth. Although improvements in technology and greater accu-
mulation of capital foster economic growth, in order to fully understand what causes
growth, we need to explain why some countries invest more in technology and capital.
This requires the study of more fundamental variables.
Economic policies, institutions, and geographical features are the favourite candidates
for fundamental variables. This thesis focusses on institutions as fundamental cause of
1Economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean has been low in the period 1960-2010. The
region grew at a rate of 1.32% below the world average of 1.83% but also below other developing
areas of the world.
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Latin American and Caribbean growth. The reason for this is found in the evidence
shown in Chapter 2 which reviews the region’s growth since 1960 using three differ-
ent analyses. First, it engages with the contrary argument from Glaeser et al. [2004]
for which human capital is more fundamental than institutions for explaining growth.
While the authors’ qualitative analysis shows that initial human capital explains better
than institutions the different growth paths in developing countries, the same analysis
for Latin America shows that low initial levels of institutions are detrimental for the
region’s growth. The second analysis is based on a Barro-regression for a panel data
of Latin American and Caribbean countries in which institutional variables are statis-
tically significant. Finally, following the works of Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik
[2005] and Sen [2013], Chapter 2 shows that institutions matter for explaining growth
accelerations (episodes of rapid growth) in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Even if institutions are fundamental for the growth of Latin American economies, it
does not mean they are exogenous to the growth process. Exogenous variables are
not systematically affected by changes in the other variables in the model, including
the dependent variable. Therefore, in a model, a variable is endogenous if it is at
least partly function of other parameters and variables within the model. Most of the
variables used as causes of growth suffer from endogeneity issues (e.g. higher economic
growth increases investments in technology and in physical and human capital). In the
case of institutions, these are a function of the levels of growth and development of a
country so that richer countries can afford better institutions.
The presence of endogenous variables as explanatory variables in economic models
creates significant difficulties for the empirical estimation of these models. While in-
strumental variable (IV) estimations are a very popular tool to deal with endogeneity
issues in Barro-regressions, to find good instruments for institutions is not an easy task
and wrong instruments make the estimates inconsistent and biased. The analysis in
2
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Chapter 2 uses system generalised method of moments estimators (GMM). Given the
milder initial assumptions, this method provides consistent estimators while it deals
with endogeneity.
To know that institutions are fundamental for growth and endogenous to the process
leaves an open question: what are the origins of Latin American and Caribbean in-
stitutions? Many scholars argue that, for former colonies, current institutions are an
outcome of the colonial times. This literature is based on two hypotheses. One is
that the character of the early institutions (institutions in the first years after indepen-
dence) depends on some aspects of the colonial experience. The second hypothesis is
that the quality of current institutions depends on their character at the time of the
independence.
Chapter 3 investigates whether these two hypothesis apply for Latin America and
the Caribbean. With respect to the first hypothesis, neither the specific features that
Acemoglu et al. [2001] (European settlements) nor Mahoney [2010] (native populations)
identify appear to explain differences in institutions at the time of independence in Latin
America. However, quality of institutions at the time of independence is indeed affected
by two colonial features: the coloniser power and the natural resources of the country
at the time. Furthermore, although institutions in general tend to be highly persistent,
early and current institutions are not highly correlated in Latin America, i.e. the Latin
American evidence counts against the second of these hypotheses.
Thus, while the character of institutions at the time of independence is not such a
puzzle, their evolution since independence is. This reflects the endogeneity of institu-
tions: they change with the process so the evolution of institutions is affected by other
parameters within the model.
Chapter 4 proposes a theory of how to explain the evolution of institutions in Latin
America since independence, focussing on three distinctive features of these economies:
3
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political instability, high levels of inequality, and the dependency of natural resources.
This chapter proposes a two equation model for inequality and political institutions.
These equations are jointly estimated using a panel data over the period 1905-2010.
Building on the insights of the previous chapters, the analysis uses variables that ex-
plain the impact of British Empire in the early 20th century through investments and
international trade, and the discovery of natural resources (e.g. oil) after independence.
The results confirm that bilateral causality exist between political institutions and in-
equality in Latin America. There is strong evidence that poor institutional quality
results in a higher degree of inequality that in turn negatively affects institutions, so
that the two variables reinforce each other.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and offers a summary of the main findings of this work.
There are three appendices where the data and variables used for the empirical analyses
are explained more in detail.
4
2. An Empirical Analysis of Latin American
and Caribbean Economic Growth
This chapter investigates the causes of Latin American and Caribbean growth. The
countries in the region exhibit a good variety of economic experiences over time and
determining the causes of economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean remains
an important task. Modern growth patterns can be distinguished in three sub-periods.
The period between 1960 and 1980 features positive growth across most countries in
the region; however, this period ends with the growth collapses experiences in the 1980s
and 1990s, known in fact as the lost decades. Despite differences in current economic
conditions across countries, Latin America has experienced a period of solid economic
growth since early 2000s. Section 2.1 shows some basic facts of growth in the region in
the three different sub-periods.
Literature on the determinants of economic growth is vast. There is a still open debate
on the causes growth which has brought scholars to distinguish between proximate and
fundamental causes. The former are immediate factors responsible for the functioning
of the growth process and can be seen as mechanisms that enable growth, while the
latter refer to the conditions that led to a given growth outcome and explain why
certain mechanisms are favoured.
5
Section 2.2 summarises this literature. Early growth theory finds that technical progress
and investments in physical and human capital are the key determinants of a country’s
growth. Nonetheless, these are considered to be only proximate causes. Better tech-
nology and higher accumulation of capital foster economic growth, but we do not know
why poor countries fail in investing more in physical and human capital and in techno-
logical improvement? This requires the study of more fundamental causes. Empirical
literature prompts policies, institutions and geographical conditions as fundamental
causes of growth.
This thesis focuses on institutions. This is due to the evidence of this chapter which
shows that institutions are fundamental for growth in Latin America and the Caribbean.
As matter of fact, the relevance of institutions comes from three different analyses.
First, Section 2.3 considers the contrary argument from Glaeser et al. [2004] who argue
that human capital is more fundamental than institutions for explaining growth. They
conclude that countries needs to invest in increasing their human capital in order to
get out of poverty. As result, more educated people with higher income will demand
better institutions. However, the results of replicating the same analysis show that, in
the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, initial levels of institutions in 1960 are
a better candidate for explaining the growth path of these countries between 1960 and
2010.
The empirical analysis of Section 2.4 confirms the importance of institutions. This
section uses a Barro-regression for a panel data of Latin America and Caribbean coun-
tries in which growth is the dependent variable and various measures of proximate
and fundamental causes are used as explanatory variables. The results show that in-
stitutions are always statistically significant in explaining average growth rates in the
region, while human capital loses significance once fundamental variables are included
in the regression. In order to deal with the endogeneity issues, a system generalised
6
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method of moments estimation (GMM) is considered. This estimation offers few advan-
tages on the alternative techniques (IV regressions). For instance, the estimation relies
on mild, plausible assumptions which do not require the residuals to be uncorrelated
with past specifications of the independent variables and provides consistent param-
eter estimates in panel data models with lagged dependent variables and unobserved
time-invariant individual-specific effects. Even in presence of measurement error and
endogenous right-hand-side variables, with the right choice of moments conditions, we
can obtain consistent parameter estimates.
Finally, the analysis in Section 2.5 shows that institutions matter also for explaining
the episodes of growth acceleration in the region. Pritchett [2000] shows that develop-
ing countries have distinct patterns of growth characterised by several rapid episodes
of growth (growth accelerations) followed by periods of stagnation, decline or even
catastrophic falls. Rapid episodes of growth are important for these economies because
they allow to close the development gap with advanced economies. The discussion of
stylised facts of Latin American and Caribbean growth in Section 2.1 shows that the
greatest improvements in general welfare in the region occur during periods of growth
acceleration, mainly in late 1960s and 1970s and more recently in 2000s. Section 2.5
shows that favourable terms of trade promotes growth accelerations in Latin America,
but that political instability have negative effects on the probability of observing these
episodes.
This chapter offers thus evidence that institutions are fundamental for growth in Latin
America. However, the three different analysis do not explain how these institutions
were created and how these evolved since early times. These aspects of institutions are
going to be studied in the rest of the thesis.
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2.1. Some Facts on the Economic Growth of Latin America
and the Caribbean in the Last Five Decades
Latin America and the Caribbean grew at an average rate of 1.32% in the period 1960-
2010, below the world average growth of 1.83%. There is a high degree of heterogeneity
in growth experiences across countries in the region and over the time. In fact, the
region of Latin America and the Caribbean shows a high variety and volatility of
economic experience in the twentieth century. It started the century as a relatively
poor, peripherical region of the world economy and it ended even further behind the
world leaders [Taylor, 1999; Solimano and Soto, 2004].
In terms of modern growth patterns, we can distinguish three sub-periods: 1960-1979
(period of positive growth), 1980-1999 (known as lost decades), and 2000-2013 (slow
recovery). To have a better idea of the geographical patterns of growth in the region,
it is useful to distinguish between Latin American1 countries and Caribbean2 ones.
Figures (2.1) and (2.2) show the disaggregate data for Latin American and Caribbean
countries in the different decades since 1960.
The period of 1960s saw a good growth performance especially for those countries
that adopted new strategies of export diversification (leaving behind policies of import
substitution). In fact, from the mid-1960s, export promotion policies became a pillar of
foreign economic policy in larger Latin American economies such as Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia and Mexico [Paiva de Abreu, 2006]. On average, Caribbean countries grew
at a higher rate than Latin American ones (3.64% against 2.22%). In fact, with the
exception of Dominican Republic and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, all Caribbean
1Continental South and Central America: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
2Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti,
Jamaica, St. Kittis and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago.
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countries experienced a growth rate above 3 percent. In continental Latin America,
only Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico and Brazil reached the same levels of growth.
This trend was maintained in 1970s when Caribbean countries grew on average at a
rate of 3.29% against the 2.41% of Latin America. All countries in the region were
experiencing a period of economic boom, with few exceptions. In particular Nicaragua,
a rapid grower in 1960s, experienced a period of economic slump in 1970s (and 1980s)
due to the civil conflict following the Sandinista Revolution and the 1972’s earthquake
that created several damages in the country. On the Caribbean side, Jamaica also
experienced a period of slowdown (that continued into the mid-1980s) after a strong
economic growth in 1960s. This growth was fuelled by foreign investments in the main
industries of tourism and manufacturing which were heavily affected by the global
economy’s slowdown in 1970s.
Economic growth in 1960s and mainly in 1970s was driven by the high prices of oil and
other commodities of which Latin American countries are producers. The drop in oil
prices and the following debt crisis in Latin America at the beginning of 1980s halved the
period of economic growth in these countries. Bulmer-Thomas [2006] explain the causes
of the crisis as being the small and insufficiently dynamic export sector which was unable
to finance the increase in debt service payments, and the rise in the world interest rates
that pushed up the cost of servicing the debt. Average growth in Latin America was
-0.73% in 1980s this is in sharp contrast with Caribbean countries which experienced
a rapid growth spurt in the 1970s that continued in the 1980s (3.38%) fuelled by
the expansion of tourism and banana and sugar production under preferential trade
arrangements [Acevedo et al., 2013], and large aid inflows that followed independence
from the United Kingdom [Thacker et al., 2012].
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2.1. SOME FACTS ON LAC GROWTH
The structural economic reforms that took place in Latin America in the late 1980s
and early 1990s aimed at exploiting the opportunities provided by international mar-
kets were instrumental in putting an end to macroeconomic instability and gave rise to
positive rates of growth in 1990s [Ocampo, 2004]. However, the rate of growth of GDP
per capita was lower than those which characterised the decades before the debt crisis
(1.8%). Although, the economic reforms aimed to steadily increase the inflow of ex-
ternal capital, these were very volatile3 negatively affecting the region’s growth. These
effects were magnified by the tendency of adopting pro-cyclical fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. About half of the Latin American countries experienced domestic financial crises
during the 1990s absorbing considerable fiscal resources and affecting the functioning
of the financial systems [Ocampo, 2002; Stiglitz, 2003].
On the other hand, Caribbean countries experienced an economic slowdown in 1990s.
This was triggered by the loss of trade preferences to European markets and the dete-
rioration of the terms of trade. Recurring natural disasters also contributed to lower
growth and increased fiscal vulnerability [Acevedo et al., 2013].
Despite important differences in current economic conditions within the region, Latin
America has experienced a period of solid economic growth since early 2000s. The
boom in global demand for commodities (minerals, hydrocarbons, soy and other farm
commodities) has been key to the improvement in the macroeconomic performance of
the region’s exporting countries [ECLAC, 2013]. This demand has allowed commodity
exporters to use fiscal savings to stimulate their economies during the 2008’s financial
crisis. However since 2011, the prices of several export commodities have trended
3In early 1990s there was a positive net resource transfers through the capital account and in the
second half of the 1990s, foreign direct investment became the leading source of net resource flows
to Latin America. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 results in a negative financial flow to
Latin America which was exacerbated by the sharp fall foreign direct investment in early 2000s [see
Ocampo [2004] for an analysis of the effects of external capital in Latin America]
12
CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA
downwards4, which has generated a decline in the region terms of trade and in the
growth rates.
After reviewing the relevant literature on economic growth, this chapter offers three
different analyses that deal with (i) what are the fundamental causes of growth in
the region, (ii) what determines long-run average growth rates and, (iii) what are the
mechanisms that allow for growth accelerations.
2.2. What Do We Know About What Causes Growth?
Which factors cause countries to grow economically and achieve different levels of wealth
is one of the oldest research agendas in Economics. The first relevant work can be
attributed to Adam Smith with “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations” in which Smith emphasises the improvement of efficiency in the use of
capital by division of labour and technical progress as a source of growth. David
Ricardo also recognises the importance of these factors for growth, but he emphasises
the role of the land-labour ratio.
The neo-classical models of economic growth, pioneered by Solow [1956] and Swan
[1956] focus on how capital formation and technology could overcome the declining
output due to the increasing population and limited land resources emphasised by
the classical models. The Solow-type models of growth became the workhorse for the
development of this literature. The model is consistent with a number of stylised facts
related to economic growth (i.e. the relative constancy over time of capital-output
ratio and factor income shares) and emphasises the accumulation of physical capital
as major force behind growth. The major innovation introduced was to allow for
factor substitutability so that stable equilibrium growth could be obtained [Renelt,
4This is due, in part, to the moderate growth in China, the main destination for several of the region’s
primary products.
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1991]. In the long run, the Solow model converges to a steady state with balanced
economic growth, where total output, consumption, investment and the capital stock
all grow at the same rate (i.e. the sum of the exogenous growth rates of population and
productivity). For this reason growth is affected only in the short-run as the economy
converges to the new steady state output level.
One of the main sources of criticism of the basic Solow model is the sources of growth
are found on exogenous factors (i.e. unexplained technical progress). Developments of
this literature attempted to endogenise the key determinants of growth. Romer [1986];
Lucas [1988] extent growth models and find that investments in human capital have
positive spillover effects on the economy and reduce the diminishing return to capital
accumulation fostering economic growth.
2.2.1. From Proximate to Fundamental Causes of Growth
“The factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, cap-
ital accumulation, etc) are not causes of growth; they are growth” [North
and Thomas, 1973].
While technological progress and investments in physical and human capital have found
a large support amongst scholars, there is an ongoing debate on whether these can be
recognised as causes of growth. Although Solow-type and endogenous growth models
explain why there is a wide variation in the wealth of nations, they do not explain
the economic problems in developing countries such as, why these countries invest
less in capital formation than rich ones or, why rich countries attain higher levels of
technology.
As a result, theorists and economists distinguish between proximate and ultimate causes
of growth [North and Thomas, 1973; Diamond, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Weil, 2009].
14
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Investments in physical and human capital and technological progress are considered
proximate causes of growth and the Solow model and growth accounting frameworks are
useful to understand the correlation between these variables and growth. Fundamental
causes of growth are factors that enable us to link the questions of economic growth to
the concerns of the rest of the social sciences, such as why do societies fail to improve
their technologies, invest more in physical capital and accumulate more human capital?
The main fundamental causes considered in literature are policies, institutions, and
exogenous environmental factors.
When considering policy choices there are many open debates. The main ones are based
on the links between government size, inflation, trade and growth. In a cross country
analysis Barro [1991] shows that low levels of government expenditure foster growth.
Nonetheless, this evidence is not strong and Levine and Renelt [1992] identify a fragile
correlation between government consumption and growth. In general, is difficult to
reach a conclusion on the role of government size at the aggregate level [Temple, 1999].
The role of government expenditure is likely to be crucial for explaining the impact of
welfare state on growth, but cross-section studies will not reveal these effects [Atkinson,
1995; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993].
The role of inflation and foreign trade are also common among the investigated policies.
Empirical studies show that high inflation negatively affect economic growth [Barro,
1991] however, these results can be distorted by few outliers [Temple, 1999]. Bruno
and Easterly [1998] do not find a long-term relationship between inflation and growth.
Grossman and Helpman [1989, 1990] argue that foreign trade affects economic growth.
Trade distortions (through tariffs or quota barriers) are considered to generate ineffi-
cient allocation of investments and resources; however, finding some way of quantifying
trade regimes is a difficult task and empirical works are mainly based on proxies. The
15
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direction of causality also challenges these studies. It is easy to see that trade might
be affected by fast growth.
All economic activity takes place within a given institutional environment. Economic
and political institutions can facilitate, or impede, productive economic activities. The
importance of institutions for economic growth is largely accepted and there is a vast
literature on the topic. In “The Mistery of Economic Growth” Elhanan Helpman
recognises the increasing role of institutions: “a recent surge of research on the effects
of institutions and politics on economic growth has convincingly shown the importance
of these elements of social structures... If I were to write this book five years from
today, I probably would write the same book except for the chapter on institutions and
politics, because I believe that much progress will be made in this area in the next few
years” [Helpman, 2004].
While the literature on institutions have certainly expanded, it has also set some fur-
ther questions. For instance, one of the main issues is to identify which institutions
matter and how they matter. The new institutionalist economists focus on the coor-
dination role of institutions for making social interaction possible and support market
development and transactions, and protect property rights from a potential authori-
tarian government [North, 1990; Greif, 1993, 1997; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Rodrik
et al., 2004]. Nonetheless, this literature is accused to neglect the political aspects
of institutions. Attempts to incorporate the analysis of political institutions in eco-
nomics are pioneered by the analysis of the regime type (autocracy vs democracy) on
economic performance [Rao, 1985; Haggard, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Collier and
Rohner, 2008; Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski, 2004]. Furthermore, the instability
of political institutions in some countries has called for studies on the effects of this
instability on growth. Alesina and Perotti [1994] offer evidence for a strong negative ef-
fect of instability on growth. Another political aspect investigated is the role of power.
16
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Economic institutions are largely politically determined and ultimately reflect choices
made by the groups in power. What determines the concentration of power and how
this affects institutional choices has ben subject of research in other areas of social
sciences [Knight, 1992; Khan, 2010].
Finally, specific environmental factors are also considered to be fundamental in deter-
mining growth. Countries are characterised by intrinsic geographical features that can
limit economic activities and therefore harm economic growth. For instance, the study
of the effects of natural resource endowments considers how the exploitation and pro-
duction of these resources affect economic growth. There is evidence for both negative
and positive effects of resource wealth on growth. (see Arezki and van der Ploeg [2011];
van der Ploeg [2011] for a detail review of this literature). In general, cross-country
analyses emphasise a negative correlation between exploitation of natural resources and
economic growth known as resource curse [Auty, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001];
however, more recent contributions argue that bad performances in resource-rich coun-
tries cannot be attributed to the resource itself but rather to the types of arrangements
which have developed around its exploitation, making the curse inevitable.
One of the greatest risks with the exploitation of natural resources is the unproductive
rent-seeking behaviour that can originate from the rents arising from the difference
between the value of that resource and the costs of extracting it. Rents from natural
resources tend to be large, geographically concentrated, and controlled by the govern-
ment. This may put a country’s institutional arrangements to a test. Mehlum et al.
[2006] and Robinson et al. [2006] argue that resource curse only appears in countries
with inferior institutions where politicians engage in corrupted behaviours. However,
after a discovery of a resource, governments may become predatory, especially where
resource rents can be captured and pressure to realign the interests of the state with
the majority is less urgent [Auty and Gelb, 2001].
17
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Governments in resource-rich countries have also less incentives to develop the gover-
nance mechanisms that enable general taxation. Much of a government’s fiscal strength
comes from its capacity to extract taxes from the population, a capacity that often takes
decades to develop [Addison et al., 2002; Di John, 2006, 2008]; hence, a government
that fails to develop this ability may also be unable to establish the type of bureaucracy
that can provide effective public goods, and ameliorate social conflicts [Mahdavy, 1970;
Beblawi, 1987; Lynn, 1997; Ross, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003]. Arezki and Bruckner
[2010] provide evidence that commodity-rich countries often have poor records of fiscal
discipline. Sound fiscal policy encourages savings during boom phases and spending
during busts, however in these countries fiscal policy is pro-cyclical in nature, which
damages macroeconomic stability [Polterovich et al., 2008; Lo´pez, 2010]. Therefore,
when governments are funded through natural resource revenues rather than taxation,
countries are left with weaker political and economic institutions.
2.2.2. Are Fundamental Causes Exogenous to the Growth Process?
One of the single most controversial issues in the economic growth literature is related
to endogeneity. A variable is considered endogenous when it is affected by changes of
other variables within the model. Proximate determinants of growth are considered
to be endogenous to the growth process because, although investments in human and
physical capital seem to positively affect growth, changes in income per capita are
also likely to affect investments. Fundamental (or ultimate) causes of growth could
be considered better candidates to explain what causes growth (and what impedes
countries to invest more in human and physical capital), but the debate on whether
these variables are truly exogenous, i.e. with no causal links leading to them from other
variables in the model, is still open.
18
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Endogeneity makes very difficult to discriminate which variables explain better what
generates growth on a priori basis. A reason for the differing results is the intensive
interaction between the variables considered. For example, good institutions are more
likely to adopt sound policies that benefit growth and some policies may be limited by
some geographical characteristics. At the same time, good policies that foster economic
growth benefit the creation of good institutions. Kenny and Williams [2001] argue that
due to the endogeneity issues many economic growth models fail in finding the true
determinants of growth.
Some authors tend to favour some variables over others. For instance, institutionalists
take the view that institutions rule over geography, and of course, supporters of the
geography-hypothesis argue the supremacy of geography over institutions5. This de-
bate was triggered by the results of empirical studies in which geographical variables
lose explanatory power once institutional variables are introduced into the empirical
estimations [Rodrik et al., 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2002]. However, authors that
advocates for the geographical hypothesis criticise the use of geographical characteris-
tics as instruments for the analysis of the impact of institutions on economic growth
[Sachs, 2003].
Both institutional- and geographical-hypothesis are challenged by supporters of the
policy-hypothesis who argue that all institutional and geographical limitations can be
overcome by the adoption of good policies (see for example Frankel and Romer [1999]
and Rodriguez and Rodrik [2001]; Irwin and Tervio [2002] on trade policies and geog-
raphy).
5That there is a hot debate between institutions- and geography-supporters is clear from the titles
of the published studies: “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the
Modern World Income Distribution” [Acemoglu et al., 2002], “Institutions Rule: The Primacy
of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development” [Rodrik et al., 2004];
“Institutions Don’t Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita income” [Sachs, 2003].
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On the policy vs institutions debate, Glaeser et al. [2004] find evidence that policies
rule over political institutions, and in particular, that investments in human capital is a
more fundamental source of growth than institutions. The authors provide a very good
argument on the problems of using institutions as a fundamental determinant of growth
and try to dig deeper into these issues. Because of the objective of this thesis is to shed
light on how these fundamental variables affect economic growth in Latin America,
Section 2.3 replicates this analysis for Latin America and the Caribbean.
2.2.3. Beyond the Analysis of Long-Run Average Growth?
Developing countries have a lower average long-run growth compared to developed ones
and research on what causes growth looks for the determinants of the long-run average
growth in order to explain this discrepancy. However, it has also been observed that
developing countries have a higher growth volatility. Some studies have found that
volatility negatively affect long-run growth [Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Easterly et al.,
2000], however there is little empirical or theoretical work on what might determine
volatility in growth rates.
Pritchett [2000] observes that economic performance in developing countries is based on
stop-go growth episodes: growth accelerations (episodes of rapid growth) followed by
growth decelerations (slow growth) or even growth collapses (negative growth) which
generate large fluctuations in growth of per capita income. A study of these episodes
could reveal important facts to explain the determinants of growth in the long-run.
This view is shared by Sen [2013] who argues that understanding the political drivers
of economic growth needs an explanation of the political dynamics around the tran-
sition from one growth phase to another. [Rodrik, 1999] finds that the determinants
of growth accelerations and growth collapses are based on social conflicts and domes-
tic institutions. Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik [2005] focus explicitly on moments
20
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of growth take-off and identify 83 such episodes in the developing world. In order to
explain what causes these episodes they use different economic and political variables.
Similar exercise is carried out by Imam and Salinas [2008] for Sub-Saharan Africa.
In both these studies, the driving forces of growth turnaround are found in external
shocks, economic liberalisation, and political stability.
Latin American and Caribbean growth story shows frequent and large fluctuations in
growth rates and low correlation between current and past growth rates [Hakura, 2007;
Sahay and Goyal, 2006]. Growth accelerations and decelerations have dominated the
region’s growth in the period 1960-2010 with very few stable periods being observed.
The frequency of growth accelerations (and decelerations) is illustrated by the fact that,
the region as a whole, experienced a total of nine growth transitions in the considered
period: five accelerations followed by two decelerations, and two stable periods [Gutier-
rez, 2007]. The story is similar at the level of individual countries with most episodes
of growth accelerations concentrated in the 1970s and more recently in 2000s and the
analysis of what causes these episodes seem only relevant.
The literature on economic growth helps to set the basis of the analyses in this chap-
ter. Determining the causes of economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean
remains an important theoretical and empirical task. Formal empirical studies of eco-
nomic growth in Latin America are relatively few and they are mainly focused on the
idea that cross-section differences in technological progress (Solow residual or total
factor productivity) could explain the differences in growth outcomes in the region [De-
Gregorio, 1992; Fernandez-Arias et al., 2005; Cole et al., 2005; Chumacero and Fuentes,
2006; Sawyer, 2010]. Very little research has been done on the causes of episodes of
rapid growth in the region. Political economy studies into the long-run patterns of
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growth in Latin America focus on historical aspects to explain the causes and conse-
quences of the region’s economic backwardness. These studies emphasise the role of
natural resources [Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002], colonisers and colonial regimes
[Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002], and the external institutional and political constraints
in the colonies arising from institutional differences in colonisers [Lange et al., 2007;
Mahoney, 2010; Coatsworth and Tortella, 2002].
The next sections propose three complementary analyses that evidence the role of
institutions as fundamental for growth in Latin America. The first analysis follows the
argument in Glaeser et al. [2004] to show that institutions are more fundamental that
human capital for explaining growth in Latin America. The second analysis shows the
importance of institutions for long-run average growth in the region. Finally the third
analysis shows the effects of institutions on growth accelerations.
2.3. Human Capital or Institutions?
Based on the observation that current measures of institutions fail in reflecting two key
aspects (a) constraints on government, and (b) permanent or at least durable features
of the environment Glaeser et al. [2004] conclude that: (i) human capital is a more
fundamental source of growth than institutions; (ii) poor countries get out of poverty
through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (iii) subsequently improve their
political institutions.
In order to show that current measures of institutions do not represent constraints
on the government and/or durable features of the environment, Glaeser et al. [2004]
compare the average within-country deviations of measures of institutions and human
capital. Table 2.1 shows these deviations for a sample of Latin American and Caribbean
countries. Human capital is measured by average years of schooling from the Barro-Lee
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data set, while measures of institutions come from the Polity IV database6. In effect,
democracy, autocracy, and constraints on the executive have higher within-country
average deviation than years of schooling7. However, this can arguably be considered
enough evidence for supporting the view that human capital is more fundamental than
institutions in explaining economic growth.
Table 2.1.: Institutions and Human Capital: Within-Country Deviations
Polity IV Barro-Lee
Democracy Autocracy Constraints years of years of
on the Exec. Schooling 25+ Schooling 15+
0.288 0.251 0.297 0.130 0.138
The high within-country deviation of institutional variables can be considered as a
characterisation of institutions per se. Institutions in developing countries are well-
known for their instability which harms growth. Of course, considering that institutions
are endogenous (and therefore affected by the growth process), lower growth will in turn
affect the stability of institutions.
The fact that growth affects institutions is another point of discussion in Glaeser et al.
[2004]. They argue that the high correlation of GDP levels and institutional variables
shows the reverse causality between growth and institutions, that is, growth causes
institutions. Table 2.2 shows the correlations between the institutional variables and
the levels of initial GDP. We can indeed observe a strong correlation between GDP and
democracy, autocracy and constraints on the executive, however, a strong correlation is
also observed between human capital and GDP. The issue with this analysis is that we
6Glaeser et al. [2004] discuss the shortcomings of three commonly used databases for institutions:
the Governance Indicators from the World Bank, the International Country Risk Guide and Polity.
While the first two are considered to be merely measures of economic and political outcomes in
a country and therefore are not used in their analysis, Polity IV makes the greatest attempt at
measuring the political environment; however, according to Glaeser et al. [2004], the database still
reflects the results of recent experiences such as the last elections, and to the extent that rich
countries are more likely to hold regular elections, Polity IV variables are considered a consequence
of development rather than the other way around.
7All variables are normalised between 0 and 1 and are measured every 5 years following data availability
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cannot deduct reverse causality or simultaneity issues by just looking at correlations.
In order to conclude whether institutions, human capital, or both are causes of growth
we need to consider more sophisticated analyses.
Table 2.2.: Correlations of measures of Institutions and Human Capital
Log GDP Years of Years of Democracy Autocracy Constraints
per capita Schooling 25+ Schooling 15+ (1960-2010) (1960-2010) on the Exec.
2010 (1960-2010) (1960-2010) (1960-2010)
Schooling 25+ 0.6017**
Schooling 15+ 0.5858** 0.9970***
Democracy 0.5230* 0.2504 0.2298
Autocracy -0.4587* -0.1123 -0.1079 -0.8803***
Constraints 0.5037* 0.2468 0.2325 0.9745*** -0.9139*** 1
on the Exec.
Notes:
*,**,*** significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively
Glaeser et al. [2004] consider two analyses. One analysis is based on a qualitative
study of the effects of initial institutions and human capital on the economic growth
of developing countries. The second analysis uses a Barro-type regression to quantify
the effects of institutions and human capital on average growth. In order to deal with
the endogeneity problems, they use IV regressions. This section replicates Glaeser et
al.’s qualitative analysis, while a study of Barro regressions is considered in the next
section.
2.3.1. Institutions Matter: A Qualitative Analysis
Glaeser et al. directly assess the effects of institutions and human capital on economic
growth using a sample of 89 developing countries for the period 1960-2000. The sam-
ple is independently divided into three levels of human capital and types of political
regimes, low, intermediate, high, both measured in 19608. Initial human capital is con-
sidered to be low in those countries with average years of schooling below 2.68 years
8Glaeser et. al use the period 1960-2000 for institutions, however, if we want to analyse the effects of
institutions on growth, we need to look at the initial levels. This study considers the average score
in the period 1955-1960
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per capita (median value); intermediate if schooling is between 2.68 and 5.01; and high
if schooling is above 5.01 (75th percentile value). Institutions are measured by the
democracy index from the Polity IV database (it ranges between 0 and 10). Initial
institutions are considered low for those countries that score under 2, intermediate if
the index is between 2 and 7, and high if the country scores above 7.
Table 2.3.: Political Regimes and Growth
Democracy Growth (1961-2010)
(1960) >2.5% 1.5 - 2.5% 0 - 1.5% <0%
Dominican Rep. Mexico Bolivia Haiti
Low Paraguay El Salvador
(<=2) Cuba Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Chile Argentina Venezuela
Intermediate Panama Brazil
(2, 7] Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
High Costa Rica Jamaica
(>7) Uruguay
Notes:
Data from PolityIV, World Bank Indicators, and Penn World Tables elaborated by the author
Table 2.4.: Human Capital and Growth
Human Capital Growth (1960-2010)
(1960) >2.5% 1.5 - 2.5% 0 - 1.5% <0%
Dominican Rep. Mexico Bolivia Haiti
Brazil El Salvador
Low Guatemala
(<2.6785) Honduras
Nicaragua
Venezuela
Chile Costa Rica Jamaica
Intermediate Panama Uruguay
[2.6785, 5.0115] Colombia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Peru
High Belize Argentina
(>5.0115) Barbados
Trinidad & Tobago
Notes:
Data from Barro-Lee dataset, World Bank Indicators, and Penn World Tables
elaborated by the author
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We can then classify Latin American and Caribbean countries according to the initial
levels of human capital and institutions (measured in 1960) and subsequent economic
growth (1961-2010). Table 2.3 shows that the majority of countries with low initial
democracy scores have low growth rates in 1961-2010 (or negative in the case of Haiti).
Exceptions to this are Dominican Republic, Chile and Panama that experienced very
high average growth rates even with low initial levels of democracy. Table 2.4 shows
the same classification for human capital. Countries with low levels of human capital
in 1960 experience slow growth rates afterwards (with the same exceptions Dominican
Republic, Chile and Panama). Haiti seems to be trapped into a vicious circle of low
human capital, poor institutions and bad economic performance.
Table 2.5 puts together these results and looks into the immediate effects of initial
institutions and human capital (measured in 1960) on economic growth (between 1961
and 1970). Panel A shows that in 1960 nearly all Latin American and Caribbean
countries that score low in democracy are also poorly educated. Only Jamaica scores
high in both human capital and democracy. There is more dispersion among those
countries with intermediate levels of human capital: Ecuador and Paraguay started with
low democracy while Chile, Colombia, Panama and Peru had reached an intermediate
level. Costa Rica and Uruguay score high in democracy even with intermediate levels
of human capital.
Panel B presents the within-average growth rates for the period 1961-1970 (the results
for Glaeser et al. are reported in green squared brackets). For Latin America and
the Caribbean, there are no significant differences in average growth rates across the
different levels of human capital. Countries that started with low human capital grew
at a similar rate as countries starting with high levels of human capital (around 2%).
This contrasts the results in Glaeser et al., where those countries with low human
capital grew at a rate of 1.2%: over one percentage point below those countries with
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Table 2.5.: Political Regimes, Human Capital, and Growth
Democracy (1960)
Years of Schooling Low Intermediate High Totals
(1960) ≤ 2 2 <Democracy ≤ 7 >7
Panel A: Countries
Bolivia Brazil
(0.009) (0.030)
Haiti
(-0.014)
Dominican Rep. Venezuela
(0.014) (0.012)
Honduras
Low (0.007)
(<2.6785) El Salvador
(0.022)
Mexico
(0.034)
Guatemala
(0.031)
Nicaragua
(0.043)
Ecuador Chile Costa Rica
(0.008) (0.021) (0.026)
Paraguay Colombia Uruguay
Intermediate (0.023) (0.021) (0.002)
[2.6785, 5.0115] Panama
(0.049)
Peru
(0.023)
High Argentina Jamaica
(>5.0115) (0.026) (0.018)
Panel B: Average within-country 10-year growth rate
Low 0.018 0.021 - 0.019
[0.029] [0.019] [0.008] [0.012]
Intermediate 0.016 0.029 0.014 0.022
[0.022] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026]
High - 0.026 0.018 0.022
[0.022] [0.024] [0.020] [0.025]
Total 0.018 0.023 0.015 0.020
[0.024] [0.023] [0.014] [0.020]
Panel C: Mean Standard Deviation of the 10-year growth rates across countries
Low 0.044 0.035 - 0.040
[0.030] [0.022] [0.030] [0.029]
Intermediate 0.022 0.021 0.030 0.023
[0.020] [0.021] [0.032] [0.025]
High - 0.055 0.047 0.039
[0.012] [0.008] [0.012] [0.015]
Total 0.036 0.030 0.038 0.034
[0.023] [0.021] [0.032] [0.025]
Notes:
Panel A: 1961-1970 growth rates reported in parenthesis
Panel B and C: The green squared-brackets report the results for Glaeser et al. [2004]
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intermediate and high levels of human capital that grew at around 2.5%. More marked
differences in Latin American and Caribbean countries can be seen at the institutional
level: countries with low initial levels of democracy grew at a lower rate (1.8%) than
those countries with intermediate levels of democracy (2.3%). In Glaeser, there is no
difference between countries with low and intermediate democracy (which grew at 2.4%
and 2.3% respectively)9.
Finally, Panel C shows the dispersion of growth rates among the different groups (mea-
sured by the within-country average standard deviation of growth rates for the period
1961-1970). We can observe that the dispersion across human capital classification is
higher than the one observed across the institutions classification: countries with high
levels of human capital in 1960 show a higher average standard deviation in growth
rates (5.5% and 4.7% for intermediate and high levels of democracy respectively) while
the average dispersion for across the democracy levels is very close to the total average
dispersion (3.4%).
The analysis of this section shows that there is no evidence that human capital is a
more fundamental determinant of growth in Latin America and the Caribbean than
institutions. The observations made by Glaeser et al. [2004] that (a) the measures
of institutions used in literature are highly volatile; and (b) these are correlated with
economic development, are valid when we observe political institutions in Latin America
and the Caribbean, however, given the previous discussion, we need to revisit the main
conclusions.
First, we cannot rule out institutions as fundamental determinant of growth on the basis
of the high volatility of these measures. The experiences of Dominican Republic and
Haiti offer interesting evidence for this. Both countries had low levels of human capital
9Countries with high initial levels of democracy show a slow growth between 1960 and 1970 (in both
Latin American and Glaeser et al.’s sample). In the case of Latin America, only Costa Rica,
Uruguay and Jamaica started with high levels of democracy, and despite the low average growth in
this period, currently these are all high income countries.
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and democracy in 1960; however, Dominican Republic experienced a rapid average
growth rate in the following decades, while Haitian GDP per capita has contracted
since 1960. Looking at differences in political institutions and human capital in the two
countries, we can observe a marked contrast in terms of political instability (but not real
change in levels of human capital which are still low). Haiti’s political instability is the
highest in the whole region, with several democratically-elected regimes quickly turned
over by coups or authoritarian leaders. Dominican Republic lived under Rafael Trujillo
dictatorship for more than three decades between 1930 and 1961 and the period between
Trujillo’s assassination in 1961 and the civil war in 1965 was chaotic economically as
well as politically. However since 1970, the country has been one of the most politically
stable in the region, and the Dominican Republic’s growth began to outpace that of
Latin America. This suggests an alternative interpretation of the high within-country
deviation of political institutions as a sign of high political instability which, as Alesina
and Perotti [1994] suggest, may harm economic growth. This suggests a need for further
research on the sources of political instability in Latin America.
Second, the conclusion that poor countries get out of poverty through investments in
human capital (even if these investments are pursued by dictators) does not hold for
Latin America and the Caribbean. The evidence in Table 2.5 favours institutions over
human capital. Panel B shows that countries with high initial levels of human capital
did not grow faster than those ones with low initial human capital. On the contrary,
given similar starting levels in human capital, some countries did better than other in
terms of growth (there is a high dispersion in growth rates). Of course, those countries
with low initial levels of both human capital and democracy struggle their way out
of poverty (in fact they are still classified as low or lower-middle income countries10),
10The current World Bank income classification is based on the GNI per capita (constant US$ 2005).
Countries are considered to be low-income if the GNI per capita is US$1, 035 or less. Lower-middle
income countries have a GNI per capita between US$1, 036 and US$4, 085. Upper-middle income
countries fall in the interval US$4, 086-US$12, 615 and high income countries have per capita GNI
higher than US$12, 615.
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but this is also the case for countries such as Paraguay and Ecuador that started with
intermediate levels of human capital but low democracy.
Finally, the debate on whether growth causes democratisation (and not the way around)
is still open. In the last decades, Latin America and the Caribbean has experienced an
increase in growth rates, higher levels of democratisation and greater human capital
accumulation and we observe high correlation rates between these variables. Most
Latin American and Caribbean countries are currently upper middle income or high
income countries which is a net improvement since 1960 when most of these countries
were classified as low or low-middle income. There has also been a democratisation
process in the period, with only Venezuela and Haiti scoring low in democracy in
2010. The level of human capital has also increased, reaching a regional average of
8.20 years of schooling (of population aged 25 and over). Different country experiences
show the difficulties in explaining the causation process among these three variables.
For instance, Paraguay started with low level of democracy and intermediate level
of human capital in 1960 and has not managed to leave the status of lower-middle
income in the last 50 years. Trinidad and Tobago on the other hand, started with
high levels of both human capital and institutions and we may argue that this favoured
the economic performance of this country that currently is classified as high income
economy. Also Chile and Uruguay have reached a high-income status having different
initial institutional experiences.
The study of causation needs to go beyond the observed correlations and include a
regression analysis that incorporates other variables that may affect growth (but also
institutions and human capital) and deals with the issues of endogeneity discussed
earlier in this section. We cannot rule out that higher growth, better institutions, and
improvements in human capital are all outcomes of the economic system (and not just
institutions as argued by Glaeser et al.) and we need to look a more exogenous variables
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that explain these processes. For instance, the analysis of Dominican Republic and Haiti
shows that geographical characteristics might have had a crucial role in the different
growth paths in these regions.Diamond [2005] points out that Haiti has a semi-arid
climate which makes cultivation more challenging and the ongoing deforestation only
exacerbates the problem. In addition, Haiti’s high population growth and increase in
rural labour force has led to an expansion of subsistence food crops to the detriment of
export crops [Lundahl, 2001]. Very likely these geographical characteristics might affect
the political instability of this country, that in turn harms economic growth.
2.4. Barro-regressions for Latin America and the Caribbean
The starting point for a growth regression considers the following function for a coun-
try’s per capita growth rate:
DYt = F (Yt′ , et′ , ht′ ; ...) (2.1)
where DYt is real GDP per capita growth in the interval t, Yt′ is initial per capita
GDP11, et′ is initial schooling per person, ht′ is a measure of the typical person’s health
(measured by life expectancy), and ‘...’ denotes the array of other variables considered
relevant for growth.
The vast empirical literature on economic growth has predominantly used simple linear
cross-country regressions to analyse the relationship shown in Equation 2.1. These re-
gressions are commonly known as Barro regressions after the work of Barro [1991]. To
the conventional Solow-type human capital augmented growth models, Barro regres-
sions add other variables to include the fundamental causes.
11t′ indicates that the variables is observed at the beginning of the period. For instance, if the period
is 2000-2005, the initial real GDP per capita is observed in 2000.
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The general Barro regressions use cross-sectional data for their analysis. A key draw-
back is the problem of unobservable heterogeneity. In cross-country regressions, we
can never be sure whether we are controlling for all possible ways in which countries
might differ [Rajan and Subramanian, 2008]. Furthermore, cross-country growth re-
gressions lack a time dimension which may cause substantial bias due to the correlation
of unobserved country-specific factors and the variables of interest.
Due to the recent availability of longer-term series for several variables for developing
countries, scholars have switch to longitudinal data analysis. Panel estimations have
the virtue of (partially) addressing the problem of unobservable heterogeneity by incor-
porating country fixed effects. Essentially, by adding fixed effects, we consider whether
changes in the independent variables over time for a country contemporaneously affect
its growth [see Hansen and Tarp, 2000].
The equation used for the panel estimation of 2.1 can be written as:
Dyi,t = α+ βyi,t′ + δ
′Xi,t + µt + ηi + i,t (2.2)
where i denotes the country, and t denotes the time period (t = 1, ..., 9), yi,t′ is the
initial real per capita GDP (in logs)12, Xi,t is the matrix of conditioning variables which
includes variables for both proximate and fundamental causes. µt is the time effect, it
varies over time but it is constant within a country. ηi is a country fixed effect that
captures all unobserved, time-constant factors that affect growth (it varies between
countries), and i,t is the residual.
In the basic neoclassical model, the growth rate tends to be inversely related to the
level of initial per capita GDP, that is, countries with lower levels of initial income tend
to grow at a faster rate [Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004]13. Empirically, the initial level
12the regressions consider the log of these variables. Therefore, yt = log(Yt)
13The neo-classical growth model predicts absolute convergence: poorer economies should grow faster
and tend to catch up to the richer economies, however empirical evidence shows that the proposition
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of per capita GDP is introduced into the growth equation in the form of log(Y ) so that
the coefficient on this variable represents the responsiveness of the growth rate to a pro-
portional change in initial income known as the rate of convergence. This variable has
been found significant in most cross-country analysis providing empirical evidence to
the hypothesis of convergence [Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004]. Nonethe-
less, Putterman [2000] suggests that long-run geographical and institutional measures
have a deeper role than simple convergence in determining growth rates. This is sup-
ported by the works of Burkett et al. [1999]; Chanda and Putterman [2007] who using
cross-country data, show that initial GDP per capita loses significance when measures
for some historical facts (i.e. pre-modern economic conditions) are included.
The identification of which variables should be included in the matrix of condition-
ing variables (Xi,t) represents one of the main areas of research in economic growth.
Xi,t generally includes measures for both proximate and fundamental causes of growth
(see Durlauf et al. [2005] for a survey of different regressors proposed in the growth
literature). Although this literature has made important advances in uncovering the
determinants of economic growth, there are still several concerns with the econometric
approach. In fact, cross-country empirical studies have been challenged on the grounds
of model uncertainty and endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias, unobserved
heterogeneity, simultaneity or reverse causation.
The debate between human capital and institutions introduced by Glaeser et al. [2004]
is a clear example of model uncertainty. There is no doubt that supporters of both
hypotheses can provide good arguments how each of these variables cause growth.
However, growth theories are open-ended, that is, growth theories are typically com-
of absolute convergence fares badly in terms of cross-country data. For this reason, the relation
between the GDP growth rate and the starting position of a country has to be examined after holding
constant some variables that distinguish the countries [Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004].
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patible with one another and for this reason is difficult to rule out a variable in favour
of another [Brock and Durlauf, 2001].
The most famous attempts to address the problems of model uncertainty are made
by Levine and Renelt [1992] and Sala-i-Martin [1997a,b]. Levine and Renelt [1992]
use extreme bounds analysis to assess the robustness of the various variables found
relevant to explain growth. These include variables that proxy those suggested by the
Solow model: initial income, investment share of GDP, secondary school enrolment
rates, and population growth. They found that the only robust growth determinants
are initial income and the share of investment in GDP; these findings are confirmed in
Kalaitzidakis et al. [2000] who also find inflation volatility and exchange rate distortions
to be robust. The limitations of the extreme bounds approach are discussed in Brock
and Durlauf [2001]; Brock et al. [2003]. Sala-i-Martin [1997a,b] proposes an alternative
way of evaluating regressors in growth regressions by using weights determined by the
likelihoods of each model as well as employing equal weighting. As Levine and Renelt,
he also finds that initial income and investment to GDP ratio are robust determinant of
growth, as well as some measures for education and institutional characteristics.
The problem of endogeneity is also a common source of criticism in growth literature. In
a regression equation, an explanatory variable is endogenous if it is correlated with the
error term. Endogeneity is often described as having three sources: omitted variables,
unobserved heterogeneity, and reverse causality. Endogeneity may arise from omitted
variable when we do not include all the variables that may affect growth into the
regression, therefore the impact of these variables is captured by the error term.
We have omitted variable bias if (i) the omitted variables are determinants of the
dependent variable (growth), and (ii) the omitted variable is correlated with one or
more of the included independent variables. This violates the Gauss-Markov theorem’s
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assumption that error term is uncorrelated with the regressors and causes the OLS
estimator to be biased and inconsistent [Greene, 2002].
When our unit of analysis is country, there may specific country’s characteristics (in
general not observed) that affect both the dependent and independent variables that
are not included in the estimation. This unobserved heterogeneity can cause omitted
variable bias and be a source of endogeneity. Fixed effects estimators in panel data
help to address this problem, by introducing country specific dummies that capture
this unobserved heterogeneity. [see Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996; Temple, 1999;
Hansen and Tarp, 2000]. A problem with fixed effects is that some variables of interest
may be measured at only one point in time (e.g. geographic characteristics), or they
are highly persistent (e.g. education, institutions). Here the only variation is between-
country and empirical work needs to be based on cross-sections or pooled cross-section
time series.
Growth regressions are often accused of not taking into account problems of reverse
causality. The high correlation of human capital and institutions with economic devel-
opment shows that both these variables may cause growth, but when countries become
richer they can afford better institutions and greater investments in human capital. In
general, reverse causality problems apply to the debate of fundamental and proximate
causes of growth. The fundamental reason why a correlation between any variable and
level of per capita income may not allow any inference over causation, is the observed
data does not come from a randomised experiment. We cannot assign different insti-
tutions to different countries and check the effects that these institutions have on the
countries in the treatment group. Therefore, we cannot eliminate the problem that un-
observed factors might be driving any correlation between independent and dependent
variables.
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If reverse causality is not taken into account, it can lead to serious inaccuracies in
research results. Not only are the parameter estimates inconsistent, but the magnitude
and the meaning of the parameter is altered as well. Additionally, the error term in a
given model may include factors that both affect growth and are correlated with other
explanatory variables, thus rendering the parameter estimates inconsistent.
One way of addressing the potential for endogeneity bias is to use instrumental variables
[Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2004]. This is an alternative to attempting
to identify and control for all possible factors that might be correlated with both the
dependent and explanatory variables. However, to identify valid instrumental variables
is not an easy task. An invalid instrument (one that is not uncorrelated with the
error term) makes the estimates inconsistent, and many of the instrumental variables
proposed have also been used by other studies as determinants of growth. Since growth
theories are mutually compatible, the instruments used may not be always valid.
Panel data allows for a further way to obviate endogeneity. Given that the variables
are observed at various points in time, lagged values of the independent variables could
be used as instruments. Nonetheless, some variables tend to be highly persistent and
therefore, past realisations of the independent variable may still be correlated with
current values of the dependent variable making the instrument weak.
Recent contributions have employed dynamic panel system generalised method of mo-
ments (GMM) estimators in growth econometrics developed by Arellano and Bover
[1995]; Blundell and Bond [1998]. These estimators are designed for situations with
few time periods for many countries, with a dynamic dependent variable (which de-
pends on its own past realisations), with independent variables that are not strictly
exogenous (they are correlated with the past and possibly current realisations of the
error), and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals [Roodman, 2009].
This method ensures that lagged first difference of the dependent variable is a valid
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instrument since it is uncorrelated with the composite error term in the levels equation.
This builds in some insurance against weak identification.
The advantages of GMM panel methods in the context of growth regressions are three-
fold. They (i) account for unit-level fixed effects, (ii) incorporate internal methods for
dealing with endogenous regressors, and (iii) avoid the bias of standard panel estima-
tors in dynamic settings. The last characteristic is important as any panel regression
of growth on lagged income arithmetically derives from an autoregressive specification,
which introduces substantial bias in the presence of unobserved unit-specific heterogene-
ity especially where the number of time periods is small. The use of transformations
of lagged variables as internal instruments for the endogenous variables may also seem
to be an attractive alternative to finding external instruments that remain valid and
robust across all panels [Arndt et al., 2009].
Although empirical studies have made a fair effort in improving the econometric tech-
niques in order to deal with challenges pose by endogeneity and model uncertainty,
growth is a very complex process and the research of growth determinants seems to be
inconclusive. This reason has led some authors to step away from empirical analysis
in favour of most case studies narratives. For instance, given that country growth ex-
periences have been extremely heterogenous and that this heterogeneity is difficult to
capture by any econometric model, Kenny and Williams [2001] advocates for historical
accounts over cross-country empirical analyses. Historical narratives should allow to
shed light on the complex and varied inner workings of actual economies.
Despite the many difficulties with the empirical analysis, growth econometrics can pro-
vide signposts to interesting patterns and partial correlations. Mankiw [1995]; Wacziarg
[2002] suggest that, although we need to accept that reliable causal statements are al-
most impossible to make, the use of partial correlations of the growth literature is useful
to rule out some possible hypotheses about the world’s growth. Seen in terms of es-
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tablishing stylised facts, empirical studies help to broaden the demands made of future
theories. In addition, when considering the limitations of panel data methods, it is clear
that the prospects for informative work should improve over time due to the addition
of further time periods, but also the development of economic and political events in
developing countries for which panel data can be used to investigate their consequences
on growth. In addition, the shift to case study analysis is not free of concerns. We need
to be cautious on interpreting the results from these analyses. Case studies in general
require the treatments to be exogenously assigned, when analysing growth processes,
the events under study are themselves endogenous to the system [Durlauf et al., 2005].
The ability to quantify even an average treatment effect is strongly circumscribed and
it may be possible to identify only the direction of effects. At the very least, this offers
a complement to regression-based methods.
2.4.1. Data
A panel data set of up to 34 countries14 for the period 1960-2010 (divided in 5-years
intervals15, so T = 10) is used in this analysis. The independent and explanatory
variables are from the most common databases used in growth literature. (Appendix
?? shows some basic statistics and data sources).
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP (from Penn World
Tables, version 8). All the regressions include the initial real GDP per capita as inde-
pendent variable to account for (conditional) convergence. Proximate causes of growth
consider measures of physical, human, and health capital. Physical capital is measured
by the investment share of real GDP per capita . Average years of schooling (aged 25+)
14to the best of my knowledge, this is the largest sample considered in literature
15When using panel data in growth regressions, we need to decide the length of the time span. Islam
[1995] argues that yearly time spans are too short to be appropriate for studying growth because
short-term disturbances may loom large in brief time spans. Five-years time intervals are the most
common choice. We could use 10-years time spans, but this would drastically reduce the number
of observations.
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is used as measure of human capital (from Barro-Lee data-set) and life expectancy and
mortality rates of children under-5 are indicators of health capital.
Fundamental variables such as policies, institutions, and geographical characteristics
are also included as regressors. Government consumption and expenditure, rates of
inflation and trade openness (from the the Penn World Tables) are considered as policy
variables. Democracy (PolityIV) and Government Stability (from World Bank Gover-
nance Indicators) measure institutions and the dependence on natural resource rents is
used as geographical feature.
2.4.2. GMM Results
Table 2.6 shows the results of using GMM estimators in a panel-data of Latin American
and Caribbean countries. These results mostly confirm the findings of previous empir-
ical literature. Column (a) shows the results for a basic Solow growth model using as
regressors initial GDP per capita and investments in physical capital. The coefficient
for initial GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant, which offers evidence
for convergence towards a steady growth among countries in the region (at a rate of
nearly 0.6% - lower than in the one found when analysing larger panels). Investments in
physical capital is statistically significant and positively related to growth, confirming
previous results in literature.
Column (b) and (c) includes the measures for human and health capital respectively.
Human capital, measured by average years of schooling is statistically significant and
positively related to economic growth. The measures for health capital, life expectancy
and child mortality are both statistically significant with a positive sign. While we
would expect that an increase in life expectancy fosters growth, the sign of the child
mortality coefficient is not expected. According to this result, an increase in child
mortality positively affects growth in Latin America. We should not read too much into
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this result. Mortality rate (as all proximate determinants of growth) is not exogenous
to the process, in fact, better economic performance should reduce the rate of mortality.
However the mechanism through which this happens are various and very likely this
result depends on which variables we include in the regression. These controversial
results are also find in more broad literature on the impact of health on growth. For
instance, Bloom and Sachs [1998]; Gallup and Sachs [2001] argue on a positive effect
of health on growth in large samples, while Mayer [2001] shows a long-term effect of
health on income for the specific case of Latin America. On the other hand, Acemoglu
and Johnson [2007] challenge this evidence and argue that an increase in life expectancy
has a negative impact on economic growth due to its effect on increase in population
so that there is no evidence on a first-order impact of health on economic growth. A
common view is generally that these effects may take a long time to come into full effect
or may be conditional on other economic factors and therefore not being observable in
simple linear regressions.
In column (d), policy variables are added to the regression. Government size, mea-
sured by government consumption, is negatively related to growth. By decreasing the
government consumption-GDP ratio of 1%, we can expect an increase of the growth
rate of 0.1% (this result holds even when other variables are added). The results show
evidence that large governments which are very common in Latin America and the
Caribbean are less efficient in promoting growth in the area. This is also the case for
high rates of inflation that negatively affect GDP per capita growth – an increase of
inflation by 1% will cause a decrease in growth of 0.02%. The study does not find evi-
dence on the importance of trade openness for economic growth in Latin America and
the Caribbean; in fact, the variable that measures the level of openness of the regions
is not statistically significant.
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Most of Latin American and Caribbean countries are producers and net exporters of
natural resources. Columns (e) and (f) add variables for natural resources and oil rents
as percentage of GDP, respectively. We can observe that these two variables negatively
affect GDP per capita growth (an increase in resources rents provoke a decrease of
growth of 0.01%).
Finally, columns (g) and (h) include the measures of institutions. Both democracy
and government stability are positive and statistically significant. In specific, an in-
crease of these measures by 1 index point represent an increase in growth of 14% and
20% respectively. These results show evidence that good institutions facilitate a good
economic environment that enhances productive activities and growth and support the
hypothesis that institutions are fundamental determinant of growth in the region.
The results of this analysis show that the commonly considered fundamental variables
in literature do explain long-run average growth in Latin America and the Caribbean.
With particular reference to the debate human capital vs institutions, unlike Glaeser
et al. [2004] argue, when fundamental variables are added in the regression, the coef-
ficient for years of schooling (the measure for human capital) loses significance. This
does not mean that human capital is not important for growth, but it is just stating
that human capital is not more “fundamental” than institutions.
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2.5. Growth Accelerations in Latin America and the Caribbean
Following the work of Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik, [2005], this section offers an
analysis of the episodes of growth acceleration in Latin America and the Caribbean
between 1960 and 2010. Growth acceleration episodes are identified by looking for
rapid growth episodes that satisfy the following conditions (as specified by Hausmann,
Pritchett, and Rodrik, [2005]):
1. gt,t+7 ≥ 3.5% Growth is rapid
2. ∆gt ≥ 2.0% Growth accelerates
3. yt+7 ≥ max(yi), i ≤ t Post-growth output exceeds pre-episode peak
Where gt,t+7 is the growth rate over a 8-year period, ∆gt is the change in the growth
rate at time t defined as ∆gt = gt,t+7 − gt−7,t, and yt is the GDP per capita in a given
period.
As baseline data source, this study uses both the Penn World Tables 8.0 and the World
Development Indicators. The results from both these datasets are very similar and they
lead to find 27 episodes of growth in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1960
and 2010. Table 2.7 shows these episodes by country and period. The third column
shows the average growth during the period of acceleration, followed by the growth
before and after the event.
The episodes of growth identified mostly coincide with those episodes identified by
Hausmann et al. [2005] for Latin America. In addition to the ones observed in Table 2.7,
Hausmann et al. [2005] identify another eight episodes: Argentina (1963), Dominican
Republic (1969), Nicaragua (1960), Haiti (1990), Panama (1975), Trinidad and Tobago
(1975), Uruguay (1974, 1989); however, the data available does not support these
episodes and these were therefore excluded from this analysis (either growth is below
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the threshold or it is not sustained for the number of years required to satisfy the
criteria). These episodes are also compared with the ones considered by Solimano and
Soto [2004]. These authors identify eight growth episodes in Latin America in the
period 1960-2000. All these episodes are included in this analysis with the exception
of Bolivia (1965). This is due to the different definition of growth acceleration used by
Solimano and Soto [2004] (six-years of growth over 2%).
We can observe that the growth episodes are concentrated in the 1960s and 1970s (8
episodes), and more recently in 2000s (9 episodes). Episodes of growth in 1980s are
more common in the Caribbean (6 episodes) with only one Latin American country
experiencing growth acceleration after 1980 (Chile).
Table 2.7.: Episodes of Rapid Growth
Country Years Growth Growth Growth Hausmann, Solimano &
before after et al. Soto
Antigua & Barbuda 1983-1989 8.3 -0.1 1.2 n.a. n.a.
Argentina 1991-1997 4.1 0.1 2.8 yes no
2003-2008 6.4 -4.2 3.7 n.a. n.a.
Brazil 1967-1974 7.3 2.4 6.2 yes yes
2004-2008 3.5 -0.5 1.8 n.a. n.a.
Chile 1986-1994 6.2 -0.3 6.6 yes yes
2003-2008 4.3 0.9 3.7 n.a. n.a.
Colombia 1968-1974 3.9 0.2 2.6 yes yes
2003-2008 3.5 1.1 2.6 n.a. n.a.
Costa Rica 1965-1972 3.6 1.2 3.9 no yes
Cuba 1999-2006 5.5 0.8 3.5 no n.a.
Dominica 1980-1987 6.0 1.8 4.3 n.a. n.a.
Dominican Rep. 1992-1999 5.3 -1.0 3.8 yes yes
2005-2010 6.5 0.1 3.1 n.a. n.a.
Ecuador 1970-1977 6.7 -0.1 4.6 yes yes
Mexico 1963-1970 4.2 0.0 3.4 no yes
Panama 1961-1968 5.6 1.5 2.1 yes no
2002-2008 5.9 -1.5 6.4 n.a. n.a.
Paraguay 1972-1979 6.5 1.8 5.2 yes no
Peru 1961-1967 4.3 0.8 1.9 yes no
2002-2008 5.6 -0.1 4.5 n.a. n.a.
Puerto Rico 1983-1990 5.4 -2.2 2.5 n.a. n.a.
St. Kitts & Nevis 1984-1991 7.6 -2.2 4.4 n.a. n.a.
St. Lucia 1984-1991 6.7 -0.9 5.6 n.a. n.a.
St. Vincent and the Gren. 1976-1983 4.9 -0.8 6.4 n.a. n.a.
Suriname 2002-2008 6.5 0.7 4.1 n.a. n.a.
Uruguay 2004-2011 6.2 -2.1 - n.a. n.a.
Notes:
1. yes - the episode of growth acceleration is considered in the study
2. no - the country is included in the analysis, but the episode of growth acceleration is not considered in the study
3. n.a - the country is not considered in the sample
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2.5.1. Variables and Empirical Results
The dependent variable for the empirical analysis of what causes growth accelerations
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 around the time of the growth acceleration (0
otherwise). Those countries with no episodes of growth acceleration, but for which data
are available, are also included (with a value of 0).
Hausmann et al. [2005] consider that growth accelerations can be triggered by favourable
external conditions, changes in the underlying political balance, and changes in eco-
nomic policies. The authors therefore use measures of external shocks (captured by
terms of trade), political changes (represented by changes in the Polity index), and
economic reforms measured by the Sachs and Warner index. In this analysis, as mea-
sures of external shocks, I use changes in terms of trade (difference between trade of
trade this period from the previous period) and, considering that most of these coun-
tries are net-exporters of natural resources, the changes in rents arising from natural
resources.
Two variables are used to measure political change, one is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 in the year when there was a positive change in the Polity Index and in the
two following years (0 otherwise), the second is a dummy that measures the negative
changes in the Polity Index estimated in a similar way. The data availability of the
Sachs and Warner index for Latin America and the Caribbean is limited, so this has
been replaced by changes in government expenditure. Government expenditure can
be seen as an internal economic policy and several studies have shown that too large
governments hurt economic growth in a country.
Table 2.8 shows the results of this analysis. It uses a probit regression considering the
nature of the dependent variable (dummy). Column (a) shows the regression of growth-
accelerating periods on changes in terms of trade, positive changes in the Polity index
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Table 2.8.: Probit for Growth Accelerations
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Growth Acceleration episodes
(a) (b) (c) (d)
External Shocks
Changes in Terms of trade .021*** .021***
(008) (008)
Changes in natural .633*** .612***
resouces rents (.233) (.229)
Political Changes
Positive changes in Polity -6.39 -4.88
(10689) (148.84)
Negative changes in Polity -1.25* -.455*
(.733) (.267)
Economic Policies
Changes in Gov. Expenditure -1.69* -2.15* -.676 -.695
(1.01) (1.149) (.614) (.616)
constant -2.83*** -2.75*** -1.99*** -1.95***
(.477) (.486) (.334) (.331)
n 599 599 893 893
T 23 23 23 23
log likelihood -136.56 -136.32 -241.06 -243.43
Wald χ2 9.87** 11.41** 8.74** 11.27**
Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses.
2. *,**,*** significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively
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and changes in government expenditure. Changes in terms of trade and in government
expenditure are both statistically significant: a favourable change in terms of trade
increases the probability of experiencing a growth acceleration, while an increase (pos-
itive change) in government expenditure decreases this probability. Positive changes in
the Polity index are not statistically significant.
Column (b) shows the results for the same regression, but using negative changes in
Polity index as a measure for political changes (i.e. countries becoming more auto-
cratic). The results confirm those ones of column (a), in particular an increase in terms
of trade increases the probability of a growth acceleration episode, while an increase
in government expenditure decreases this probability. However, in this case, negative
changes in the Polity index decreases the probability of having one of these episodes
and this coefficient is statistically significant.
Columns (c) and (d) use changes in natural resource rents instead of terms of trade to
measure external shocks. The reason for this is that most of the growth accelerations
happen around episodes of commodity booms, considering that a large proportion of
trade of Latin American and Caribbean countries is given by commodity exports, this
helps to explain the effects of terms of trade on accelerating growth. The results
confirm the previous findings that external shocks increase the probability of growth
accelerating episodes. Political changes show a similar result too: negative changes
have a negative and statistically significant effect, while positive changes don’t.
These results are in line with the previous findings that institutions and natural re-
sources do play a fundamental role in explaining growth in the region. The results in
this section offer further support to the discussion that political instability has nega-
tively affected Latin American and Caribbean growth: shifts towards more autocratic
regimes reduce the probability of experiencing growth accelerations in the countries of
the region. These results suggest the need to research on how institutions are created
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in first place in order to understand the origins of the political instability that affects
growth in the region.
2.6. Final Remarks to Chapter 2
The discouraging growth of Latin America and the Caribbean in the last decades mo-
tivates the research of the determinants of growth in the region. Economic growth
is a complex process and finding real sources of exogeneity (which variables are more
fundamental) that explain this process is an arduous task. This chapter argues that
institutions are crucial for explaining growth in the region.
The qualitative analysis in section 2.2 shows that Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries with low initial levels of democracy had, in average, a lower average growth after-
wards. This contrasts with the findings in Glaeser et al. [2004] that low human capital
is a better predictor of poor growth than poor institutions, and therefore human capital
is the fundamental determinant of growth. An interesting outcome of this analysis is
that the high political instability in Latin America and the Caribbean has harmed the
economic growth in the region. The case of Dominican Republic and Haiti provides us
with a good example of this. Dominican Republic has one of the highest growth rates
in 1960-2010, while Haiti exhibits the worst performance in the region. A key difference
between the two countries is the high political instability in Haiti that contrasts with
the stable political environment in Dominican Republic.
The empirical analysis in Section 2.4 supports these findings. A Barro-regression used
to explain long-run economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean shows that
fundamental variables such as institutions and natural resources are key determinants
of growth in the region. Once fundamental variables are added to the regression, the
variable for human capital (years of schooling) loses statistical significance.
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The high volatility in growth rates has driven the attention to the analysis of what
causes episodes of rapid growth (growth accelerations). The analysis of Section 2.3
finds 27 of these episodes in Latin American and the Caribbean which reflect the
periods of sustained growth highlighted in Section 2.1. The probability of observing
these episodes increases with changes in terms of trade which, for the region, are mainly
due to changes in commodity prices. Commodities make up 60% of the region’s exports
and periods of prosperous growth in Latin America coincided with booming prices of
natural resources. For instance, the 2000s commodity boom was for the region the
longest lasting and most comprehensive, in terms of number of commodities affected
and countries benefiting. Around half the increase in the value of Latin American
exports in the 2000s was a result of commodity price rises [Sinnot et al., 2010]. However,
due to the lack of diversification of the production structure, these countries tend to
experience long periods of stagnation (and even collapses) once the terms of trade
become less favourable.
It is not surprising that while a commodity boom (changes in terms of trade or in
resource rents) increases the probability of rapid growth episode, natural resource rents
decreases long-run growth. Changes in the price of commodities are closely related to
external shocks that, in countries with a heavy concentration on commodity exports,
increase growth volatility which in turn decreases growth (see Ramey and Ramey [1995];
Easterly et al. [2000] for the effects of volatility on growth, and Sachs and Warner
[2001]; Auty [1993, 2001]; Birdsall et al. [2001]; Ortega and de Gregorio [2007] for
the consequences of resource-specialisation on economic performance). These problems
can be obviated by a change in the productive structure, from commodity-based to a
more diversified economy, but this requires effective policies supported by good-quality
institutions. Latin American and Caribbean countries however, lack good governance
and political stability which may affect how these rents are managed and therefore
increase corruption and rent-seeking behaviours.
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The exact mechanisms through which natural resources and institutions affect devel-
opment are still subject of debate in literature and the rest of this thesis contributes
to this debate. The economic history of Latin America and the Caribbean empha-
sises the crucial role of natural resources since the discovery and colonisation of these
territories. Differences in initial conditioning sets of a country can have a strong im-
pact on a country’s trajectory and the exploitation of the region’s natural resources
has influenced policies and institutions since early times. Several authors emphasise
the importance of considering historical events in order to understand the fundamental
determinants of development [see Easterly and Levine, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Kenny and Williams, 2001]. The next two chapters aim to shed light on the main
unanswered question of this chapter is how and why good institutions arise.
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America and the Caribbean
According to the results from the previous chapter, it would appear that institutions
play a key role in explaining the economic growth of Latin America and the Caribbean
and also that political instability harms growth and reduces the probability of observing
episodes of growth acceleration.
The literature on institutions has seen a significant revival in recent years and has made
good attempts to answer some basic questions, particularly relevant to the analysis of
development issues, such as what is the origin of current institutions in developing
countries? Why only few countries have been able to set good institutions and how can
we explain the persistence of bad institutions in these countries? How do institutions
change with changes in the political and economic environment?
In order to fully understand what is affecting economic growth, we need to answer
these questions. We have said that institutions are endogenous to growth, and although
statistical methods that deal with endogeneity show that institutions are a fundamental
cause, we do not know why Latin American countries adopted or inherited specific
institutional settings. We need to find a source of exogeneity to explain what originates
institutions in first place.
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One of the main characteristics of institutions is their persistence over time. As result,
in a series of influential and to an extent, convergent works, various scholars argue that
problems in former colonies are deeply rooted in colonial times and in the institutional
setting that was established during this period. There are, in effect, two hypotheses in
this literature. The first is that the character of the independence institutions depends
on a variety of sometimes disputed aspects of the colonial experience. The second is
that, given institutional persistence, the quality of current institutions depends on their
character at the time of independence. The evidence in support of these hypotheses
typically comes from the analysis of a wide range of countries. In this chapter, I
examine to what extent these hypotheses regarding the colonial experience hold for
Latin American countries in particular (Section 3.2).
Although institutions in general tend to be highly persistent, by comparing the econo-
metric results of previous literature that uses a world-wide cross country sample with
an analysis for only Latin American countries, Section 3.3.3 shows that the correlation
between early and current institutions1 in Latin America is less strong that hypoth-
esised in literature. This result is perhaps not so surprising: most Latin American
countries obtained independence in the first half of the 19th century while most other
colonies only became independent in the second half of the 20th century. The greater
passage of time in Latin America has given, in effect, greater scope for non colonial
factors to influence the character of current institutions.
This does not mean that the colonial experience is unimportant for the region and I
examine its possible influence. The main colonial aspects analysed by this literature
are (i) identity of the coloniser power, (ii) size of European settlements during the
colonial period, (iii) native population, (iv) mineral and agricultural resources. In
1Early institutions are the institutions set immediately after independence (the first 10 years after
a country’s independence was declared and recognised). Current institutions are institutions in
contemporary times, generally the period 2000-2010.
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Section 3.3.4, I consider whether these colonial aspects appear to have influenced the
quality of institutions at the time of independence and whether they appear to have
had an enduring influence in the sense that they continue to explain the character of
current institutions.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 offers an review of the literature on
how institutions have been used to explain growth. Section 3.2 describes the possible
colonial origins of institutions in Latin America and set four hypotheses on how colonial
aspects may affect institutions. These hypotheses are empirically tested in section 3.3.4.
Section 3.4 summarises and concludes.
3.1. An Overview of the Literature on Institutions
Recent years have seen a remarkable revival in the study of the role of institutions
on economic development. The roots of this literature can be found in the works
of Oliver Williamson [1981] and Douglass North [1990]2. This literature highlights
that institutions matter because rules are essential to make social interaction possible,
therefore the facilitating role of institutions is often described in terms of transaction
costs [North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1990; Greif, 1993, 1997]. Institutions in this
view are basically norms or rules that foster exchange by the enforcement of contracts
designed to support market development and transactions, and protect property rights
from a potential authoritarian government [Shirley, 2008]. In absence of rules, the costs
of organising economic activities may be so high that coordination and cooperation may
be precluded.
2That institutions matter for economic performance is an old and inherently plausible position, how-
ever during the first half of the 20th century, as the neoclassical theory progressed, institutional
phenomena received less attention and played almost no role in the early neo-classical models. That
is why this literature is widely know as the New Institutional Economics.
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This literature offers a large body of historical and cross-country empirical evidence that
institutions matter for economic outcomes. The historical narratives implemented have
produced appealing results for the understanding of long-run socio-economic develop-
ment. Econometric studies on contemporary cross-sections show that a great bundle
of institutional factors have a large influence on a large set of economic outcomes. The
institutions considered by both these strands of literature are those that enforce prop-
erty rights, reduce transaction costs and promote formal contracts and business rules.
These are known as good institutions.
Historical narratives attempt to explore the role of history in institutional emergence,
perpetuation and change [Greif, 1997]. This literature evidences both virtuous and
vicious mechanisms on how institutions affect economic development. On one hand,
good institutions have been linked to the East Asian miracle between 1960s and early
1990s. Ahrens [2002] and Gonzalez and Mendoza [2002] argue that strong governments
and well-functioning public institutions are basic to explain the rapid growth of these
economies. On the other hand, some scholars list a series of explanations for the
inability of most African and Latin American countries to set up institutions that
enhance growth and progress [Shirley, 2008]. The most common explanation invoked
by this literature lies on the legacy inherited from colonial rules [North, 1990; Djankov
et al., 2002; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997].
A second strand of this literature has implemented econometric estimations on cross-
country analyses including measures of institutional quality [La Porta et al., 1997,
1998, 1999] or another factors inherited from colonial legacies [Acemoglu et al., 2001,
2002]. Most of these studies try to assess to what extent various measures of institutions
explain the differences in economic performance across countries by adding institutional
measures as regressors in Barro-type regressions and use instrumental variable analyses
to deal with endogeneity problems.
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Although, this literature has offered good insights in the role of institutions on economic
performance, its approach is not free of criticisms. The definition of good institutions
as solving the issue of transaction costs is criticised as being too narrow and it has been
accused of not recognising the importance of understanding power dynamics and bu-
reaucratic costs in organisations and therefore do not addressing the role of politics and
governments. This gave rise to a more comprehensive analysis that includes political
institutions. Economic institutions are largely politically determined and ultimately
reflect choices made by powerful groups in the society [Sen, 2013]. Therefore, the study
of which institutions matter for growth needs to include more political features in or-
der to understand why, in certain contexts, growth-enhancing institutions emerge and
why certain institutions that harm growth – growth impeding institutions – are highly
persistent, especially in developing countries.
The first attempt to combine economic and political analyses to account for the deter-
minants of economic growth studied the effect of political regimes on growth. According
to Rodrik [1997] there are very few questions in social sciences more fundamental than
the relationship between political regimes and economic prosperity. Do dictatorships
or democracies better promote economic growth? The answers to this question vary.
For instance, Galenson [1959]; Huntington [1968]; Rao [1985] argue that dictatorships
are more effective than democracies in mobilising resources for investment. This is
supported by Haggard [1990] who argues that dictatorships force firms to invest and
export and therefore, avoid unproductive uses of resources. Hewlett [1980] finds evi-
dence that the military regime in Brazil in 1960s prevented social unrest and stabilised
the economy. Typically the advocators of the conflict school used the cases of some East
Asian countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan, as evidence that “good-for-growth”
dictatorships could create the right conditions for growth [Feng, 2005].
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However, these views have been strongly contrasted by authors that argue that eco-
nomic and political freedoms foster economic growth [Sen, 2000], and that only democ-
racies produce long-lasting economic successes [Olson, 2000]. In his seminal contribu-
tion, Przeworski et al. [2000] examine the experience of 135 countries from 1950 to 1990
and provide a insightful investigation on the role of democracy on development. The
main conclusions emphasise that the per capita income do grow faster in democracies
(independently of the level of income) however, the level of a country’s wealth is crucial
for the survival of democracy; that is, even when a democracy is settled, a return to
autocratic regimes is not unlikely in poor countries.
Another aspect of the political institutions considered by this literature is the distri-
bution of power. Power is considered crucial for institutional analysis because it can
obstruct rules that are against their interest of those holding it. Knight [1992]; Moe
[2005]; Khan [2010] consider institutions as a distributional instrument that allocates
resources based on the pre-existing distribution of power in the society and contrast
this to the coordination role given in more economic contexts. These authors argue
that, although institutions are used as coordination devices to solve collective action
and facilitate transaction in the economy, the main role of institutions is to shape
distributional outcomes. Individuals and groups enter into the society with different
resource endowments, and these differences ensure that the subsequent allocation have
unequal implications that favour those with initial greater power
Khan [2010] explains the relationship between distribution of power and institutions.
The distribution of power is based on income and wealth and on the capacity of power-
ful groups to organise themselves. This drives the creation of institutions that sustain
a distribution of benefits for different classes and groups in line with their relative
power and therefore sustain the holding power distribution. If a particular institution
imposes a distribution of benefits that is not accepted by the holding power groups,
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these will oppose to the introduction or enforcement of this institution, even if this is
growth-enhancing. In fact, Knight [1992] explains that institutions may not be socially
efficient. The efficiency of institutions also depend on the distribution of power. When
power is concentrated on the hands of few, it is likely that growth impeding institutions
are created. In order to achieve self-gain, authors may destroy growth enhancing in-
stitutions that promote coordination, and replace them with institutions that reduce
coordination and collective benefits.
The main problem with this literature, is the failure to explain the origins of the
initial distribution of power. In order to understand the origins of Latin American
institutions, we need to learn what affected initial power distribution. The challenge
is thus to identify how collective actors are likely to take possession of the resources
which allow them a greater slice of the power distribution.
The criticisms to the econometric analysis on the role of institutions, come mainly
from the endogeneity issues discussed in the previous chapter and the limitations of
the econometric techniques in dealing with endogenous regressors [for an extent dis-
cussion on the limitations of econometric techniques in the analysis of institutions see
Pande and Udry, 2005]. Despite the criticisms, the empirical analysis has uncovered
important correlations across countries between growth and the nature and quality of
a core set of economic, political and social institutions. With the use of both historical
narratives and econometric analysis, this literature has emphasised that problems in
former colonies are deeply rooted in colonial times and in the institutional setting that
was established during this period [David, 1994; Greif, 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2001,
2002; Banerjee and Iyer, 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2008; Baker et al., 2008;
Easterly and Levine, 2012]. The rest of this chapter analyses the colonial origins of
Latin American and Caribbean institutions on the light of this literature.
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3.2. Do Latin American and Caribbean Institutions have
Colonial Origins?
In order to find what originates institutions, we may need to look back into past events.
Colonialism is one of the single most salient facts in the modern era. Several studies
argue that the institutions established during the colonial period exhibited over-time
effects through both their own persistence and the actors and processes that they
brought into being. For this reason, institutions should have colonial origins.
This literature is based on two hypotheses. One is that a series of colonial aspects
shaped the character of those institutions created after the independence. The second
one is that the current institutions strongly reflect early ones due to institutional per-
sistence. This section analyses how these theories apply to the case of Latin America
and the Caribbean.
One of the problems with the hypothesis that current institutions depend on early ones
is that it does not take into account the differences in decolonisation times in former
colonies. One of the outstanding features of Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin
America is their early independence. Table 3.1 shows that the bulk of these countries
acquired their independence in early nineteenth century; this is almost a century before
the main decolonisation process of 1960s in the rest of the colonial world.
Even when institutions tend to be highly persistent, if we consider only Latin America
(instead of all former colonies in the world) the effects of early institutions on current
ones may differ. Figure 3.1 plots the correlation between early and current institu-
tions in early independent countries in Latin America. Sub-figure (a) uses an index of
democracy [from Vanhanen, 2000], while sub-figure (b) uses the political constraints
index [from Henisz, 2010]. Both graphs show a weak correlation between early and
current Latin American institutions (the correlation coefficients are 0.15 and −0.18,
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Table 3.1.: Independence of Latin America and the Caribbean
Period of Independence
Independence Early Late Overseas territories
from ( before1830) (after 1960) (no independent)
Spain/ Argentina
Portugal Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cubaa
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Puerto Rico
Uruguay
Venezuela
France Haiti French Guiana
Guadeloupe
Martinique
St. Martin
St. Barthe´lemy
Netherlands Netherlands Antillesb Bonaire
Aruba Sint Eustatius
Curacao Saba
Sint Maarten
Suriname
Britain Antigua & Barbuda Anguilla
Bahamas British Virgin Islands
Barbados Cayman Islands
Belize Monserrat
Dominica Turks and Caicos Is.
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Vincent and the Gren.
Trinidad and Tobago
Notes: a. Cuba obtained its independence in 1902
b. Netherlands Antilles dissolved in 2010. After dissolution, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius
and Saba became special municipalities of the Netherlands, while Curacao and
Sint Maarten became constituent countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
along the lines of Aruba, which separated from the Netherlands Antilles in 1986.
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respectively). Therefore, we cannot assume for Latin America that colonial factors
affect current institutions in the same way they affected early ones (at the time of
independence).
Figure 3.1.: Current vs Early Institutions in Latin America
(a) Index of Democracy
(b) Political Constraints
The most recurrent colonial factors consider to have shaped institutions in former
colonies are: coloniser identity, European settlements, native population, and natural
resources. In order to analyse the effects of these on institutions, this chapter proposes
four hypotheses that can be described as:
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Hypothesis 1. British did better
The main European countries active in colonisation processes were Spain and Portugal
in the first period, followed by France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The role
of the coloniser identity is one of the most discussed sources of institutions. Most of
these studies conclude that British did better. La Porta et al. [1998, 1999] argue that
former British colonies have better institutions due to the inheritance of common law
legal systems. The authors see legal systems as indicators of the relative power of the
State vis-a´-vis property owners. While common law developed in England as a defence
of Parliament and property owners against the attempts by the sovereign to regulate
and expropriate them; civil law developed more as an instrument used by the sovereign
for State building and controlling economic life.
The supremacy of British legacy has also been related to tax policy [Thirsk, 1997] labour
market regulation [Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Botero et al., 2004], contract en-
forcement [Djankov et al., 2003], investments on education and school enrolment [Grier,
1999; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002].
Looking at a simple comparison between institutions in former British and non-British
colonies (Figure 3.2) there seem to be some evidence that British ones had better
institutions. The first hypothesis investigates this.
It is worth of notice that British and non-British colonies differ also for the period of
decolonisation (see Table 3.1). While British territories left their status of colonies only
in the 20th century, Spanish colonies acquired their independence in the first half of the
19th century. In fact, another question that has arisen when attempting to assess the
impact of colonial rule is whether a longer period of colonial rule was better or worse
for economic development. Some studies provide evidence that longer colonial rule is
related to higher economic development within colonised territories, nonetheless, for
the case of Latin America, it is difficult to disentangle the relationship between Britain
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Figure 3.2.: Institutions in British Colonies vs Non-British Colonies
(a) Early Institutions
(b) Current Institutions
colonies and late independence. So to find that former British colonies have better
institutions may also mean that a longer period of colonisation favoured the creation
of better institutions.
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Hypothesis 2. Larger early European settlements were better for institutions
During colonial times, many European colonisers settled the conquered territories. In
their famous contribution, Acemoglu et al. [2001] propose a theory of colonial origins of
institutions based on colonial European settlements. The hypothesis behind this theory
is illustrated in Figure 3.3. According to this theory, Europeans settled and replicated
their institutions (good institutions) in those colonised territories with climate condi-
tions similar to the ones in their home country. These good institutions protect private
property from possible government expropriation. Due to the high persistence of in-
stitutions, highly settled territories still enjoy the inheritance of good institutions. On
the other hand, those territories with no favourable climate conditions for settlement
inherited bad institutions. The institutions set in these territories (the authors call
them extractive) aimed to transfer as much of the colony’s resources to the coloniser,
so they provide neither protection for private property nor checks and balances against
government expropriation.
Figure 3.3.: Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson’s hypothesis
Source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001]
According to this theory, we should observe that large European settlements during
colonial times are related to better early and current institutions in Latin America.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 plots institutions against European settlements in the colonised
territories in 1800. We observed that, unlike the theory hypothesises, it seems to be a
negative relationship between European settlements in 1800 and early institutions in
the region (Figures 3.5a and 3.5b). In the case of current institutions the relationship
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is less marked (Figures 3.6a and 3.6b), but it still seems to be negative3. The second
hypothesis of this study tests the effects of European settlements in the institutional
setting of the area.
Figure 3.4.: Early Institutions and European Settlements
(a) Index of Democracy
(b) Political Constraints
3Section B.2 in Appendix B shows the analysis of the relationship between institutions and European
settlements for various samples, using the same dataset as in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
[2001]
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Figure 3.5.: Current Institutions and European Settlements
(a) Rule of Law
(b) Political Stability
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Hypothesis 3. Territories with larger native populations inherited bad institutions
While coloniser identity and European settlements focus on the coloniser power, some
features of the colonised territories have also been considered. Some of these territories
were already inhabited at the time of the first contact with Europeans and how the
organisation of pre-colonial societies may have also played a role in the further institu-
tional setting created by the colonisers. In general, large native populations have been
related to poor institutional settings and lower levels of development [Acemoglu et al.,
2002; Baker et al., 2008; Mahoney, 2010].
Mahoney [2010] offers an interesting discussion on the negative impact of native pop-
ulations on the quality of current institutions. An implicit assumption in Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson’s works, is that all European institutions were good. Mahoney
disagrees with this view and distinguishes European colonisers in mercantilists and
liberal. During the colonial period, European institutions were mostly based on mer-
cantilist principles. However, this was also the period when liberalism started as major
doctrine and intellectual endeavour in Europe and some countries approached this doc-
trine earlier than others. Mahoney argues that these differences impacted the type of
institutions that colonisers set in their colonies. Mercantilist coloniser powers settled
and implanted their institutions in territories with large populations where they could
find possibilities for labour exploitation. The institutions that they implanted were bad
for economic development and this is reflected in the post-colonial levels of development.
On the other hand, more liberal colonisers preferred less complex societies, where they
sought possibilities for capitalist accumulation (without the problem of dealing with
local populations). These institutions promoted post-colonial development.
According to Mahoney, British colonisers were driven by more liberal principles than
the rest of European crowns. However, the Spanish change from the Habsburg dynasty
(that ended in 1700 with the death of the King Charles II) to the rise of the Bourbon
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Figure 3.6.: Coloniser’s Institutional Background and Development
(a) Mercantilist colonial power
(b) Liberal colonial power
Source: Mahoney, 2010 p. 255
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monarchy, had large consequences on Spanish-America. Specifically, Mahoney argues
that Bourbon monarchy established more liberal institutions. So, in the second part
of the colonial period Spanish colonisers shift their attention towards those territories
with smaller populations in Spanish America.
Mahoney’s theory is depicted in Figure 3.6. Territories with large pre-colonial popula-
tions tended to attract the attention of the Habsburg monarchy, but they were largely
neglected by the Bourbon system, the institutions are a result of mercantilist coloniser
powers and are related to lower levels of current development. In the case that a
territory was not relevant for Habsburg, but becomes a centre of economic activity
during the Bourbon monarchy (mainly areas with no complex pre-colonial societies), it
inherited only liberal institutions that bring high levels of post-colonial development.
Finally, if a territory was central for the Habsburg and the Bourbon monarchy, this
inherited both institutions, reaching an intermediate level of development (this is the
case of Mexico).
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 plot the population density of the territory in 1500 against early
and current institutions respectively. These figures show a weak (positive) correlation
between institutions and native populations. This does not support Mahoney’s theory
for which we should observe a negative correlation between institutions and pre-colonial
populations. Hypothesis 3 investigates this.
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Figure 3.7.: Early Institutions and Pre-colonial populations
(a) Index of Democracy
(b) Political Constraints
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Figure 3.8.: Current Institutions and Pre-colonial populations
(a) Rule of Law
(b) Political Stability
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Hypothesis 4. Natural resources had a negative effect on institutions
One thing that we should take into account when explaining the colonial heritage of
Latin America is that the exploration and further colonisation of these territories was
driven by the search of mineral wealth first and profitable cash-crops after. The search
for sources of gold and silver carried the Spaniards far and wide across the Americas,
contributing much to the amazing rapidity to which they explored and settled their
portion of the continent: on the promise of gold Spaniards settled the Caribbean;
finding little in the islands, they moved to the Isthmus, then to New Spain (Mexico),
then to Peru.
The presence of mineral resources was in fact the key determinant of the level of coloni-
sation, at least in a first phase. Mexico, Peru and Bolivia (where large deposits of
silver were found) were initially the crucial centres of the colonial power. Nonetheless,
following the increase of demand of tropical crops in Europe, agriculture plantation for
export became very profitable. In fact, it was in the context of plantation agriculture
and sugar that the Brazilian colonial society was formed and sugar production emerges
in the Caribbean as an alternative to the rapidly depleted mining industry.
The role of colonial mining and cash-crop production have been largely neglected in
economics, but it has been subject of debate for several economic historians and other
social scientists. While in first instance, these studies were mainly focused on the effects
that colonial mining had on the European economies (e.g. European inflation in the
sixteenth century); further studies have focused on the impact of these resources on
the economic development of former colonies [Tandeter et al., 2005]. Based on these
studies, Hypothesis four considers the role of natural resources on the institutional
setting of these countries.
Different natural resources (mining or plantation agriculture) required different ways
of organisation and this reflected in how labour was structured and land was divided.
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Mineral resources were found in areas with large native populations (such as Aztecs
in Mexico and Incas in Peru), but when areas were less populated American natives
were moved into the place under different systems (the case of the mine of Potosi
in Bolivia). Plantation agriculture was mainly supported by the import of African
slaves. The discovery of gold or silver in a territory translated into several direct state
interventions in favour of the mining sector. On the same way, cash-crop production
such as sugar (but also coffee and cocoa) are most efficiently produced on large estates4
and require a high initial investment.
The institutions created were thus used to systematically extract surplus from indige-
nous and African slaves, even if this labour force (indigenous or Africans) was prevented
from partaking in the benefits and possibilities from that economic wealth. Further-
more, the policies adopted during the colonial period were the instruments through
which economic and political actors were built. The resource allocation that arises
from this facilitates the creations of different endowed and motivated groups that could
steer the mode of accumulation within the society as a whole. Landowning elite tends to
develop coercive labour market institutions such as serfdom, slavery or permanent debt
peonage [Domar, 1970; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002]. The great wealthy mer-
chants were born out of trade restrictions and monopolistic structures. They were often
tied via investment to large estate owners, who arose in response to colonial institutions
regulating the control of land and labour. This merchant-landed elite trapped capital,
stifled investment and entrepreneurial activity, and thus blocked development.
Figure 3.9 shows that in average, those Latin American and Caribbean countries that
did not exploit mineral resources during the colonial times perform better in both
early and current institutions. The relationship between the exploitation of cash-crops
and institutions is shown in Figure 3.10. Those areas with more suitable lands for the
4Scale-neutral food crops such as wheat, rice and maize are historically produced on modes size plots
[Kawagoe et al., 1985]
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production of sugar are correlated with worse early and current institutions (correlation
ratio equal to -0.06 and -0.23 respectively).
Figure 3.9.: Institutions and Minerals
(a) Early Institutions
(b) Current Institutions
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Figure 3.10.: Institutions and Cash-Crops
(a) Early Institutions
(b) Current Institutions
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3.3. Empirical Analysis
This section introduces an empirical analysis of how colonial origins affect institutions
in Latin America. First, it investigates the relationship between current and early
institutions, and then tests the four hypotheses introduced in the previous section for
a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries.
The analysis is based on a cross-country data set for up to 31 countries in the region.
The data sources are summarised in Appendix B. The dependent variable is a measure
of political institutions. There are several datasets offering measures of institutions.
Next section describes the data sets used in this analysis.
3.3.1. A Description of the Measures of Institutions
Four different data sets are used to measure political institutions in this analysis. One
is the index of democracy from Polyarchy data set which covers 187 countries over
the period 1810-2000 created by Vanhanen [2000]. A second data set is the Political
constraint index by Henisz [2010] which aims to identify underlying political structures
and measure their ability to support credible policy commitments. It covers 226 present
and historical countries from 1800 to 2007. The third data set is the Polity IV Project
which offer measures for democracy, autocracy and constraints on the executive power
[Gurr, 1999]. This covers the period 1800-2011. Finally, as measure of current political
institutions this study uses the Rule of Law and Political Stability from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators [Kaufmann et al., 2009] mainly because this database offers a
larger number of observations for current institutions than the previous ones.
The Index of Democracy from the Polyarchy dataset [Vanhanen, 2000] is based on two
dimensions competition and participation which the author addresses as the “two basic
indicators of democratisation”. Competition is defined as “the percentage share of the
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smaller parties and independent of the votes cast in parliamentary elections, or of the
seats in parliament”, while Participation is “the percentage of the adult population
that voted in elections”. These two measures are used for calculating an aggregated
index of democratisation.
The Political Constraint Index [Henisz, 2010] is an endeavour to measure political
constraints. This is not an index of democracy and this index does not aim to provide
a measure of the political regime. The index uses quantitative data on the number
of independent branches of administrative government with veto power, over policy
change, and the distribution of preferences within those veto players. The dataset
contains around 90 variables that measure various features of the legislative, executive
and judicial branches of government. The data are analysed in a simple spatial model of
political interaction to assess the feasibility with which any one actor (eg. the executive
or a chamber of the legislature) is constrained their choice of future policies. The results
range from 0 (no checks and balances) to 1 (extensive checks and balances).
The Polity IV Project by Gurr [1999] focuses on “concomitant qualities of democratic
and autocratic authority in governing institutions”. The polity scheme consists of six
component measures that refer to key qualities of executive recruitment, executive con-
straints, and political participation. These components are aggregated into two com-
posite indicators, Democracy and Autocracy. Democracy is conceived as an “outcome
of three essential and interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and
procedures through which citizens can express effective preference about alternative
policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalised constraints on the ex-
ercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in
their daily lives and in acts of political participation” [Marshall et al., 2014]. Autocracy
on the other hand is defined “in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political
characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive
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political participation” [Marshall et al., 2014]. Finally, constraints on the executive,
refer to “the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of
chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities”. Democracy and Autocracy both
take values from 0 to 10 while Constraints on the Executive ranges between 1 and 7.
All these variables have been normalised to vary between 0 and 1.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are composite governance indicators based on
32 underlying data sources for 215 countries over the period 1996-2012. Two indicators
are used in this study. Rule of Law “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence” while Political Stability “measures perceptions of the
likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional
or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism” [Kaufmann
et al., 2009].
3.3.2. Limitations of the Quantitative Measures of Political Institutions
There are no few criticisms to the attempts to quantitatively measure political institu-
tions, and in particular the degree of democracy. All the measures used in this thesis
have been contested in a way or another. In fact, all political indicators have been
challenged for the way they define and measure political concepts. The main addressed
criticisms are grounded in issues related to conceptualisation (how democracy is de-
fined), measurement, and aggregation [Rydland et al., 2007; Gutie´rrez Sanin, 2011;
Coppedge et al., 2011].
What is the notion of democracy that underlies existing measures? There are some core
definitional elements in the definitions used for democracy but the debate is still open.
Some conceptions of democracy are more encompassing than others considered more
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minimal [Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Coppedge et al., 2011]. Both approaches have
their limitations. Too many attributes may limit the analytical usefulness of the index
but minimalist approaches could omit attributes that are generally considered to be
intrinsic to the concept of democracy [Rydland et al., 2007]. Polity IV and Polyarchy
index both fall in the latter approach. For example, Polity IV does not include universal
suffrage as an attribute of democracy [Munck and Verkuilen, 2002] and both Polity IV
and Polyarchy index do not consider whether elections are free and fair [Rydland et al.,
2007]. Gutie´rrez Sanin [2011] observes that there is a good correlation between the
quantity of missing data and GDP per capita; data will be scarcer, and poorer, relative
to contexts for which it is more needed.
The components that make up a definition of democracy are in general unobservable
variables. Several indices are based on indicators that are, at best, poor approximations
of the underlying concepts they attempt to measure [Rydland et al., 2007]. Mistakes in
the way these concepts are coded can create serious problems related to measurement.
For instance, although Vanhanen argues in favour of using objective indicators for
competition and participation to measure the main attributes of its index of democracy,
Hadenius and Teorell [2005] find several flaws in the measures used for competition and
participation. Furthermore, miscoding based on limited knowledge of cases may affect
the validity of these indices [Bowman et al., 2005]. In addition, if the availability of
sources is biased and for instance, sources are more reliable for some countries than for
others, the indices may not be directly comparable[Bollen and Paxton, 2000].
Considering that democracy is a multi-faced concept, all the considered indices have to
deal with the aggregation problem. Existing measures of political institutions frequently
fail to offer any justification for their aggregation procedure or they do not provide
theoretical justification for the weighting scheme [Munck and Verkuilen, 2002].
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Alternative aggregation rules can produce markedly different scores on the index. In
order for any aggregation scheme to be successful, rules must be clear and must reflect
an accepted definition of democracy. All current indices of democracy have some prob-
lems with their aggregation procedure. For instance, Coppedge et al. [2011] argues that
it is not clear how the Polity Index codes its components in particular instances, or how
the stated aggregation principles lead to an overall score for a given country or year.
However, an arguably strength of the Polity index is that its components are displayed
in a disaggregated fashion, country by country, so these can be re-processed with other
methods of aggregation if needed [Hadenius and Teorell, 2005]. The Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators have taken more seriously the problem of setting weights and these are
the estimated parameters of a statistical model, in which each of the observed indicators
of governance is taken to be a linear function of an unobserved true governance measure
with common parameters across countries for each indicator [Kaufmann et al., 2009;
Ravallion, 2012]. There are no many studies on the comparability and data quality of
the Political Constraint index, however considering that the index measures political
characteristics (i.e. number of independent branches of government, veto power over
policy change, party composition of the executive and legislative branches, preference
heterogeneity within each legislative) it can be subjected to similar criticisms.
3.3.3. Early and Current Institutions
It is often assumed that institutions for former colonies at the time of independence are
strongly correlated with current ones. Empirical studies on large cross-country data
sets show that institutions are highly persistent. These studies are based on regressions
such as the one described by Equation 3.1. This equation considers current institutions
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as a function of early ones.
Current Institutionsi = β1 + β2Early Institutionsi +  (3.1)
Table 3.2 shows the results of regressing current institutions on early ones in Latin
America but also in a larger data-set of all former colonies in the world (for which
data is available). Panel A uses the Index of Democracy (from Vanhanen [2000] and
the Political Constraints Index (from Henisz [2010]). Panel B shows the results for the
measures of democracy, autocracy and constraints on the executive from the Polity IV
Project. All these data sets confirm the initial hypothesis: while there is statistical
evidence that current and early institutions are correlated if we consider a sample
of all former colonies, we cannot assume the same for institutions in Latin America.
The regressions show that the coefficients for early institutions are not statistically
significant in any of the specifications.
Therefore, even if institutions are highly persistent, the hypothesis that early institu-
tions cause current ones does not hold in the case of Latin America.
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3.3.4. Colonial Origins of Institutions
What follows tests the four hypotheses on the colonial origins of institutions in Latin
America described in Section 3.2. Since, as we have just seen, we cannot assume that
Latin American early and current institutions are strongly correlated, this study will
analyse the effects of colonial factors on both, early and current institutions. Equations
(3.2) and (3.3) summarise the econometric analysis to be carried out:
Early Institutionsi = α1 + βColonial Originsi +  (3.2)
Current Institutionsi = α2 + δColonial Originsi + υ (3.3)
These regressions are going to be estimated in a cross-country framework using OLS
estimators with robust standard errors using Democracy and Political constraints from
Vanhanen [2000] and Henisz [2010] respectively. The Polity IV data set is one of the
most comprehensive data sets on measures of political institutions and offer the longest
time-series (1800-2012) however, one of the shortcoming of this data-set is the limited
number of countries for Latin America. While Vanhanen [2000] and Henisz [2010] offer
data for 32 of the countries in the region, the Polity Project database only has 24.
Testing the Hypotheses on Colonial Origins: Independent variables explained
What follows describes the independent variables used to test the hypotheses on colonial
origins of both early and current institutions in Latin America. Appendix B lists the
data sources and definitions.
Hypothesis 1: British did better A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
country was a former British colony (0 otherwise) is used;
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Hypothesis 2: Larger early European settlements were better for institutions
European settlements is a measure of the percentage of Europeans in these coun-
tries in 1800;
Hypothesis 3: Territories with larger native populations inherited bad institutions
Two variables are used. One is the population density in 1500 as a proxy of pre-
colonial native population. The second one is a variable to allow for Mahoney’s
theory on the relevance of the change in the Spanish dynasty from Habsburg to
Bourbon. This variable is equal 1 if the country is considered mercantilist by
Mahoney, 0 if this is liberal. In the case of Spanish colonies, it assumes the value
of 1 if the country was an important centre during the Habsburg dynasty, 0 if this
was a centre during the Bourbon period (this is the case of Argentina, Uruguay,
Paraguay);
Hypothesis 4: Natural resources had a negative effect on institutions Again, two
variables are used. One captures those countries endowed with gold and silver
mines by using a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the country’s
economic activity at the time of the colonial period was based on the exploitation
of either gold or silver and 0 otherwise. The second variable considers those
countries that were specialised in the production of cash-crops. For this purpose
I use a measure of the land suitability for the production of sugar from the FAO
database.
Empirical Results
Table 3.3 shows the results for the test of the hypotheses on early institutions (in
the first 10 years after independence). Panel A shows the results using the index of
democracy from Vanhanen [2000] as dependent variable, and Panel B shows the ones
using political constraints Henisz [2010]. These two are preferred due to the larger
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number of countries for which data is available (in Latin America), nonetheless, the
results using Polity IV Project database are replicated in Table 3.4.
The hypothesis that former British colonies inherited better institutions cannot be
rejected. Regression (a) in Table 3.3 (in both panels) tests hypothesis 1. The coefficient
of the British dummy is positive and statistically significant so we cannot reject this
hypothesis. The result does not change when using Polity IV data in Table 3.4.
Regression (b) tests hypothesis 2. The coefficient for European settlements in 1800
is negative and statistically significant for both measures of early institutions; thus,
contrary to the Acemoglu et al. [2001] argument, there is statistical evidence that larger
Europeans settlements during the colonial period in Latin America and the Caribbean
are correlated with worse institutions (rather than better as argued by the authors).
When using Polity data, the variable for European settlements is still negative, but
loses significant for the case of democracy and autocracy measures (it is still statistically
significant when the dependent variable is constraints on the executive).
Hypothesis 3 is tested by regression (c). The variable for pre-colonial native population
is not statistically significant for the Vanhanen’s index of democracy or for political
constraints (Table 3.3). In the case of Polity, this is statistically significant only in the
case of Autocracy and Constraints on the Executive, but unlike discussed by Mahoney,
the larger native populations seem to be related to better institutions. The variable
for mercantilist coloniser is negative and statistically significant. The lack of statistical
evidence on the negative effect of native populations on institutions makes me conclude
that we can reject the Mahoney’s theory. In addition, even if “mercantilism” negatively
affects institutions (as argued by Mahoney), this variable is highly correlated with
British colony (Britain was the only liberal country in that period) and this may be
capturing the effect of being a non-British colony.
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Finally, Regression (d) tests hypothesis 4. The coefficient for mineral resources is nega-
tive and statistically significant when explaining most of the measures of early institu-
tions used. The variable for sugar suitability is not statistically significant. Therefore,
we partially fail to reject hypothesis 4: there is statistical evidence that minerals did
play a role in the creation of institutions at the time of independence.
Regressions (e)-(g) in Table 3.3 include those variables that turn to be significant in the
analysis of hypotheses in Regressions (a)-(d). Regression (e) for both measures of early
institutions includes British coloniser dummy, European settlements and the measures
for the initial resource endowment. Former British colonies have in average higher index
of democracy (0.28 higher than non British ones), while for colonial mineral centres
this index is 0.03 lower than in non-mineral centres (Panel A). The index for political
constraints is also in average higher for British colonies than from non British ones.
However, the dummy for mineral centres loses significance in this specification while
sugar suitability turns to be statistically significant and with positive sign. An increase
in the proportion of soil suitable for the production of sugar of 10% is associated to an
increase in the political constraints index of near 0.03 index points (Panel B).
At this point it is important to emphasise few facts about the process of colonisation in
the region. In the early period of colonisation (16th and 17th centuries), the colonisa-
tion process was mainly an Iberian matter. British history of colonisation starts in the
early 18th century but this rule out British access to mineral-rich colonies. Due to this
status of second-comers in the colonisation and exploration of America and the lack
of access to rich-mineral regions, we can observe a high (negative) correlation between
British colonies and colonial mineral centres (ρ = −0.437). Regression (f) considers
this, so it excludes the British dummy but includes European settlements and natu-
ral resources. European settlements are statistically significant and negative related
to both measures of early institutions: an increase of 10% of the size of European
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settlements in 1800, is related to lower levels of both indexes (−0.65 for democracy
and −0.69 for political constraints). Both measures of early institutions are, in aver-
age, lower for colonial mineral centres than for non colonial ones (of −0.10 and −0.13
respectively). Sugar in this case is not statistically (or quantitatively in the case of
democracy) significant. Regression (g) confirms the results of Regression (e) for both
measures of institutions.
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Table 3.3.: Early Institutions
Panel A:
Dependent Variable - Democracy in the first 10 years of independence
Hp1 Hp2 Hp3 Hp4 Controls
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
British .283*** .278*** .279***
colony (.023) (.026) (.024)
European -.801*** -.011 -.651**
Settlements in 1800 (.272) (.140) (.263)
Pre-colonial .028
Native Population (.030)
Mercantilist -.169***
coloniser (.045)
Minerals -.155*** -.027* -.101*** -.028*
(.032) (.015) (.015) (.015)
(log) sugar .002 .014 -.000** .014
suitability (.016) (.010) (.015) (.011)
constant .014 .252*** .220*** .152*** .005 .253*** .003
(.010) (.055) (.035) (.042) (.029) (.061) (.013)
n 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
adj R2 .871 .318 .361 .216 .891 .401 .891
F 151.92*** 8.69*** 7.49*** 11.65*** 47.13*** 10.91*** 60.03***
Panel B:
Dependent Variable - Political Constraints in the first 10 years after independence
Hp1 Hp2 Hp3 Hp4 Controls
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
British .293*** .282*** .286***
colony (.038) (.044) (.043)
European -.873*** -.039 -.689***
Settlements in 1800 (.240) (.096) (.230)
Pre-colonial .044
Native Population (.031)
Mercantilist -.151**
coloniser (.053)
Minerals -.183*** -.052 -.126*** -.053
(.040) (.032) (.037) (.032)
(log) Sugar .014 .027*** .012 .027***
suitability (.022) (.007) (.022) (.007)
constant .027 .280*** .226*** .159*** .015 .266*** .006
(.020) (.057) (.038) (.045) (.044) (.061) (.035)
n 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
adj R2 .697 .281 .258 .222 .751 .375 .750
F 59.21*** 13.21*** 5.09** 10.86*** 66.01*** 9.45*** 82.56***
notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
***, **, *; significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively
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Table 3.5 shows the results of the test of our hypotheses on the quality of more con-
temporary institutions (2000-2010). Panel A shows the results using Rule of Law as
dependent variable, while Political Stability is used in Panel B. Even when consider-
ing current institutions, there is statistical evidence that former British colonies have
better institutions than non-British ones (Regression (a)). In average, former British
colonies have higher measures of rule of law and political stability in the order of 0.15
index points.
Regression (b) shows that while European settlements have a negative effect when
explaining early institutions, there is no evidence of impact on current ones (the coeffi-
cient is not statistically significant in any of the specifications). Pre-colonial populations
also have no statistically significant effect on current institutions (Regression (c)). The
effect of mineral exploitation during the colonial times is still negative for current in-
stitutions, while the variable for sugar suitability has no statistically significant effect
in this equation (Regression (d)). These results hold when including more than one
variable (Regressions (e), (f), and (g)).
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Table 3.5.: Current Institutions
Panel A:
Dependent Variable - Rule of Law (2000-2010)
Hp1 Hp2 Hp3 Hp4 Controls
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
British .155*** .109* .116**
colony (.047) (.064) (.056)
European -.430 -.130 -.261
Settlements in 1800 (.297) (.304) (.314)
Pre-colonial .030
Native Population (.023)
Mercantilist -.166***
coloniser (.048)
Minerals -.147** -.093 -.131** -.097*
(.056) (.062) (.062) (.061)
(log) Sugar -.022 -.018 -.020 -.020
suitability (.022) (.019) (.021) (.019)
constant .460*** .584*** .586*** .571*** .539*** .608 .518***
(.033) (.057) (.036) (.036) (.083) (.061) (.051)
n 41 41 36 41 41 41 41
adj R2 .188 .069 .279 .174 .269 .198 .264
F 10.75*** 2.09 7.19*** 5.85*** 6.14*** 4.43*** 7.90***
Panel B:
Dependent Variable - Political Stability (2000-2010)
Hp1 Hp2 Hp3 Hp4 Controls
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
British .149*** .1017** .101**
colony (.041) (.047) (.042)
European -.314 .009 -.115
Settlements in 1800 (.262) (.236) (.245)
Pre-colonial .014
Native Population (.020)
Mercantilist -.169***
coloniser (.043)
Minerals -.169*** -.127* -.162** -.126**
(.060) (.066) (.065) (.063)
(log) Sugar -.019 -.017 -.018 -.017
suitability (.018) (.01) (.017) (.016)
constant .476 .580*** .614*** .587*** .539*** .604*** .541***
(.029) (.049) (.031) (.027) (.062) (.051) (.035)
n 41 41 36 41 41 41 41
adj R2 .217 .046 .299 .265 .350 .270 .350
F 13.30*** 1.43 8.19*** 6.23*** 5.67*** 4.32** 7.52***
notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
***, **, *; significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively
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3.4. Final Remarks to Chapter 3
This chapter analyses the origins of Latin American institutions. Based on the charac-
teristic of high persistence of institutions, many scholars argue that current institutions
in former colonies reflect the early institutions inherited from the colonial experience.
A crucial finding in this chapter is that, this is not the case for Latin America. The
correlation between early and current institutions in the region is not as strong as the
one observed in large samples containing all former colonies. This can be a surprising
result, but the early decolonisation history of these countries provides a source of ex-
planation. The bulk of Latin American countries became independent in the first half
of the nineteenth century, this is around a century before the rest of the colonies.
To understand what originates institutions in Latin America, the empirical analysis
tests four hypotheses on how colonial history affect both early and current institutions
in the region. The first hypothesis tests whether former British colonies have better
institutions than non-British ones as argued by La Porta et al. [1998, 1999]. Con-
sidering the work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001], the second hypothesis
tests whether territories with large European settlements during the colonial period
inherited better institutions. The third hypothesis investigates the role of pre-colonial
populations on institutions and whether more liberal colonisers help to establish bet-
ter institutions than mercantilists ones (this follows the contribution from Mahoney
[2010]). Finally, Hypothesis 4 considers the historical narratives of how colonial re-
source endowment affected the creation of institutions in Latin America [Engerman
and Sokoloff, 1997] and investigates the effects of the exploitation of minerals (mainly
silver and gold) and cash crops (such as sugar) during colonial times. Considering that
we cannot assume that current and early institutions in the area are correlated, these
hypotheses are tested on measures of both institutions at the time of independence and
contemporary ones.
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The analysis shows that former British colonies seem to have performed better in
terms of institutions. Former British colonies have better institutions around their
independence and in current times. The difficulty with this result is that we cannot
disentangle which specific features of the British Empire is the main cause of this
positive effect. In many aspects, British and Spanish colonisers were very similar,
especially during the first period of colonisation. The British set up monopolies in
order to control the trade with the colonies and, in the case of sugar plantations, they
divided land and organised labour as Spain and Portugal did in continental America
(e.g. by using slavery and other forms a forced labour).
However, there are some aspects that are strictly correlated with the British Empire
that are different to Spanish ones such as law systems, forms of government, and the
length of colonial period. Therefore, once it has been established that some aspects of
the British colonisation still play a positive impact on current institutions, more work
needs to be done in understanding which are the specific factors that matter. The next
chapter considers not only the role of Britain in Latin America as a direct coloniser,
but it also includes an analysis of the indirect ways of British colonial presence in the
region. It does this by introducing more specific variables of the impact of Britain in
Latin America.
A further finding of the analysis in this chapter is that, unlike Acemoglu et al. (but
also Easterly and Levine [2012]), where the results show that European settlements
left behind a good institutional setting, large European settlements during the colonial
period in Latin America are related to poor quality of early institutions. We can
explain this by looking at the reasons why Europeans settled these territories. The
engine of colonisation was the search for minerals and other sources of wealth. Once
these resources were found (or developed as in the case of plantations), Europeans
settled the territory and set up a complex institutional system that did not take into
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account the welfare of the local population and territories but they were oriented to
the benefit of the coloniser crown and few local authorities.
The analysis also rejects the hypothesis based on Mahoney’s work. Pre-colonial popu-
lations have no significant role on the region’s institutions. In addition, the impact of
the coloniser’s institutional background (mercantilist rather than liberal) is difficult to
disentangle from the effect of being a British colony. Britain is assumed to be liberal
during the whole period of colonial rule, while the main difference is in the Spanish
legacy.
The series of important changes occurring in Spanish America in the eighteenth century
is often associated with changes in Spanish dynasty. The perception that Mexico and
Peru formed the centre was still valid, but by the last decades of the century things
were moving quickly in a different direction favouring the Atlantic seaboard. European
demand for tropical crops and even for temperate products (especially hides) increased
substantially in this period. At the same time, ships grew larger and faster so transat-
lantic shipment of bulk products became more viable, and trade routes shifted. Ac-
cording to Mahoney, this is due to the more liberal policies adopted by the Bourbon
monarchy in the Americas and he offers a persuasive discussion on this, however his
argument depends upon the assumption that the Bourbon reforms did usher liberalism.
Fisher [2012] shows that what these reforms really did was to push mercantilism to a
new level of efficiency but without opening up to genuine economic liberalism.
Finally, the exploitation of mineral resources (gold and silver) seem to have a negative
long term impact on institutions. Mineral resources negatively affect early and current
institutions. Mineral resources provide a source of wealth until they are exhausted
generating little incentive to invest more than is strictly necessary for the extraction of
this resource from the land, and once this resource is exhausted the area was generally
abandoned by the coloniser power (e.g. Potosi in Bolivia). This effect is less clear
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when controlling for other variables, but we need to keep in mind potential problems of
correlation among variables. First, some of the possible effects of these resources may
be already caught by other variables. As mentioned, British pursued a later process of
colonisation in Latin American focusing mainly in the Caribbean; therefore, those areas
rich in mineral resources were already under Spanish and, to a less extent, Portuguese
control, which means that the British variable may be also capturing the lack of minerals
in these areas. Moreover, mineral centres were preferred by Europeans for settlements
in the area, therefore, the negative relationship between European settlements and
early institutions may be capturing the effects of mineral exploitation.
In summary, institutions in Latin America show some specific traits that have not been
fully investigated and that cannot easily be accounted for by the dominant arguments
in the literature on the colonial origins of contemporary institutions. Colonial factors
such as the coloniser identity and the resource endowment during colonial times do have
some effects on current institutions, however we cannot consider these institutions as a
pure outcome of the colonial period. In fact, there is no correlation between these and
the institutions inherited from the colonial legacy. In order to understand the origins
of poor institutions in Latin America today and in the recent past, we need to look at
post-colonial events.
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4. The Evolution of Institutions in Latin
America: Colonial and Post-Colonial
Factors
The previous chapter explains how Latin American political institutions at the time
of independence (early institutions) can be traced back to factors in the colonial era:
coloniser identity and resource endowments. It also shows that the character of contem-
porary political institutions in Latin America is typically, and unlike most other regions
of the world, not well explained by their state at the time of independence.
This chapter is concerned with how to explain the evolution of institutions since inde-
pendence. For this purpose, it focuses on three features that are frequently regarded
as distinguishing Latin America in this period and that have been considered to affect
economic development: high levels of political instability, high levels of inequality, and
the dependency on the production of natural resources. Section 4.1 reviews the litera-
ture on how these aspects interact. There is no agreement in literature on the causal
relationship between institutions and inequality. While it is plausible that inequality
plays a part in blocking the adoption of good institutions, the reverse holds as well, so
that poor institutional quality results in higher degree of inequality.
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Section 4.2 proposes an empirical analysis that models the relationship between insti-
tutions and inequality in Latin America. The analysis estimates a two-equation model,
one for institutions and the other one for inequality, in a panel data over the period
1905-2010. These equations are jointly estimated to take into account the possible
simultaneity between institutions and inequality. This relationship is explained using
both colonial and post-colonial factors. The colonial factors are those found relevant for
explaining the origins of institutions in the previous chapter. The post-colonial aspect
are historical events that may have had a role in shaping the evolution of institutions
in the region. A broad literature considers British intervention to be a key factor in
the post-independence development of Latin American countries. This intervention
took place through investments and the expansion of Latin American exports into the
British market, and measures of both British investments and Latin American trade
with Britain are included as explanatory variables. British intervention was generally
linked to the exploitation of natural resources of which Latin American countries were
well-endowed. In fact, the region’s participation to the international market has been
largely based on the exploitation of the primary sector of the economies. This is another
aspect considered by the empirical analysis as possible explanatory variable.
There are three main conclusions from this empirical analysis. First, institutions and
inequality are highly correlated and their relationship is characterised by high persis-
tence which makes difficult to establish clear causal effects. Second, the colonial factors
investigated in the previous chapter as important for institutions, also affect inequality
in Latin America. Finally, British intervention and natural resource discoveries both
have influenced the post-independence evolution of the region’s institutions.
These conclusions are supported by the historical narrative of four Latin American
country-experiences illustrated in Section 4.3. The experiences of Costa Rica and
Uruguay which are considered consolidated democracies in the region, contrast with
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the realities of Peru and Bolivia which history is marked by political instability with
continuous break-downs of democracy help to explain the specific mechanisms of how
these variables interact and influence the evolution of institutions to current times.
Section 4.4 summarises these findings and concludes.
4.1. Beyond Colonial Origins: Literature Review on How
Institutions Evolve
From chapter 2 we know that institutions are a fundamental cause of growth in Latin
America. Chapter 3 shows that, even if there are some colonial aspects that still affect
current institutions, the character of these is not well explained by their state at the
time of independence. The reality is that our knowledge about the complex process
of creation, evolution, and consolidation of institutions is still limited. While colonial
factors are useful for explaining the origins of institutions, we need to consider which
other factors may have influenced the way these institutions evolve.
We need to look at post-independence events to explain the transition from early to
current institutions. Various authors have emphasised the role of British intervention
in the development of newly independent Latin American countries. The previous
chapter shows that British colonial legacy has a positive effect on early and current
institutions in the region. However, the British intervention in the region was not
limited to the colonial period and it extended (through investments and trade) into the
early post-independence period. A more detail analysis of how British capital and Latin
American trade with Britain may help to shed light on the British dummy. Moreover,
Latin American development has been characterised by other distinct features such as
high inequality and dependency on natural resources and these characteristics may also
play a role in explaining what shaped current institutions in Latin America.
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4.1.1. Post-colonial Latin America: British Intervention
Although most of the Latin American countries were Iberian colonies, Britain did show
interest on these territories and this interest developed and expanded after the indepen-
dence wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth century through trade and investments
[Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; Miller, 1993; Brown, 2008]. The growth of industrial
production in Britain makes the Latin American market crucial for British growing tex-
tile exports. While in 1804-1806 only 2% of the British exports went to Latin America,
in the period 1824-26 this number rose to 13% [Miller, 1993]. In the same way, Latin
America was essential to Britain as supplier of food and other raw materials (mainly
silver and gold)1. However, until 1860, the volume of Britain’s trade with Latin Amer-
ica remained relatively low. The 1870s and 1880s saw a sharp increase in trade between
Britain and Latin America, as the region became fully incorporated into the Atlantic
economy [Platt, 1972].
In the late nineteenth century however, the centre of dynamism within the British
economy moved from the manufacturing areas towards the commercial and financial
interests, Latin American governments tapped the London bond markets, the flow of
portfolio capital was followed by direct foreign investment, with Britain leading the
field among the industrial countries [Victor Bulmer-Thomas, 1998].
First, Latin American economies approached the international capital markets in order
to finance independence wars. Once freed from Iberian rule, Latin American coun-
tries rapidly embraced the use of global capital markets to finance their public debt.
Following the high political instability during the post-independence period a wave of
defaults ensued, with all bond issues in default by 1827 [Rippy, 1959]. Most countries
remained in default for decades, and new flows of capital started to circulate only dur-
1After the independence, these countries were free from the obligation to sell their primary products
through Iberian outlets and were able to expand their exports to other markets.
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ing 1850s2. The macroeconomic and financial crisis produced a second wave of defaults
that spread over the region in the 1870s. With the recovery of trade in the 1880s a
new and bigger borrowing boom began. Capital inflows were mostly concentrated in
favour of those countries with new booming trade sectors [della Paolera and Taylor,
2012]. This once again ended with an economic crisis in 1890s (which affected mainly
the greater economies of Brazil and Argentina).
Therefore, the British impact in Latin America went through two channels. First,
Britain was one of the main destiny markets of Latin American goods in the nineteenth
century. Second, the massive growth in British investment which occurred after the
1860s totally redefined the nature of Britain’s relations with Latin America. On the
eve of World War I, British investments in Argentina were the second largest group of
investments made by British investors in a foreign country (US being the largest).
4.1.2. On the Role of Inequality
Conventional economic wisdom on inequality and growth has been dominated by two
arguments. The first is based on the trade-off between inequality and efficiency and
in particular on the belief that inequality is needed in order to offer incentives to
economic actors [Okun, 1975; Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998]. The second argument
suggests that the impact of inequality on the process of growth depends on the stage
of development. The conjecture is that inequality should necessarily increase during
the early stages of development due to urbanisation and industrialisation and decrease
later on as industries attract a large fraction of the rural labour force [Galor and
Moav, 2004; Galor and Zeira, 1993]. Alesina and Rodrik [1994]; Persson and Tabellini
[1994] add a third argument on the relationship between inequality and development:
inequality harms development. In particular, land and income inequality is negatively
2First, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile accessed to new loans, followed by Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, Bolivia, Peru.
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correlated with subsequent economic growth. In societies where a large section of the
population does not have access to the productive resources of the economy, there will
be a strong demand for redistribution which generates conflict over distribution that
harms growth.
In order to fully address the impact of inequality on growth, we need to consider how
inequality interacts with the other determinants of growth. For instance, Sonin [2003]
suggests that inequality has a negative effect on growth, but that this effect goes through
institutions. Poor institutions, that negatively affect growth, are associated with a more
unequal redistribution. There is in fact an extent literature on the relationship between
inequality and institutions which largely agree that poor institutions are correlated
with higher inequality; however, the causality direction raises several concerns. Several
authors suggest that the quality of institutions in a country depends on the income
and wealth distribution. For instance, Hoff and Stiglitz [2004] suggest that an equal
distribution of income is a more fertile ground for good institutions; while Easterly
[2001]; Keefer and Knack [2002] empirically show that social polarisation negatively
affects institutional quality (and thereby slows growth). Haber et al. [2003] propose a
theory on how political institutions may affect redistribution through selective property
rights. This theory argues that in developing countries (the authors focus on Mexico
during the Porfiriato period between 1876 and 1929) governments may enforce property
rights as private goods so that only an elite group integrated into the government benefit
from them.
Theoretical research has also found that inequality affects the genesis and consolidation
of political regimes. Lipset [1959] emphasises the positive role of wealth redistribution
on the democratisation of a country. Rubinson and Quinlan [1977]; Muller [1988]
argue that an egalitarian distribution on income indicates a strong middle class that
supports democracy makes dictatorships less likely. More recently, Boix [2003] argues
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that increasing levels of economic equality bolster the chances of democracy. The link
between inequality and democracy is redistribution. With a simple model, Boix shows
that, in societies with high levels of asset specificity (e.g. with big landowners), the
demand for redistribution increases and the potential level of transfers becomes larger
(which would make the elites worse off), this fosters the authoritarian inclinations
of the wealthy and declines thus the probability of democratisation. Therefore, if the
political power in hands of few, the small wealthy elite refuses the implementation of any
change that redistributes economic power. High inequality will also affect the survival
of democracy. Friedman [2002] argues that democracy survives only if it narrows the
gap between rich and poor. Houle [2009] argues that equal democracies are unlikely to
collapse and in fact, the greater challenge for unequal countries is to sustain democracy
once it is established.
Researchers that argue that the causality direction goes from institutions to inequality
(i.e. institutions affect inequality), focus on the effects of electoral systems on income
distribution. Powell [2002] shows that majoritarian regimes redistribute less than those
chosen with a proportional system3. Iversen and Soskice [2006] develop a three-party
model and show that proportional systems systematically choose governments that
favour redistributive policies. Other authors, look at the role of political parties on
redistribution policies. Political parties can be expected to pursue policies that serve
the economic interests of their chief constituencies [Kenworthy, 2010]. For left-wing
parties this may mean the working class, while for right-wing this means owners of
capital. Therefore, Hibbs [1977, 1987]; Boix [1999] argue that left parties are more likely
to implement macroeconomic policy strategies that aim for a more equal redistribution
of wealth. This is supported by a long line of research that demonstrates a link between
3Majoritarian regimes gives a majority of seats to the party with a plurality of votes while proportional
systems give a number of seats that are proportional to the number of voters.
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left governments and the generosity of welfare states [Korpi, 1983; Hicks, 1999; Swank,
2002; Kwon and Pontusson, 2010].
It is thus by no means clear what the specific dynamics between institutions and in-
equality are and, consequently, what is the resulting causal relationship between them.
While it is plausible that inequality plays a part in blocking the adoption of good in-
stitutions, the reverse holds as well, so that poor institutional quality results in higher
degree of inequality. The analysis in this chapter suggests in fact that income inequal-
ity and poor institutional quality may reinforce each other, indicating double feedback
between the two.
4.1.3. On the Role of Natural Resources
Much has been written on the relationship between natural resources and economic
development. While natural resources are an important source of wealth, scholars
argue that resource-rich countries are not necessarily better-off than those with scarce
resource endowment and some empirical work shows a negative correlation between
resource abundance and economic growth known as resource curse [Auty, 1993, 2001;
Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; Soysa, 2005; Caselli, 2006]. There is no reason for natural
resources to be negative for growth per se, but the exploitation of these resources may
affect other variables that interact with growth causing the curse.
A large and growing literature emphasises the effects of natural resources on the lev-
els of democracy of producer countries. This literature mostly agrees that the link
between natural resources and political regimes lies on the political incentives associ-
ated with the rents arising from the exploitation of these resources. These rents tend
to be large, volatile, geographically concentrated, and controlled by the government.
Together these features have important consequences on basic functions of the govern-
ment. For instance, rentier effects are associated with a high proportion of government
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revenue originating from resource rents. The consequent fiscal volatility may create an
unfortunate political dynamic that ratchets up expenditures in booms to levels that
cannot be efficiently absorbed or sustained over time, with a stop-go pattern of public
expenditure that reduces the quality of public investment and services and thus limits
growth potential. In addition, much of a government’s fiscal strength comes from its
capacity to extract taxes from the population, a capacity that often takes decades to
develop. A government that fails to develop this ability may also be unable to establish
the type of bureaucracy that can provide effective public goods, and ameliorate social
conflicts [Mahdavy, 1970; Beblawi, 1987; Ross, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003].
Moreover, a windfall of resource rents can generate conflicts over redistribution which
may provide incentives for politicians and/or ruling elites to suppress democracy in
order to take possession of these rents. This will thus affect the foundations of political
regimes in favour of more authoritarian regimes [Sachs and Warner, 1995; Ross, 2001;
Boix, 2003; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004]. Engerman and Sokoloff set the origins of
these conflicts back in colonial times. In a series of papers focusing on the divergent de-
velopmental experiences of the New World, these authors explain how the exploitation
of natural resources during colonial times led to high levels of inequality. Mineral-rich
territories and those with soils and climate suitable for cash crops inherited a politi-
cal elite that favoured unequal wealth distribution and created extractive institutions
[Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002, 2003].
However, these theories have been challenged by arguments that that either disagree
with any role of natural resources on growth or that support a positive impact of these
resources on economic development. [Hausmann and Rigobon, 2002; Brunnschweiler
and Bulte, 2008; Lederman and Maloney, 2007, 2009]. Of particular interest, is the
work of Haber and Menaldo [2011] that proposes an empirical investigation on whether
fiscal reliance on natural resource wealth is associated with authoritarian regimes. The
103
4.1. BEYOND COLONIAL ORIGINS: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
authors argue that previous studies are tainted by reverse causality and omitted variable
bias and using a series of econometric techniques on a historical data going back to
1800, conclude that resource wealth is not associated with authoritarianism, in fact, it
promotes democracy.
Ross and Andersen [2012] explain why Haber and Menaldo’s results differ so much from
previous studies. By using the same dataset but allowing a structural break in the late
1970s, they show that from 1800 to 1970s there is no strong evidence for the negative
relationship between resource wealth and democracy; however, since late 1970s, oil
wealth has strongly inhibited democratisation. This is explained by the possible change
in the causal relationship of oil wealth on democracy between 1960s and 1980s as the
global distribution of oil rents shifted from firms to governments.
Many scholars offer a more nuanced view of the role of natural resources on political
regimes. For instance, Herb [2005] does accept that resource rents incentivise autocracy,
however, these resources also increase GDP which leads to an indirect positive effect on
democracy. Goldberg et al. [2008] find that resource abundance has a range of different
indirect effects working through taxation and asset specificity where weak tax efforts
and increased inequality contribute to more competitive politics while asset specificity
decreases it. Nugent and Robinson [2010] suggest that the equilibrium institutional
structure is not uniquely determined by factor endowments, but it depends crucially on
the nature of political cleavages and competition in society. Therefore, the pre-existing
nature of politics determines the role of the natural resources in an economy.
The best attempt to date to address the possibility of conditional effects of resources
on political regimes is perhaps offered by Dunning [2008] who claims that resource may
have both democratic and authoritarian effects and the key task is to understand vari-
ables or structural factors that tend to privilege the one or the other effect of rents. The
conflict over the redistribution of the resource rents does foster authoritarian desires,
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but this is only one way how resources may affect the political regime. In societies with
substantial inequality of (non-natural resources) assets, a resource boom may help to
mitigate the negative impact of inequality and therefore strengthens democracy.
Institutions, inequality and natural resources are all considered to influence economic
development. However, the exact mechanisms through which these work are not clear.
Political instability, high inequality, and large resource endowments characterised many
Latin American economies. Therefore, understanding how these variables interact may
benefit the explanation on how institutions evolve.
4.1.4. Institutions, Inequality and Natural Resources in Latin America
Political instability has been regarded as a structural trait of Latin American societies
where revolutions and major social conflicts are very frequent [Marshall and Cole, 2011].
Between 1900 and 2006 there were 327 coup d’etat in 25 Latin American countries and
long periods of military dictatorships that gave these regimes little constraints on the
executive power, marking very low in democracy (and high in autocracy) indexes during
these regimes [Guerrero, 2006].
Even if the level of inequality in Latin America has decreased since 2000, inequality
is still very high. In fact, the region has the highest level of inequality in the world.
The richest one-tenth of the population in Latin America earns 50% of total income,
while the poorest tenth earns only 2.5 percent. Using the Gini index, the inequality
in the region measures 50 percent in the period 2000-09, this is higher than all other
developed and developing areas of the world [World Bank, 2011].
Abundance of land and natural resources is an intrinsic characteristic of these coun-
tries. Resource wealth has been crucial in the participation of these economies on the
international market from their colonisation until recent times. In the past decade,
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commodities accounted for 52 percent of the region’s exports according to the World
Bank. This is down from 86% in the 1970s, but over the same period the figure in East
Asia and the Pacific fell from 94 to 30% [Sinnot et al., 2010].
However, none of these features on their own can explain the problems of the region.
The social structures, the distribution of power and wealth, the role and strength of
its elites, and the complex, often painful process of state-building, in combination with
the legacy of colonial times and the economic and political difficulties that the newly
independent states have in positioning themselves on the world stage, have all been
decisive factors and all have something to do with the successes and failures of Latin
American economies. This chapter proposes an empirical analysis on how institutions,
inequality and natural resources interact and the effects of colonial and post-colonial
factors on these interactions in Latin America and the Caribbean.
4.2. Empirical Analysis
This section offers an empirical analysis of the relationship between institutions and
inequality. This analysis uses two equations that test how different colonial and post-
colonial factors affect institutions and inequality in Latin America. Equation 4.1 con-
siders institutions as function of inequality, post-independence British intervention,
discovery of natural resources, and colonial origins. Equation 4.2 considers inequality
as a function of the same variables previously mentioned and institutions. Therefore,
these two equations, by considering each variable as function of the other, explore the
double relationship between inequality and institutional quality discussed in literature.
It is indeed very likely that institutions and inequality affect each other, making very
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difficult to identify a one-way causation.
Insti,t = α1 + α2Ineqi,t + α3BRi + α4Nat Resi,t + α5COLi + it (4.1)
Ineqi,t = β1 + β2Insti,t + β3BRi + β4Nat Resi,t + β5COLi + υit (4.2)
Where BR is a variable for the impact of Britain on Latin America between the end of
19th and early 20th century. This follows the results of the previous chapter that British
did better, and the literature discussed in Section 4.1.1 on how British intervention in
Latin America extended into the after-independence period through British capital
invested in Latin American economic activities and trade. Nat Res is a variable for
the discovery of natural resources in the post-independence period, and COL represents
the different variables used to capture the effects of colonial times on institutions.
The methodology consist of estimating these two regressions in a panel setting for up
to 20 Latin America countries4 for the period 1906-2005.
4.2.1. Data
Data and sources are described in detail in Appendix C. The dependent variables in
this analysis are institutions and inequality. Institutions are measured as in Chapter 3
using the variables for Democracy, Autocracy and Constraints on the Executive Power
from the Polity IV Project. Inequality is measured by the percentage of family farms
from Vanhanen [2003] defined as the area of family farms as a percentage of the total
area of holdings – a family farm employs no more than four people and the family owns
and cultivates the land. More family farms thus represent a better distribution of these
resources and therefore higher values of this variable are related to lower inequality.
4Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
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Therefore this is a measure of wealth equality. Several measures of inequality have been
proposed, however the share of family farms is the only measure of inequality that is
consistently available through time for a large sample of the countries considered and
in the period analysed. Moreover, given the key role that land distribution have had
since colonial times in Latin America, this is the most adequate measure to study how
inequality affects institutions in the region.
The impact of British intervention in Latin America after the independence is measured
by the level of trade of these countries with Britain [Statistical Office, 1906], and the
British investments at the beginning of the century [Paish, 1909]. Trade with Britain is
given by the average exports of Latin American economies to Britain weighted for the
total exports for the period 1898-1906. This variable is constructed using data from
the Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and
British Possessions for various years. British investments in Latin America considers
the average of these investments in the period 1905-1911 (data from Paish [1909]).
The analysis also includes the variables for colonial factors considered in Chapter 3. In
particular, it controls for whether the country was a colonial or sugar centre, the size
of European settlements in 1800 and the pre-colonial population.
The effects of natural resource shocks are measured by a binary variable for the dis-
coveries of oil and natural gas. It assumes the value of 1 if there has been a discovery
in the 5-year period considered, 0 otherwise (constructed from the data provided by
Lujala et al. [2007] on oil discoveries on- and off-shore). The advantages of this variable
are two-fold, (i) there is a larger number of observations (across country and time), and
(ii) it is not subject to the common endogeneity issues. Several variables have been
used to measure natural resources and in particular to investigate whether resource-rich
countries are actually cursed. Based on the work of Sachs and Warner [1995]commonly
used variables are the ratio of resource exports to GDP and the ratio of resource ex-
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ports to total exports. Brunnschweiler and Bulte [2008]; Ross [2006] and Dunning [2008]
argue that these variables measure dependence rather than abundance therefore they
are not independent of economic policies and institutions (i.e. they are endogenous).
Ross [2006] and Dunning [2008] use a measure of oil rents per capita based on the work
of Hamilton and Clemens [1999]. This measure provides an estimate of the value of a
wide range of natural resources, net of production costs and a return to capital, giving
an approximation of the size of the rents available for public spending. Although this
variable provides a better measure of resource abundance, it is not without problems.
Extraction costs are based on estimates for a single observation in 1990s, and costs for
other years are obtained using a GDP deflator, when no data on extraction costs are
available for a country, the extraction costs for a neighbour country are used [Ross,
2006].
In addition, the effects of natural resources on institutions may start well before these
resources start producing rents. The mere discovery of a mineral resource might be
a source of rent-seeking behaviour from the governing elites in order to guarantee an
early appropriation of future rents (e.g. guaranteeing exploration and extraction rights
under the promises of future economic favours).
4.2.2. Results
Institutions and inequality are simultaneously determined by the economic and political
process. We can expect that those countries with a more efficient institutional system
would also have lower levels of inequality, and that at the same time a better distribu-
tion of resources will be translated into better division of power and therefore better
political institutions. In Table 4.1 the relationship between institutions and inequal-
ity is investigated. In Panel A, a GLS estimation is used to explain institutions (i.e.
democracy, autocracy and constraints on the executive) as function of land redistribu-
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tion (family farms). There is statistical evidence that a better land redistribution has a
positive effect on the quality of institutions. In Panel B land redistribution is considered
as function of institutions. There is again statistical evidence that institutions have a
positive effect on the distribution of land. These results suggest a bilateral causality
between institutions and inequality. However, this causality can only be confirmed by
estimating a simultaneous equation model, to which we turn next.
Table 4.1.: GLS - Institutions and Inequality
Panel A - Institutions as dependent variable
Explanatory Contraints on
Variable Democracy Autocracy the Executive
Family Farms .683*** -.598*** .805***
(.131) (.123) (.121)
constant .190*** .401*** .249***
(.026) (.025) (.026)
n 20 20 20
T 20 20 20
Wald χ2 27.34*** 23.79*** 43.88***
Panel B - Family Farms as dependent variable
Explanatory
Variables (a) (b) (c)
Democracy .098***
(.011)
Autocracy -.086***
(.014)
Contraints on .110***
the Executive (.012)
constant .138*** .200*** .126***
(.005) (.006) (.006)
n 20 20 20
T 20 20 20
Wald χ2 73.53*** 36.74*** .87.16***
notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
***, **, *; significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively
This section deals with the endogeneity problems caused by the relationship between
inequality and institutions. A first approach that could consider the lags of the en-
dogenous variables into Equations (4.1) and (4.2). Nonetheless, the validity of the lag
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variables as instruments is questionable due to the high persistence of these variables.
In particular, we need to assume that E[it|Ineqis] = 0 and E[υit|Instis] = 0 for all
t > s (but not otherwise) in order for second- and higher-order lags of the endogenous
variables to be good instruments in the estimation of our model. Nonetheless, if our
endogenous variables display persistence over time (as is the case for institutions and
inequality), their lagged levels will be poor instruments5.
A second approach could be to find strictly exogenous instruments. Our colonial vari-
ables could be considered as good instruments because they are not subject to reverse
causality, nonetheless, they suffer from the drawback that they do not vary over time,
so these cannot be used in a panel framework. The preferred estimation for this study
is a Hausman-Taylor estimator (a transformed random effect model with instrument
variables) that deals with endogeneity issues while distinguishes between time-varying
and time-invariant regressors.
Table 4.2 shows the results of the Hausman-Taylor estimator for institutions (as depen-
dent variable). Column (a) in Table 4.2 shows the basic regression (column (a), (a’),
(a”) show the results using democracy, autocracy, and constraints on the executive as
dependent variables respectively). We observe that a higher percentage of family farms
is related to better quality of institutions: an increase of 1% of family farms increases
democracy and constraint of the executive of 1.32 and 1.35 percent respectively and
lowers autocracy of −0.08 percent.
The analysis offers evidence for the hypotheses put forward in the previous section on
the possible impact of Britain on the development of early independent countries. The
hypothesised positive impact of trade with Britain on Latin American institutions is
statistically significant. Moreover, there is a statistically significant negative effect of
5Section C.2 in Appendix C shows the results estimating Equations (4.1) and (4.2) using GLS estimates
with the lags of the endogenous variables as regressors (Tables C.5 and C.6). We can observed that
the results are very similar to the ones in Tables C.3 and C.4 in which equations (4.1) and (4.2)
have been estimated without dealing with the endogeneity problems
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British investments on the quality of institutions. An increase in British investments
in early 20th century decreases democracy and constraints on the executive, while is
related to more autocracy.
The evidence in Table 4.2 also suggests that the impact of a resource shock (due to a
new oil or gas discovery) is negative. A discovery of the natural resource decreases the
quality of institutions (i.e. negative for democracy and constraints on the executive
and positive for autocracy). These results thus support the hypotheses of resource
curse in Latin American economies that we first observed in Chapter 2. In fact, now
it is clearer how natural resources negatively affect economic growth: this effect goes
through institutions. For Latin America we can observe a negative effect of natural
resources on institutions which in turn affect economic growth.
The results also show that there is no direct effect of colonial natural resources on in-
stitutions. Regressions (b), (b’) and (b”) in Table 4.2 control the results for European
settlements during colonial times and pre-colonial indigenous populations. These vari-
ables are not statistically significant and do not change the previous conclusions.
Finally, considering that institutions tend to improve with income, and therefore, richer
countries can afford better institutions, Regression (c), (c’), and (c”) include GDP per
capita at the beginning of the period as explanatory variable. The results remain mostly
unchanged, and therefore all the previous conclusions still hold.
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Similar analysis is carried out for inequality. In Table 4.3 we can see the results of the
estimation of Equation (4.2) using the Hausman-Taylor estimator and land distribu-
tion (family farms) as dependent variable. The relationship between institutions and
inequality holds; in particular, higher values of democracy (regressions (a), (b), and
(c)) and constraints on the executive (regressions (a”), (b”), and (c”)) are statistically
significant for explaining a better redistribution of land (higher percentage of family
farms).
The discovery of oil has a statistically significant effect only if we consider autocracy
as institutional variable (regressions (a’), (b’), and (c’)). A possible explanation is that
the resource shock affects redistribution only under autocratic regimes. Under more
democratic rulers, the effects of a resource on inequality is not significant.
British investments in early 20th century are statistically significant for explaining in-
equality. When democracy or constraints on the executive are used as institutional
variables, British investments increase the percentage of family farms (i.e. inequality
decreases). Therefore, there is a positive indirect effect of British investments on insti-
tutions through inequality. This contrasts with the direct negative effect on institutions
observed in Table 4.2.
As explained in the previous section, the large inflows of British capital in Latin Amer-
ica were followed by various waves of defaults that ended in various economic crisis.
The largest recipients of these resources were also those ones that suffer the worse crises
(see for example Argentina and Brazil). This may explain the observed negative direct
effect of British investments on institutions. However, those countries that invested
these capitals in more efficient projects that improved various sectors of the economy
which in turn increased employment opportunities, may have seen a reduction of wealth
inequality. Therefore, these countries benefited of a positive indirect impact on institu-
tions (less inequality is related to better institutions). Which effect dominates depend
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on the initial quality of institutions. In strongly autocratic regimes (as in the case of
Bolivia and Peru), the indirect effect may be reduced to a minimum. According to
Miller [1993], external loans and direct investments in Latin America contributed to
put off taxation reforms and undermined local political institutions as more politicians
became beholden to their links with the British companies. This affected the adoption
of redistribution policies, and therefore the negative direct effect of British investments
on institutions dominated.
The colonial resource endowment (minerals and sugar) has a statistically significant
and negative impact on family farms: specialisation on resource production (either
mineral or cash-crop) during colonial times is related to the higher levels of inequality
in the region. These results hold when controlling for colonial European settlements
and native populations which are not statistically significant. This results shed light on
the previous findings. Chapter 3 shows mineral resources to be statistically significant
for explaining both early and current institutions. However, in the empirical analysis
of this chapter these variables lose significance for institutions. The significant effect
of colonial mineral resources observed in the previous chapter may be capturing the
effect of these resources on inequality which is correlated with institutions. Once we
introduce a variable for inequality, this direct effect disappears.
In general, the statistical analysis supports the bilateral causality that exists between
political institutions and inequality in Latin America. As argued by various authors
(such as Easterly [2001]; Keefer and Knack [2002]; Hoff and Stiglitz [2004]), a better
distribution of wealth offers a good ground for the development of good institutions.
In particular, a better distribution of wealth (measured by land distribution) had a
positive effect on the democratisation of a country. There is also strong evidence
that poor institutional quality results in higher degree of inequality. Those countries
with lower levels of democracy (or higher levels of autocracy) have higher levels of
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inequality. However, there is not just a one-way causality. The dynamics between
these two variables are more complex and we cannot exclude a bilateral causation. The
analysis does not consider the effects of electoral systems on inequality as argued by
those authors who argue that institutions cause inequality (e.g. Powell [2002]; Iversen
and Soskice [2006]; Kenworthy [2010]). Once we know that democracy and autocracy
matters for inequality, further research could investigate the specific dynamics between
inequality and electoral systems and political parties.
This result holds even when we consider the other independent variables that may
affect both these variables. Institutions are negatively affected by the high levels of
external debt that these countries acquired in the first years after the independence in
the British markets, even if the effects of a greater trade with Britain had a positive
effect (although this is less than the investments so that the total effect is negative).
The discoveries of natural resources negatively affect the quality of these institutions,
while there is no relevant effect on institutions of any of the other colonial variables
used. However, these variables have affected the levels of inequality in the region. Those
areas that were colonial mineral centres and cash-crop producers have higher levels of
inequality (less family farms).
4.3. Evolution of Institutions in Latin America: Historical
Evidence
This section looks at four country experiences in the region that help to explain and
illustrate the results of the previous empirical analysis. The good development experi-
ences of Costa Rica and Uruguay contrast with the poor economic, social and political
scenarios observed in Bolivia and Peru. The history of these four countries show the
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specific mechanisms through which the variables considered in the analysis work and
how these interactions affect Latin American institutions.
4.3.1. Costa Rica
Costa Rica is one of the most stable, prosperous, and progressive nations in Latin
America. Nonetheless, it was a poor, isolated, backwater territory during colonial
experience. Costa Rica had no gold or silver and few opportunities to promote sugar
plantations which made this territory of little attraction to colonial settlement [Monge
Alfaro, 1974; Quiro´s Vargas, 1990]. Quiro´s Vargas [1990] emphasises another factor
behind Costa Rica’s colonial poverty: the lack of a significant indigenous population
available for forced labour. Costa Rican settlers were forced to work their own land and
this prevented the establishment of large latifundios. The lack of natural and human
resources has been considered to constitute the basis for a successful rural democracy
[Thorning, 1945]. As a matter of fact, at the time of independence, Costa Rica had the
highest level of land redistribution compared to the rest of the region [based on data
of land distribution from Vanhanen, 2003].
After independence in 1821, and with the introduction of coffee, there were clear at-
tempts to stimulate export agriculture. By late 1830s coffee exports began to reach
important levels and the main destiny was Great Britain. In fact, British merchants
played a key role in financing the coffee expansion6 [Gudmundson, 1986]. The special-
isation and export-dependence in coffee was accompanied by high political instability;
the 1860s were marred by power struggles among the coffee elite. As the Costa Rican
economy moved to monoculture and declining returns7, the coffee-based peasantry and
the growing urban middle-class increasingly protested for a greater wealth distribution
6the first bank founded in Costa Rica was the Banco Anglo-Costarricense in 1862.
7The declining returns on coffee production were due to the ageing of the groves, soil exhaustion, and
the infrequent use of fertilisers (as explained in Hall [1976] cited in Gudmundson [1986, p. 5]).
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and taxation of the coffee-oligarchy. This culminated in the 1948’s Revolution which is
seen as the beginning of the new process of democratisation in Costa Rica8. Social and
economic progress since 1948 helped the return of the country to stability, and though
post-civil war politics reflected the play of old loyalties and antagonisms, elections have
been free and fair since then.
4.3.2. Uruguay
As Costa Rica, the colonial history of Uruguay is also characterised by no gold, silver,
and sugar plantations, making this territory unattractive for colonisation (especially
in early times). In fact, the current Uruguayan territories were little inhabited during
the colonial times, at least until the establishment of Colonia del Sacramento by the
Portuguese in 1680 [Be´rtola, 2003]. Unlike Costa Rica, Uruguay had a quite unstable
transition to independence. Uruguay was on the border between the Spanish and
Portuguese empires, and was the subject of several disputes between the two crowns;
this was decisive for the creation, with strong British involvement, of an independent
state in 1828-1830 [Be´rtola, 2003].
The mid-19th century was characterised by the growth of the Uruguayan agricultural
sector based on the production of meat and livestock production in general. The main
destiny of Uruguayan production was Britain which attracted British investments in
the country [Winn, 1976]. Despite episodes of political unrest and economic stagnation
in 1930s for most of the past 180 years, Uruguay has been a model democracy with one
of the lowest rates of income inequality in the region9.
8See Gudmundson [1984] for a review of the literature on the Costa Rican revolution and civil war in
1948.
9However, Uruguay did not escape the wave of military dictatorships that swept through South
America in the 1970s.
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4.3.3. Bolivia
The history of Bolivia contrasts with the development experiences of Costa Rica and
Uruguay. Bolivia is one of the less developed and more unequal countries in the region
(and in the world). Despite recent improvements in the Gini index (from 60.1 in 2002
to 56.3 in 2008), the differences in income still remains: in 2007, the 10% of the pop-
ulation earned 45% of the population’s total income, while the poorest earned merely
0.5% [World Bank, 2011]. It can hardly be argued that the origins of Bolivian underde-
velopment and inequality are found in colonial times. After the discovery of large silver
deposits in Potos´ı in 1545, Bolivia became a key mining centre and an important source
of revenue for the Spanish Empire and virtually every aspect of Bolivia’s economic, po-
litical but also cultural and social development responded to the mining monocultures
of silver first and then tin. The labour force was organised around the exploitation of
minerals and based on forced labour [Cunningham and Jacobsen, 2003].
After independence, the white Creole elite, took control of the State, and although
servitude and slavery were abolished, indigenous people were prevented from partic-
ipating in the political life through the introduction of the ‘qualified vote’ i.e. only
alphabetised people with a minimum income could vote at the elections and new forms
of forced labour were introduced10. Universal vote was introduced only after the Boli-
vian National Revolution of 1952. However, this was of little help for the redistribution
of power which was in the hands of the wealthy elite [Albro, 2005]. One of the main
limitations for political inclusion was the skewed distribution of land that strongly
favours small elite groups. The numerous land reforms introduced after 1952 imple-
mented only temporary and minor changes and had little effect on wealth distribution
[Medina, 2010]. In fact, in the 1980s, over 66% of land was still controlled by 0.22%
10The most common was ponguaje, through which indigenous population had to provide cheap or
unpaid labour in exchange for access to subsistence parcels of land [Bueno, 2011]
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of landowners with an average of more than 16,000 hectares per owner [Weisbrot and
Sandoval, 2008].
The last decades have been characterised by political instability and a continuos eco-
nomic fluctuations arising from the unstable commodity market. A succession of mili-
taristic dictators repressed labour-based organisations and continued the social discrim-
ination of the indigenous populations [Madrid, 2012]. In current times, Bolivia is still
a mining country with the second largest natural gas reserve in South America11. The
economy’s reliance on mining has reinforced regional tensions and determined political
power in Bolivia [Morales, 2010]. Of all the oil and gas significant producers in the
world, Bolivia is perhaps the only country where sub-national governments share these
resources revenues according to where they happen to be underground. This creates
further divisions and limits redistribution [Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008].
4.3.4. Peru
Peru was also a mining centre during the colonial period. Peru was in fact described
as the “Spain’s great treasure house in South America” [Pike, 1967]. Labour was
organised following the needs of the mining sector under different forms of forced labour
creating the same social inequalities between indigenous and colonisers described in the
Bolivian case. Colonisers monopolised control over land and gradually the land tenure
system became polarised between large haciendas and subsistence-based indigenous
communities [Hunefeldt, 2004]. After independence, the elite class that inherited the
power from colonisers aimed to preserve and enhance their privileged economic status12.
11Natural gas and oil and other minerals replaced tin in its role on Bolivian economy, after the collapse
of the world tin market in 1980s
12At the time of independence and for several decades after, Peru had a racially defined occupational
structure. Artisans were black, peasants were Indians, smaller merchants were mestizos, and elites
were white [Hunefeldt, 2004].
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The new-independent country experienced severe political instability lasting until the
advent of the guano boom in mid-19th century13.
The Guano Era in Peru represents a period of economic prosperity. Demand for guano
increased with the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom first and the increase
of demand in the rest of Europe and US afterwards. Although the revenues of guano
were used to accomplish some social projects such as the end of slavery and the Indian
tribute (1854), Peru failed to become a modern state. Much of the guano wealth went
into the support of state bureaucracy and some infrastructure projects that were never
completed [Hunefeldt, 2004]. The guano revenues were distributed between British and
Peruvian bondholders who held long-standing claims on the government. According to
Quiroz [1987] two-thirds of the total bond value was held by only 126 people, mostly
land-owners and state bureaucrats. In addition, guano financial windfalls made it
easy to get loans on the international financial markets which eventually led to a deep
financial crisis14. The discovery of synthetic fertilisers and the collapse of the guano
price in the international market were devastating to the Peruvian economy. The
discovery of nitrate mines could have replaced the role of guano in Peruvian economy,
but the conflict between Chile and Peru for the control of the mines ended in the War of
the Pacific where Peru lost its nitrate-rich provinces [Greenhill and Miller, 1973].
After guano and nitrate, Peru experienced several booms in its primary sector. Rubber,
coffee, sugar cane, cotton, rice and other natural resources were crucial for Peruvian
13Guano is created by seabird droppings deposited for thousands of years and sedimented n coastal
islands. The benefits of guano as fertilising were known by pre-Columbian societies, by it was
Alexander von Humboldt who alerted Europeans to the value of guano.
14The Peruvian debt crisis had his origins in the independence wars. In 1822 and 1824 two loans were
contracted in London, and by 1848 the principal and interest had increased Peru’s debts of three
times the initial loan. In addition, the government acknowledged internal debt to those citizens
who had supplied funds for the patriot armies during the independence wars in order to foster
the development of an entrepreneurial middle class. During the guano boom, British bondholders
pressured the Peruvian government for repayment and in 1849 they obtained new bonds to be issued
backed by future sales of guano. However, new loans were used to repay old loans and accumulated
interest.
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development. Nonetheless, these resources were in the hands of a Peru’s oligarchy
(estimated as 40 to 200 families) that retained much influence until late 1960s. In
1980s some attempts to address the problems of rural communities were made, and
although the levels of inequality still remain very high, the political participation of
the marginalised communities has increased, fostering a greater redistribution and the
new wave of democracy in the country.
4.3.5. Explaining the Evolution of Institutions in Latin America
A main conclusion from the empirical analysis in Section 4.2 that finds support in
the country experience comparative analysis of this section, is that institutions and
inequality reinforce each other and this relationship has origins in colonial times. The
evolution of political institutions, and specifically, the adoption of more authoritarian
rather than democratic regimes depends on the political actors that hold power within
the country. Latin American political actors were created during colonial times. Silver
mines and cash-crops defined the distribution of power and wealth in these territories.
Highly stratified societies, with a small part of the population controlling political power
and wealth distribution, were created in those territories where natural resources were
abundant during colonial times (e.g. Peru and Bolivia).
Resource-poor regions had a more equal distribution of wealth, or alternative, poverty
was more equally distributed. As seen for Costa Rica, in most of the resource-poor
regions there was little wealth to redistribute and land-production was mainly based
on subsistence-agriculture. In the same way, political power was not as concentrated
as elsewhere. Institutions and inequality thus reinforced each other and, through the
political and economic actors, this relationship became persistent over time15. This
first result complements the Engermann and Sokoloff’s theory that finds the origins
15see Khan [2010] and the discussion in Chapter 3, p. 56.
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of institutions in former colonies in the inequality created from the distribution of the
natural resources.
All countries in Spanish- and Portuguese-America acquired independence around the
same time (first half of 19th century). The newly independent economies slowly started
the process of integration into the world economy. Two features distinguished the
post-independence period. One is the increasing impact of Britain in Latin American
economies, another one is the participation to the international trade through their pri-
mary sector16. The new resource-bonanza in the second half of the nineteenth century
provided these countries with new economic resources17 which guaranteed access to the
international financial markets. The industrialisation process that started in Britain in
the 19th century required access to Latin American primary goods which made British
investors willing to finance these activities.
The empirical analysis shows that British intervention in Latin America affected both
inequality and institutions. Britain was a strategic market for Latin American exports
and there is evidence that the increased trade with Britain (which was the greatest
industrial power in that time) had a positive effect in these economies, especially those
ones able to provide a better response to the demands of the British market. British
capital on the other hand, has a positive effect on family farms (it reduces inequality)
but a negative direct effect on democracy. Those Latin American countries that wel-
comed British investments in large quantities also made themselves vulnerable to its
cessation (in fact, this is also the period when Latin American countries acquired a
large international debt).
16No industries were put in place during the colonial time, and at the few indigenous textile indus-
tries (e.g. in Ecuador, Bolivia) could not compete with the technological advances from external
competitors such as Britain
17The second half of the nineteenth century was the period of new resource-booms in these economies.
Coffee was cultivated in Costa Rica and Colombia, cacao was already a main commodity in some
regions in Ecuador and Venezuela and in many other tropical territories, it was the period of guano-
boom in Peru, and Uruguay and Argentina developed their production of cattle-based products.
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According to Miller [1993], external loans and direct investments in Latin America
contributed to put off much of the needed reforms to taxation structures and financial
institutions, and probably undermined local political institutions as more politicians
became beholden to their links with the British companies. In those countries were
elites controlled the country resources, these investments fed bureaucratic practices
and were used to maintained the benefits of the elites in power, which therefore de-
crease the quality of institutions. This is the negative direct effect of British invest-
ments on inequality. Nonetheless, in more egalitarian societies (such as Costa Rica and
Uruguay), the capital inflows benefited the development of trade sectors which offer
greater possibilities of employment and therefore decrease inequality with a positive
effect on institutions.
Finally, natural resources also played (and keep playing) a role in shaping institutions.
In general the discovery of natural resources in early 20th century offered the oppor-
tunity to modernise the economy and to build basic infrastructure (e.g. roads that
facilitate the transport of coffee in Costa Rica, railways in Peru). However, the pres-
ence of resource rents also increased the payoff to controlling power, especially when
the group that held political power controlled the distribution of the rents, incentivis-
ing elites to block democratisation (as argued by Boix [2003]). For instance Peru and
Bolivia introduced universal suffrage relatively late – 1979 and 1956 compared to, for
instance, Costa Rica and Uruguay in 1948 and 1918 respectively – excluding from vote
those groups without economic resources.
Moreover, the effects of natural resources (oil and other minerals) depend on the in-
teractions with the previous established social and political institutions [as discussed
by Dunning, 2008]. In more autocratic societies, resource rents are used by the politi-
cal elites to support their privileges (see for instance the case of Peru after the guano
boom), while in more democratic societies these resources may incentivise redistributive
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policies. Haggard and Kaufman [2008], show that more democratic regimes are more
likely to undertake a broadening of social insurance and services. In fact, Uruguay,
Costa Rica and Chile are the countries with the longest continuous histories of com-
petitive politics and also have the oldest and more established welfare states. The
social-policy initiatives of authoritarian regimes in Latin America were mostly directed
either toward increasing benefits for privileged groups or toward the consolidation of
existing programmes increasing thus inequality levels.
The results in this chapter also complement the work of Nugent and Robinson [2010].
These authors contrast the experiences of four coffee export countries in Latin America,
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala on the basis of their landownership
structures. While Colombia and Costa Rica introduced early legislations that protected
smallholders, the onset of the coffee boom induced mass land grab by political elites in
El Salvador and Guatemala which created large coffee plantations. According to Nugent
and Robinson, the origins of these differences are on the politics of the 19th century. In
Colombia and Costa Rica, political elites consistently used competitive elections as way
to allocate political power, and elites were not primarily landowners (in contrast to El
Salvador and Guatemala). This chapter shows that we can trace the origins of political
inequality back to colonial times, and that post-colonial factors and the discovery of
new resources contributed to the evolution of the political institutions and inequality.
Therefore, while the findings in this chapter agrees that 19th century’s politics are
relevant for explaining the evolution of institutions in Latin America, the results go
further and explain why certain countries had more unequal political distribution in
first place.
Both institutions and inequality tend to evolve slowly over time. Colonisation offers
a good opportunity to analyse whether differences across colonies gave rise to system-
atic differences in the way institutions evolved. In fact, colonial past created certain
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dynamics for institutional development with the result that countries take different
paths. Inequality of wealth from colonial era led directly to narrow participation and
continued political inequality. The evidence from the colonies in the Americas suggests
that those that began with extreme inequality and population heterogeneity exhibit
persistence over time in evolving institutions that restricted access to economic op-
portunities. After independence, the rents arising from the exploitation of natural
resources gave the political elites the means to maintain their economic benefits and
power. The effects of British intervention depended on the institutions previously set
in these countries.
4.4. Final Remarks to Chapter 4
This chapter has identified the factors that affected the evolution of the political institu-
tions in Latin America after independence. Latin American countries are characterised
by high levels of political instability, high inequality, and the dependency on the pro-
duction of natural resources. These features and their interaction are used to explain
how Latin American institutions evolved.
There is no consensus in literature on the dynamics and the causal relationship be-
tween institutions and inequality. While it is plausible that inequality plays a part
in blocking the adoption of good institutions, the reverse holds as well, so that poor
institutional quality results in higher degree of inequality. This study suggests that
income inequality and poor institutional quality may indeed reinforce each other and
that the specialisation on the production of natural resources affects this relationship
over time.
The mechanisms through which institutions, inequality, and natural resources interact
are investigated with an empirical study that uses a two equation model in which in-
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equality and institutions are functions of each other. The results show that in fact there
exists a bivariate relationship between institutions and inequality. We observe that the
paths of institutional development in Latin America are sensitive to the incidence of
inequality: higher levels of inequality are related to lower quality of institutions. More-
over, natural resources have a negative effect on the quality of political institutions in
Latin America: the discovery of natural resources favours more authoritarian regimes.
This result supports the findings in Chapter 2 which shows a negative effect of natural
resource rents on Latin American economic growth. There is little evidence that these
resources directly affect the levels of inequality (the effect goes through institutions).
However this study has only considered the discovery of mineral resources (oil and
natural gas), so there is still room to investigate the effects of the production of other
resources on both institutions and inequality.
Colonial and post-colonial factors have been used to explain how institutions, inequality
and natural resources interact. There is no evidence that either European settlements
or the initial native population affected the evolution of Latin American institutions,
which offers further support to the findings of Chapter 3. However, colonial experience
did affect institutions through the exploitation of natural resources in colonial times. A
quick look at some country experiences in the region shows that the relationship high
inequality-poor institutional quality was already in place at the time of independence
in countries such as Bolivia and Peru, large exporters of silver and other minerals dur-
ing the colonial times. The analysis thus complements the Engerman and Sokoloff’s
hypothesis [1997; 2002] that inequality of wealth from colonial era is linked to narrow
participation and continued political inequality. From the specialisation in these eco-
nomic activities during the colonial times these countries inherited an elite psychology
that segmented the population into a colonial elite and a subordinate exploited class
that gave these societies extractive economic and social structures with extreme levels
of inequality in wealth and human capital.
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However, post-independence events also affected the character of institutions and this
needs to be included in the analysis. New resource discoveries after independence fa-
cilitated the participation of Latin American economies into the international market.
Costa Rican coffee, Uruguayan livestock, Peruvian guano and Bolivian tin were key for
the economic development of these economies in the post-independence period. During
the colonial times, Spanish colonisers built up a system based on monopolies with their
colonies that did not allow Latin American territories to freely trade with other coun-
tries, but this situation disappears after independence. The new born countries were
free to trade with other countries and Britain took this opportunity. After the indepen-
dence the trade with Britain rapidly increased and so did the British capital invested
in this region. Access to foreign savings to finance either public or/and private enter-
prises was a permanent characteristic that had conditioned the economic development
of Latin America. The development of the coffee exports in Costa Rica was stimulated
by the increasing British demand and it was financed by British merchants. As a mat-
ter of fact, the first bank founded in Costa Rica was the Banco Anglo-Costarricence in
1862. Britain was also the main destiny of the production of livestock in Uruguay and
this country was the recipient of notable amounts of British investments.
The empirical analysis shows that British capital has a negative direct effect on institu-
tions, but a positive indirect effect through redistribution. Latin American governments
acquired a large debt in the British capital market which left these countries with high
levels of public and private debt. However, countries with a better initial redistribu-
tion of resources may have used these investments in productive enterprises that, in
the long-run, benefited the economic development and the institutional setting of these
economies (as seen in Costa Rica that improved the transport infrastructure during the
coffee era).
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These results help to explain the common conclusion in literature that British did
better, i.e. those territories colonised by Britain inherited better institutions. This
conclusion is based on the empirical observation that former British colonies in average
have better institutions. However, it is difficult to disentangle the specific mechanisms
of how British did better. The British-controlled territories benefited of investments in
the infrastructure of colonies and preferential agricultural trade ties with Britain. By
the beginning of the World War I, many basic services (i.e. hospitals, sewage systems,
public water supplies, schools) were fairly developed in these territories [Rogonzinski,
2000]. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the indirect effect on British investments
on institutions through inequality prevailed. British investments benefited the improve-
ment of basic services which reduced inequality which translated into an improvement
of institutions and this may explain the positive sign of the British dummy.
Overall, the results of this chapter give econometric support to Boix’s [2003] argument
that inequality and institutions reinforce each other. In societies with high levels of
inequality and land-concentration, the cost of taxation and redistribution becomes high
enough for the elites to prefer an authoritarian regime. This regime will put in place
policies that allow elites to keep their economic and political benefits and therefore
reinforce the current levels of inequality and land-concentration. In fact, this can be
used to explain the long-standing political discrimination of indigenous populations in
Peru and Bolivia after independence. From the colonial times these countries inherited
a strong wealthy elite that also controlled political power. The established authoritarian
regimes delayed policies to abolish forced labour and allow the political participation
of the poorer parts of the society through the introduction of ‘qualified vote’ systems
(only alphabetised people with a minimum income could vote at the elections).
However, this analysis differs from the previous literature in the specific mechanisms
on how inequality, institutions, and natural resources interact. In the Engerman and
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Sokoloff’s argument, the institutions set during colonial times tend to be highly per-
sistent so that current institutions are a reflection of colonial times. Previous chapter
shows that this is not the case for Latin America and we need to look into post-
independence events that shape current institutions. Moreover, whereas Boix [2003]
explains how inequality and institutions interact, the author fails to explain the impact
of colonial past on current institutions in developing countries. The understanding of
the origins of institutions and inequality can be used to explain the observed persistence
of the relationship between institutions and inequality.
The Dunning’s claim [2008] that natural resources may have both authoritarian and
democratic effects based on the redistribution of resources is not entirely consistent
with the Latin American experience. There is no evidence here that in societies with
substantial inequality of assets (not related to the natural resource sector) a resource
boom helps to mitigate the negative impact of inequality on institutions through an
increase in redistribution policies. On the contrary, there is a tendency for these re-
sources to promote authoritarian regimes – the presence of resource rents increases the
payoff of controlling power in order to control the distribution of rents. Even in those
countries with a more egalitarian wealth redistribution, these resources generated some
conflict over power. See for example the Costa Rican political instability marred by
power struggles among the coffee elite in 1860s.
To sum up, the econometric evidence presented here suggests that struggles over power
control and redistribution of income and wealth in Latin America have their origins
in colonial times. The discovery of natural resources after independence provided the
elites with further incentives to maintain authoritarian regimes in order to control the
rents generated by these resources. The decrease of inequality increases the political
participation and therefore favours institutions that promote democratisation which in
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turn will favour a better redistribution making the reduction of inequality a key aspect
for improving the quality of institutions in Latin America.
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The debate on what causes GDP per capita to grow is still ongoing but several scholars
consider institutions as a fundamental determinant of economic growth. This thesis
offers further empirical support to this literature by analysing the role of institutions in
Latin American economic growth. Chapter 2 shows that institutions are a fundamental
cause of growth in Latin America. However, institutions are not exogenous to growth,
i.e. these are an outcome of the growth process, and factors that affect growth may
also affect institutions. Therefore, although institutions matter for growth, we need to
explain the origins and evolution of institutions. Chapter 3 and 4 take up this challenge
and investigate how Latin American institutions originated and evolved.
Figure 5.1 summarises the main conclusions of this thesis by illustrating how the dif-
ferent variables interact and affect growth in Latin America. First, and unlike argued
by Glaeser et al. [2004], institutions are fundamental for explaining growth. This
does not imply that other variables do not matter, in fact economic growth is a com-
plex process affected by a number of other factors. The implication of this result is
that institutions play a role in this complex process and this role needs to be investi-
gated. Another variable that turns to be significant for growth in the region is natural
resources. This should not be a surprising result considering that many of these coun-
tries in the area are net exporters of natural resources, however the effect of these
resources is negative which — for further research.
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Figure 5.1.: Institutions and Growth in Latin America
The main contribution of this thesis to the literature lies in the explanation of the
genesis and evolution of institutions in Latin America and the role of natural resources.
Several authors emphasise that the origins of institutions in developing countries is
rooted in colonial times, however, this thesis does not find empirical support for some
of the common colonial factors used by this literature. In particular, the conclusions of
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001] and Easterly and Levine [2012] that European
settlements matter for explaining institutional differences do not hold for Latin Amer-
ica. There is also little evidence for the hypothesis that native populations affected the
quality of institutions [as argued by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002; Baker et
al., 2008; Mahoney, 2010].
The research carried out in this thesis shows that the colonial aspects that matter for
Latin American institutions are coloniser identity and colonial resource endowment.
In particular, the empirical evidence shows that former British colonies have better
early and current institutions, and that being a mineral centre during colonial times
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decreases the quality of institutions. Previous literature has already emphasise the
importance of these two colonial aspects [La Porta et al., 1998, 1999 on coloniser
identity, and Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002 on the colonial resource endowment].
However, while these authors assume that current institutions are strongly correlated
with early ones, this thesis argues that this is not the case for Latin America. In fact,
there is empirical evidence that current and early institutions in Latin America are not
correlated and therefore, colonial aspects alone do not explain how institutions evolved
since independence.
In order to explain the evolution of Latin American institutions, this thesis considers
one of the main features of Latin American economies: inequality. The region is
characterised by a high level of inequality, in fact, it is the most unequal in the world.
This thesis explains the evolution of Latin American institutions using a bilateral cau-
sation of institutions and inequality: while poor institutions may affect the adoption of
redistribution policies, high levels of inequality may affect the quality of institutions. It
investigates how colonial and post-colonial factors affect this relationship. The results
show that colonial resource endowments affect the inequality levels of the region which
in turns affects institutions. Furthermore, the discovery of natural resources (i.e.
oil and natural gas) also affects this relationship and this sheds further light into the
role of the exploitation of these resources in the region. The effects of natural resources
depend on the pre-existing institutional setting and levels of inequality. The discovery
of natural resources provide the political elites with the incentives to promote authori-
tarian regimes in order to control the resource rents which negatively affects institutions
and growth.
Finally, this thesis goes further in investigating the role of Britain in Latin America.
As mentioned, British colonies seem to have better institutions than non-British ones,
however, British colonisers do not seem to behave much differently than Iberian ones.
135
FUNDAMENTAL VARIABLES OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
Therefore, we need to look in which specific aspects of British intervention benefit the
institutions in these countries. Several economic historians have emphasised the role
of Britain in the post-independence development of Latin America. This intervention
took place through investments and trade and affects both inequality and institutions.
The analysis investigates the legacy that British intervention left behind.
What follows explains in detail the main conclusions of the thesis and how these con-
tribute to the current literature.
Institutions are a fundamental determinant of Latin American growth
The findings in Chapter 2 show that institutions are indeed fundamental for Latin
American economic growth. This chapter first engages with the Glaeser et al.’s argu-
ment [2004] that human capital is a more fundamental source of growth than institu-
tions. The findings in Section 2.3 contradict this argument and show that, in the case
of Latin America, initial low levels of democracy are a better predictor of subsequent
low economic growth than initial low levels of human capital. Glaeser et al.’ criticisms
to institutions come from two observations: (i) commonly used measures of institutions
are more volatile than human capital and therefore do not represent durable features
of the environment, (ii) given the high correlation between institutional measures and
GDP per capita, institutions are not a cause of but they are caused by economic growth.
We cannot reject that institutions in Latin America are volatile. Measures for democ-
racy and constraints on the executive (commonly used as institutional variables) have
indeed a higher standard deviation than years of schooling (used as variable for human
capital); however, this should be considered as a characterisation of these institutions
per se, that is, institutions in Latin America are unstable. It is in fact the instability
of these institutions that harms growth and therefore high volatile institutions do play
a role in explaining the region’s poor growth performance.
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Moreover, Glaeser et al.’s observation that economic growth affects institutions can-
not be rejected too. The growth process encompasses many aspects that influence the
economic, political and social spheres. We can hardly argue that these aspects do not
affect the variables that cause growth including institutions. Any empirical analysis
thus needs to include ways to deal with endogeneity issues. The growth regression
analysis for Latin America proposed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 uses a panel system
generalised method of moments (GMM) that deals with these problems. This is pre-
ferred to the instrumental variable analysis (IV) used by Glaeser et al. for two reasons.
First, it is hard to identify valid instrumental variables that affect institutions or human
capital but do not affect growth. An invalid instrument gives inconsistent estimates.
Second, Glaeser et al. use cross-country data. Panel data allows for further ways to
obviate endogeneity and GMM estimators ensure the use of valid instruments. The re-
sults support the conclusion that institutions are more fundamental than human capital
for explaining growth, i.e. the variable for human capital loses statistical significance
once we include institutional variables into the regression. The analysis also shows
that natural resources have affected Latin American growth and in fact the natural
resources (and geographical factors in general) are also considered to be fundamental
determinants of the growth process.
Finally, while research on what causes growth looks for the determinants of the long-run
average growth, growth in the region is also highly volatile. Chapter 2 also considers
this issue by studying the causes of growth accelerations (episodes of rapid growth) in
Latin America. Rodrik [1999]; Pritchett [2000]; Sen [2013] agree that understanding
what causes growth to accelerate will help to explain what generates large fluctuations
in growth of per capita income. Based on the work of Hausmann, Pritchett, and Ro-
drik [2005] and Sen [2013], Section 2.5 first identify the episodes of rapid growth in the
region between 1960 and 2011 and then offers an empirical analysis of the sources of
growth accelerations in Latin America. The results support the findings in Hausmann,
137
FUNDAMENTAL VARIABLES OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
Pritchett, and Rodrik [2005]. While favourable external conditions trigger growth accel-
erations in Latin America, changes in the underlying political balance and variations in
government expenditure (used as measure of economic policies) reduce the probability
of observing rapid growth.
Another important conclusion of Chapter 2 is that natural resources are also a fun-
damental determinant of growth. Resource rents have a negative effect on long-run
average economic growth in the region (Section 2.4), while positive changes in terms of
trade and in the rents arising from natural resources increase the probability of observ-
ing episodes of rapid growth (Section 2.5). These results may seem contradictory, but a
closer look shows they are not. In countries specialised on commodity exports, changes
in the price of commodities are closely related to external shocks. This increases growth
volatility which in turn decreases growth (this has been largely debated in Auty [2001];
Sachs and Warner [2001]; Ortega and de Gregorio [2007]. These problems could be ob-
viated with the adoption of good policies (that, for instance, favoured the diversification
of the productive structure), but most Latin American countries lack good governance
and political stability which affects how these resources are managed.
Latin American institutions have colonial origins
Even if we know that the high levels of political instability in Latin America affects
the region’s economic growth through various channels, the analysis in Chapter 2 does
not say how and why good/bad institutions arise. These questions are addressed in
Chapter 3 and 4 which investigate the origins of institutions in Latin America and how
these institutions evolved since independence.
Chapter 3 examines whether the dominant explanations in the literature on the contin-
uing influence of the colonial experience on current institutions can explain the Latin
American experience. In particular, the literature argue that the problems in former
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colonies are deeply rooted in colonial times and in the institutional setting established
during this period. This is based on the hypotheses that early institutions (institutions
at the time of independence) depend on a variety of colonial factors, and that current
and early institutions are strongly correlated.
Nonetheless, a crucial finding of this analysis is that, for Latin America, the assump-
tion that early and current institutions are correlated, does not hold. This might be
explained by the region’s early decolonisation process. The bulk of Latin American
countries became independent in the first half of the 19th century - around a century
before the rest of the colonies. However, colonial factors may still affect the region’s
institutions. Four hypotheses were proposed in order to analyse the effects of these
colonial aspects. These hypotheses are based on (i) the coloniser identity, (ii) the size
of European settlements during the colonial period, (iii) the pre-colonial populations,
(iv) the colonial resource endowment. For Latin America there is no evidence that
either European settlements or pre-colonial populations influenced institutions. This
is in contrast with Acemoglu et al. [2001] theory that areas with larger European set-
tlements during the colonial times inherited better institutions, and with Mahoney’s
theory [2010] which states that pre-colonial populations have a direct impact on current
institutions and development.
The analysis emphasises that former British colonies have better early and current
institutions than non-British ones. However, the problem with this result is that we
cannot identify the specific features of the British colonial rule responsible for these
results. In many aspects, British colonisers were very similar to other colonisers, espe-
cially during the first period of colonisation. They did set up monopolies in order to
control the trade with the colonies and adopted various forms of forced labour.
Colonial mineral resource endowment (i.e. gold and silver) seems to be relevant in
explaining institutions while European settlements and native populations are not sig-
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nificant for institutions in Latin America. In fact, the explanation of how institutions
arise in Latin America is more complex than the one illustrated by Acemoglu et al.,
or Mahoney. It requires more than colonial history to explain the factors that affect
the creation of these institutions that are positively correlated with growth. To ex-
plain how institutions affect Latin American development we need to consider other
factors.
Inequality and institutions reinforce each other
This thesis contributes to the literature on the relationship between institutions and in-
equality. Latin America is characterised by the highest level of inequality in the world.
Efforts in literature have failed in reaching a consensus in the causal relationship be-
tween inequality and institutions. This thesis examines the possible dynamics between
institutions and inequality.
The analysis considers that a bilateral relationship between these two variables is plau-
sible. Institutions is statistically significant for explaining inequality, but inequality
also explains institutions. To deal with the simultaneity issues that this relationship
may cause, the econometric analysis considers a two simultaneous equation model (one
for institutions and one inequality) in which each variable depends on the other and on
other factors. The results show that high levels of inequality play a role in blocking the
adoption of good institutions, but poor institutional quality also increases inequality
even when controlled by other variables. This result supports Boix’s argument [2003]
that inequality and institutions reinforce each other, but it goes further and explains
how the relationship high inequality-bad institutions emerge in Latin American coun-
tries. This was put in place during the colonial times. Countries such as Bolivia and
Peru, specialised in the production of silver and other mineral resources during the
colonial times, inherited a highly stratified society with a small group of families that
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controlled political and economic power. These countries set up highly authoritarian
governments which aimed to maintain the elite privileges. In fact, these countries tend
to delay policies that would increase political participation (e.g. universal suffrage) and
distribution of wealth (e.g. creation of welfare states).
The economic and political equilibria set up in these countries did suffer the influence
of other events that took place after independence, such as the British intervention in
Latin America and the discovery of these resources.
Natural resources affect institutions
Many changes took place in Latin America after the independence wars in 1820s. The
results of Chapter 4 show that these changes also affected institutions in the region. Two
particular post-independence aspects are considered, the effect of British intervention
in the 19th and early 20th century and the discovery of new natural resources. The
discovery of oil and natural gas has a negative direct impact on institutions in Latin
America. This supports the idea behind resource curse theories proposed by several
authors [Sachs and Warner, 1995; Ross, 2001; Soysa, 2005; Caselli, 2006]. The rents
arising from the exploitation of natural resources offer specific political incentives that
may affect the quality of institutions. In commodity-dependent countries the volatility
of these rents tends to translate into fiscal volatility which limits growth potential. In
addition, conflicts over redistribution of these rents provide incentives for ruling elites
to favour more authoritarian regimes.
However this is not an unconditional effect. The experiences of Latin American coun-
tries show that the management of these resources did depend on the pre-existing
institutional settings and political equilibria as argued by Dunning [2008]. Rents from
guano in Peru, and tin in Bolivia were used by the political elites in power to sup-
port their privileges. Although coffee in Costa Rica was mainly organised under small
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holder land [Nugent and Robinson, 2010], it did bring some conflicts among the coffee-
oligarchy. Only after the 1948’s protests a new process of democratisation took place.
This was made possible by a strong coffee-based peasantry and urban middle-class. Un-
like Dunning [2008] and Nugent and Robinson [2010] this thesis explains how colonial
factors, and in particular colonial resource endowments, influenced the pre-established
distribution of power. Therefore, even if natural resources are not fate, these resources
have had a strong impact of these countries’ institutions.
The effects of British intervention in Latin America
Finally, another important contribution of this thesis is the explanation of the effects
of British intervention in Latin America. In the 19th century, Britain became the main
industrial power in the world, and the growth of its industrial production increased
the demand for raw material and also food. The increase in British demand favoured
Latin American exports and this had a positive effect on institutions. In the late 19th
century however, Britain shifted from being a manufacturing centre to be the main
financial centre in the world. Latin American countries rapidly embraced the use of
global capital markets to finance their public debt and a large amount of British capital
went to these countries.
The empirical analysis reveals two potential effects of these investments on Latin Amer-
ican institutions. One is a direct negative effect on institutions. Latin American coun-
tries whose elites welcomed British investment also made themselves vulnerable to its
cessation. Key sectors of the economy (e.g. railways, banking system) became con-
trolled by firms based in London whose primary interests laid in profit remittances
from Latin America. External loans created thus problems of economic management
which became evident as soon as trade declined and credit was curtailed (i.e. during
the first World War). This way of government financing put-off reforms in taxation and
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financial institutions and undermined the political class. The elites of these countries
obtained substantial increments to their wealth and power in this period, but these
benefits were concentrated among certain social groups and tended to consolidate their
power. In a way, we can argue that the flow of money from British financial market to
Latin America, could have similar effects to the rents arising from resource exploita-
tion. External borrowing offered governments access to cheap funds at the cost of the
vulnerability of these economies to crises in the London market.
The second effect of British investments on institutions in Latin America goes through
inequality. There is empirical evidence that British investments decreased the lev-
els of inequality and therefore improved the regions’ institutions. It is likely that in
those countries with fairer redistribution of power, these investments favoured the de-
velopment of productive sectors that will in the long-run offer greater employment
opportunities. For instance, British investments financed coffee production in Costa
Rica and meat production in Uruguay. Given the more equal distribution of power in
these countries, the taxation of the new revenues generated benefited a larger part of
the population. In fact, Costa Rica and Uruguay (along with Chile) have the oldest
established welfare states. This positively affect institutions, in fact, these countries
also have the longest continuous histories of competitive politics in the region. This
also helps to explain the common conclusion in literature that British did better. In
British-controlled territories, the indirect effect of British investments on institutions
prevailed. These investments benefited education, health, and other basic services,
which may have benefited social inclusion and institutions.
Once we have a better understanding of the factors that affect institutions, future
research should focus on investigating what facilitates the redistribution of power within
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a country. After independence, the several revolutions and democratisation processes
that took place in Latin America allowed these countries to reach important milestones.
Democracy and universal suffrage became a reality in Latin America in 1980s and
1990s; however, sound political practices have not always kept pace. A reason for
this could be found in the persistence of the unequal distribution of power in some
countries. Power control is the key tool used by the elites in Latin American countries
to maintain their privileged positions. Even during periods of transition (which may
translate into a temporary loss of power), economic elites look for alternative ways to
influence the distribution of resources in order to maintain their privileges. Research
on how to contrast the elite behaviour in favour of a better distribution of the political
power which improves institutions would enhance our comprehension of the role of
these institutions.
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A. Appendix Chapter 2
A.1. Data sources and Variable Definitions
The main databases used for Chapter 2 are the World Development Indicators from
the World Bank and the Penn World Table (version 8.0). The World Bank DataBank
contains collections of time series data on a variety of topics for different countries in the
world and the World Development Indicators is the primary World Bank collection of
development indicators, compiled from different international sources. The Penn World
tables offer information on relative levels of income, output, inputs and productivity,
covering 167 countries between 1950 and 2011.
The Barro-Lee data set on educational attainment provides data for the measure of
human capital. This is a panel data set for 146 countries for the period 1950-2010.
Data on institutions for this chapter is from the International Country Risk Guide. It
provides variables covering political and social attributes for 140 countries for the period
1984-2012. Table A.1 provides the variables definitions and the specific sources.
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Table A.1.: Chapter 2 - Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
Real GDP per capita
growth
Difference between real GDP per capita in year t and real
GDP per capita in year t-1
Feenstra et al.
[2013]
Real GDP per capita
(constant 2005 US$)
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by
midyear population
Feenstra et al.
[2013]
Investments in Physi-
cal Capital
Ratio of real gross domestic investment (private plus pub-
lic) to real GDP
Feenstra et al.
[2013]
Educational attain-
ment
Average years of schooling of the population aged 25 and
over
Barro and Lee
[2010]
Life Expectancy at
birth, total (years)
Life expectancy indicates the number of years a newborn
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the
time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life
World Bank [2011]
Government Consump-
tion
General government final consumption expenditure in-
cludes all government current expenditures for purchases of
goods and services (including compensation of employees)
as percentage of GDP. It also includes most expenditures
on national defense and security. Data are in constant 2005
U.S. dollars
Feenstra et al.
[2013]
Inflation Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects
the annual percentage change in the cost to the average
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that
may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as
yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used
World Bank [2011]
Openness Exports plus Imports divided by real GDP. It is the total
trade as a percentage of GDP
Feenstra et al.
[2013]
Oil rents Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil
production at world prices and total costs of production as
a percentage of GDP
World Bank [2011]
Natural resource rents Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natu-
ral gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and
forest rents as a percentage of GDP
World Bank [2011]
Democracy This is a measures of democratic accountability which mea-
sures how responsive government is to its people, on the
basis that the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that
the government will fall, peacefully in a democratic soci-
ety, but possibly violently in a non-democratic one. The
original variable ranges between 0 and 6, but it has been
re-scaled to 0-1
PRS Group Inc.
[2010]
Government Stability This variables is an assessment both of the government’s
ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability
to stay in office. The original variable ranges between 0
and 12, but it has been re-scaled to 0-1
PRS Group Inc.
[2010]
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Table A.2.: Chapter 2 - Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
real GDP overall 0.085953 0.12568 -0.41178 0.4453516 N = 318
per capita between 0.05076 -0.02013 0.1860602 n = 34
growth within 0.115537 -0.4508 0.4063384 T = 9.35294
real GDP overall 7751.502 6050.761 1268.708 32273.78 N = 352
per capita between 5570.306 1386.317 26429.71 n = 34
within 2618.905 -1981.75 22606.34 T = 10.3529
Investment in overall 22.49014 9.135864 2.592429 72.71719 N = 352
physical capital between 7.209744 5.036227 42.03563 n = 34
within 6.05304 -1.35893 57.45467 T = 10.3529
Educational overall 5.752817 2.137884 0.9 10.18 N = 252
Attainment between 1.582103 2.581 8.022 n = 25
(schooling 25+) within 1.470108 3.090817 9.334635 T = 10.08
Life Expectancy overall 67.56088 7.276042 43.21606 79.25385 N = 393
(at birth) between 5.019519 53.372 74.73172 n = 35
within 5.322541 52.66173 79.22472 T = 11.2286
Government overall 12.35231 7.571384 2.38275 43.04948 N = 352
Consumption between 7.16548 3.6806 37.78621 n = 34
within 3.144453 -2.24954 33.70476 T = 10.3529
Inflation overall 1.095756 8.791645 -0.01892 117.4964 N = 267
(consumer price between 2.569621 0.0141 11.85149 n = 33
index) within 8.357149 -10.7307 106.7407 T = 8.09091
Openness overall 71.35385 40.47607 8.773735 193.9352 N = 352
between 37.69134 16.9446 161.8509 n = 34
within 16.07821 20.60421 128.4165 T = 10.3529
Oil rents overall 0.070846 0.097418 0 0.4412898 N = 119
between 0.084557 0.005283 0.278075 n = 14
within 0.050879 -0.09813 0.3084315 T = 8.5
Natural resources overall 0.058835 0.093204 0 0.6218496 N = 299
rents between 0.081775 0 0.32706 n = 35
within 0.044421 -0.18302 0.353625 T = 8.54286
Democracy overall 0.540621 0.256499 0 1 N = 275
Accountability between 0.174377 0.127778 0.852904 n = 25
within 0.191034 0.137086 1.066758 T = 11
Government overall -0.70378 0.339733 -1.65927 -0.0870114 N = 260
Stability between 0.173945 -1.04841 -0.4115315 n = 25
within 0.295408 -1.42224 0.1013228 T = 10.4
Table A.2 provides summary statistics and shows variation between countries and
within countries. For example, the variation of the real GDP per capita between coun-
tries is US$5, 570.31 while within countries it is equal to US$2, 618.91. Table A.2 also
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reports minima and maxima. For instance, the years of schooling in adults aged 25 and
over varied between 0.9 and 10 years (with an average of 5.8). The years of schooling in
each country varied between 2.58 and 8 years. The years of schooling “within” varied
between 3.09 and 9.3 The within number refers to the deviation from each country’s
average (a country deviated from its average by 9.3− 5.8 = 3.5).
Finally, Table A.2 shows the total number of observations (N), number of countries
with observations (n) and average number of time periods for each country (T ). For
instance, investments in physical capital is observed in 34 countries for a total of 352
observations. In average, there are 10.35 observations for each country.
A.2. Fixed Effect Analysis
This section shows the results of estimating equation 2.2 using Fixed Effect panel
estimators. Fixed effect estimators in static panels is largely preferred to analyse panel
data when the individual units are countries. The intuitive explanation is that the fixed
effects model can be thought of as a model of the entire population. This is thought
in contrast to the random effect model that assumes we are using a random sample
from a population. The formal formulation of the model assumes that differences
between countries can be captured by differences in the intercept term, α. Equation
2.2 becomes:
Dyi,t = iα+ βyi,t′ + δ
′Xi,t + ui,t (A.1)
Which can be explained as a regression model with n dummy variables, one indicating
each country (so that the model has no intercept). A formal test to assess that fixed
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effects are more appropriate (than random effects) is the Hausman test. The null
hypothesis is that “individual effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables”.
If we reject H0, the fixed effect estimator is unbiased and is preferred.
Table A.3 shows the same results of Table 2.6, using fixed effect estimators. It also
shows the results of the Hausman test (bottom of the table). However, the parameters
of the fixed effect estimators tend to be imprecise due to the elimination of the between
variation component. Growth episodes within countries look more alike than growth
episodes across countries. Restricting the analysis to the within variation eliminates one
source of bias, but makes it harder to identify growth effects with any degree of precision
(see Durlauf et al. [2005] for a discussion on growth econometrics). However, the
main issues of these estimators is that does not deal with the endogeneity problems of
some explanatory variables with the residuals, which makes our estimates inconsistent.
GMM estimators are preferred because it alleviates biases due to measurement error
and endogenous explanatory variables.
151
FUNDAMENTAL VARIABLES OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
T
ab
le
A
.3
.:
E
co
n
om
ic
G
ro
w
th
in
L
at
in
A
m
er
ic
a
-
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(a
)
(b
)
(c
)
(d
)
(e
)
(f
)
(g
)
(h
)
(l
o
g
)
in
it
ia
l
re
a
l
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
-.
0
4
1
*
.0
4
9
.0
3
2
.0
3
0
.1
3
6
.0
2
8
.0
1
9
.0
1
7
(.
0
2
3
)
(.
0
3
7
)
(.
0
3
7
)
(.
0
4
1
)
(.
0
8
7
)
(.
0
5
0
)
(.
0
5
2
)
(.
0
5
0
)
(l
o
g
)
In
v
es
tm
en
ts
.1
3
2
*
*
*
.1
7
5
*
*
*
.1
8
5
*
*
*
.1
5
4
*
*
*
-.
2
3
7
*
*
*
.1
7
1
*
*
*
.1
7
7
*
*
*
.1
5
8
*
*
*
(.
0
2
8
)
(.
0
3
4
)
(.
0
3
3
)
(.
0
3
6
)
(.
0
7
3
)
(.
0
4
2
)
(.
0
4
2
)
(.
0
4
1
)
to
ta
l
y
ea
rs
o
f
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
(2
5
+
)
-.
0
0
9
.0
0
9
-.
0
1
0
.0
2
0
-.
0
1
6
-.
0
2
5
-.
0
2
9
*
(.
0
0
6
)
(.
0
1
1
)
(.
0
1
2
)
(.
0
3
6
)
(0
.1
6
)
(.
0
1
6
)
(.
0
1
6
)
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
.5
0
7
-.
2
2
2
-1
.0
0
5
-.
0
7
3
-.
0
4
1
.0
9
5
(.
4
1
9
)
(.
4
6
2
)
(1
.2
9
6
)
(.
5
2
5
)
(.
5
2
5
)
(.
5
1
3
)
M
o
rt
a
li
ty
ra
te
(u
n
d
er
5
)
.0
0
2
*
*
-.
0
0
0
-.
0
0
2
-.
0
0
0
-.
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(.
0
0
1
)
(.
0
0
1
(.
0
0
3
)
(.
0
0
1
)
(.
0
0
1
)
(.
0
0
1
)
(l
o
g
)
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
co
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
-.
1
5
2
*
*
*
-.
1
9
3
*
*
*
-.
1
7
9
*
*
*
-.
2
0
8
*
*
*
-.
1
9
2
*
*
*
(.
0
3
8
)
(.
0
5
8
)
(.
0
4
3
)
(.
0
4
4
)
(.
0
4
3
)
(l
o
g
)
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
-.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-.
0
0
1
*
-.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-.
0
0
2
*
*
*
-.
0
0
2
*
*
(.
0
0
1
)
(.
0
0
1
)
(.
0
0
1
)
(.
0
0
1
)
(.
0
0
1
)
(l
o
g
)
O
p
en
n
es
s
.0
4
1
-.
0
2
5
.0
6
0
*
.0
5
9
.0
5
5
(.
0
3
0
)
(.
0
7
5
)
(.
0
3
6
)
(.
0
3
5
)
(.
0
3
4
)
(l
o
g
)
O
il
re
n
ts
-.
0
3
8
*
*
*
(.
0
1
3
)
(l
o
g
)
N
a
tu
ra
l
R
es
o
u
rc
e
re
n
ts
-.
0
1
2
.0
0
2
.0
1
2
(.
0
1
3
)
(.
0
1
4
)
(.
0
1
4
)
D
em
o
cr
a
cy
.0
9
7
(.
0
7
2
)
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
S
ta
b
il
it
y
.2
6
1
*
*
*
(.
0
8
5
)
co
n
st
a
n
t
.0
4
5
-.
8
1
9
*
*
*
-3
.0
5
*
.5
3
2
2
.6
8
7
-.
1
5
2
-.
1
1
8
-.
6
9
3
(.
2
1
4
)
(.
3
0
8
)
(1
.7
9
)
(1
.9
9
)
(5
.6
3
7
)
(2
.2
7
7
)
(2
.2
5
6
)
(2
.2
0
2
)
N
3
4
2
5
2
5
2
4
1
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
T
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
n
3
1
8
2
4
4
2
4
4
2
0
0
8
5
1
7
7
1
6
3
1
6
3
F
1
2
.2
6
*
*
*
1
0
.2
5
*
*
*
8
.2
4
*
*
*
7
.7
1
*
*
*
4
.8
3
*
*
*
6
.2
3
*
*
*
6
.7
4
*
*
*
7
.8
9
*
*
*
H
a
u
sm
a
n
te
st
(χ
2
)
1
0
.7
6
*
*
*
2
4
.9
2
*
*
*
3
1
.8
9
*
*
*
1
8
.4
5
*
*
2
2
.9
6
*
*
*
1
7
.3
1
*
*
2
2
.2
8
*
*
*
1
7
7
.4
0
*
*
*
N
o
te
s
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
*
,*
*
,*
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
,
5
a
n
d
1
%
re
sp
e
c
ti
v
e
ly
152
B. Appendix Chapter 3
B.1. Data sources and Variable Definitions
The analysis on the colonial origins of institutions in Latin America (Chapter 3) uses
different data sets. The measures of early institutions are from Poliyarchy dataset
[Vanhanen, 2000] and Political Constraint Index [Henisz, 2010]. As measure for early
institutions, I consider an average of the variable in the first 10 years after the coun-
try acquired the independence. The Polyarchy dataset is compiled by Tatu Vanhanen
and covers 187 countries over the period 1810-2000. It provides an index of democ-
racy among other variables. The current version of the dataset is 2.0. The Political
Constraint Index Dataset (POLCON) is an endeavour to identify underlying political
structures and measure their ability to support credible policy commitments and covers
226 present and historical countries over the period 1800-2007.
The measures for current institutions are from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
[Kaufmann et al., 2013]. This dataset reports on six broad dimensions of governance
for 215 countries over the period 1996-2012. For the analysis, I consider an average of
these indicators between 2000-2010.
Table B.1 shows some descriptive statistics and Table B.2 provides the variables def-
initions and sources. Table B.3 shows the data that has been created for this analy-
sis.
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Table B.1.: Chapter 3 - Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Early institutions
Democracy 31 0.114134 0.147272 0 0.403
Political constraints 31 0.13055 0.170659 0 0.453337
Current institutions
Rule of Law 41 0.51249 0.171589 0.186076 0.803323
Political stability 41 0.527212 0.153425 0.139588 0.751878
Explanatory Variables
British colony 49 0.346939 0.480929 0 1
European settlements 49 0.157923 0.102771 0 0.4612
in 1800
Native population 48 1.386844 0.995758 0 5.64
in 1500
Mercantilist coloniser 49 0.567568 0.502247 0 1
Sugar suitability 49 1.134926 1.214803 0 5.315139
Colonial mineral centre 49 0.183674 0.39123 0 1
B.2. The Impact of European Settlements on Institutions
The analysis in Chapter 3 uses updated data on institutions. This adds some Latin
American countries to the analysis increasing thus the number of observations. It also
considers European settlements in 1800 rather than in 1900. The reason is that in 1900,
the bulk of Latin American countries were already independent. Considering that we
aim to analyse the effects of colonisation on institutions, European settlements in 1800
is a more appropriate measure.
This section analyses the impact of European settlements on institutions using the
same sample as in Acemoglu et al. [2001], and therefore, using European settlements in
1900. Acemoglu et al. [2001] and Easterly and Levine [2012] argue that large European
settlements during colonial times positively affected the economic development of these
territories through the institutions that these actors put in place in the colonised terri-
tories. One crucial finding of this thesis is that, in the case of Latin America, European
settlements has no effect on institutions (and even when this variable is statistically
significant, it has a negative effect on Early institutions as show in Table 3.3).
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Table B.2.: Chapter 3 - Variables definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
Democracy Index of Democracy created by Tatu Vanhanen based on
two indicators, one for competition and one for partici-
pation. This index is explained in Vanhanen [2000]
Vanhanen [2000]
Political Constraints Measure the feasibility of change in policy given the struc-
ture of a nation’s political institutions and the preference
of the actors that inhabit them
Henisz [2010]
Rule of Law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence. The indicator varies between -2.5
and 2.5. It has been re-scaled to 0-1.
Kaufmann et al. [2013]
Political Stability measures perceptions of the likelihood that the govern-
ment will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitu-
tional or violent means, including politically-motivated
violence and terrorism. The indicator varies between -2.5
and 2.5. It has been re-scaled to 0-1.
Kaufmann et al. [2013]
British colony Dummy variable indicating whether the country was a
British colony.
La Porta et al. [1999]
and author’s research
European settlements
in 1800
Percentage of population that was European or of Euro-
pean descent in 1800.
Acemoglu et al. [2001]
and McEvedy and
Jones [1977]
Pre-colonial popula-
tion
Total population in 1500 Acemoglu et al. [2002]
and McEvedy and
Jones [1977]
Mercantilist coloniser This variable assumes the value of 1 if the country was
colonised by a mercantilist coloniser, 0 if the coloniser
was more liberal. In the case of Latin America and
the Caribbean, Britain is considered liberal, and there-
fore this variable assumes the value of 0 for all former
British colonies. In the case of former Spanish colonies,
the variable is equal to 1 if they are considered as colonial
centres in the first part of the colonisation process, 0 in
the case they were considered centres in the second part
of the colonisation process (when there was the change
from Habsburg to Bourbon dynasty in Spain). The for-
mer Spanish colonies with liberal coloniser are Argentina,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.
Author’s elaboration
based on Mahoney
[2010]
Colonial Minerals Dummy variable. It is equal to 1 if the main economic
activity during the colonial period was based on the ex-
ploitation of gold or silver. 0 otherwise.
Author’s elaboration
Sugar suitability Percent of national land area suitable for the production
of sugar, taking into account such factors as soil, rainfall,
temperature, and elevation.
FAO [2010]
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Table B.3.: Chapter 3 - Variables
country Britain Mercantilist Colonial
colony Coloniser mineral centre
ANGUILLA 1 0 0
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1 0 0
ARGENTINA 0 0 0
ARUBA 0 0 1
BAHAMAS 1 0 0
BARBADOS 1 0 0
BELIZE 1 0 0
BERMUDA 0 0 0
BOLIVIA 0 1 1
BONAIRE 0 0 0
BRAZIL 0 1 1
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 0 0
CAYMAN ISLANDS 1 0 0
CHILE 0 1 0
COLOMBIA 0 1 1
COSTA RICA 0 1 0
CUBA 0 1 0
CURACAO 0 0 0
DOMINICA 1 0 0
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0 1 0
ECUADOR 0 1 0
EL SALVADOR 0 1 0
FRENCH GUIANA 0 1 0
GRENADA 1 0 0
GUADELOUPE 0 1 0
GUATEMALA 0 1 1
GUYANA 1 0 0
HAITI 0 1 0
HONDURAS 0 1 1
JAMAICA 1 0 0
MARTINIQUE 0 0 0
MEXICO 0 1 1
MONTSERRAT 1 0 0
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 0 0 0
NICARAGUA 0 1 0
PANAMA 0 1 0
PARAGUAY 0 1 0
PERU 0 1 1
PUERTO RICO 0 1 0
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 1 0 0
ST. LUCIA 1 0 0
ST. MARTIN 0 0 0
ST. VICENT AND THE GRENADINES 1 0 0
SINT MAARTEN 0 0 0
SURINAME 0 1 0
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 1 0 0
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS 1 0 0
URUGUAY 0 1 0
VENEZUELA 0 1 1
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Table B.4 shows the results of regressing early institutions on European settlements
and European mortality rate. Acemoglu et al. [2001] use institutions in 1900 as early
institutions in most of the specifications and assign the minimum value that the vari-
able can assume to those countries that were not independent in 1900. Considering
that many countries were not independent in 1900, I consider that institutions after
independence is a better measure of early institutions. We observe that the variable for
European settlements in 1900 is not significant neither in the sample used by Acemoglu
et al. nor in a sample of all former colonies (data from Acemoglu et al. [2001]). It is
statistically significant if we consider the Acemoglu et al. sample, without the Neo-
Europes (US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) but it has a negative sign showing a
negative impact on early institutions. When considering subsamples for Latin America
and Africa, European settlements are not statistically significant and have a negative
sign. This result confirms the findings for Latin America from this thesis.
Table B.5 shows the results of regressing the measure of current institutions used by
Acemoglu et al. (average protection against expropriation risk in 1985-1995) as de-
pendent variable. It is worth of notice that the variable for early institutions has no
effect on current ones in most of the specifications (Regressions (a)). On the other
hand, European settlements in 1900 have a positive and statistically significant impact
on current institutions in the sample used by Acemoglu et al (both with and without
neo-Europes), but also when considering all ex-colonies. When a subsample for Latin
America is considered, this variable is statistically significant only at 10%. However, we
need to keep in mind that the European population in Latin America in 1900 changes.
The independence of these territories, opened the opportunity to many Europeans to
make business in the area and therefore, this variable may be partially capturing other
factors that happened after independence. Chapter 4 shows that trade with Britain
increases in this period. This trade attracted several British merchants to the new
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independent countries. European settlements in 1900 could capture the effect of this
trade (European mortality is not statistically significant for Latin America).
Table B.4.: European Settlements and Early Institutions
Dependent Variable - Constraints on the Executive after one year of independence
Independent AJR sample Ex-colonies AJR (no neo-Europes)
Variables (c) (d) (c) (d) (c) (d)
European Settlements .015 .012 -.042**
(in 1900) (.013) (.012) (.016)
European Settler mortality -.392 -.524* -.007
(log) (.293) (.265) (.326)
constant 3.14*** 5.24*** 3.36*** 6.00*** 3.61*** 3.18*
(.377) (1.42) (.294) (1.28) (.395) (1.64)
n 60 60 86 73 56 56
R2 .028 .041 .013 .068 .086 .000
LAC Asia Africa
(c) (d) (c) (d) (c) (d)
European Settlements -.048 .582* -.032
(in 1900) (.029) (.290) (.050)
European Settler mortality -.729 -1.49 .317
(log) (1.67) (.846) (.366)
constant 3.88*** 5.85 4.22*** 11.02*** 3.53*** 1.50***
(.945) (7.41) (.864) (3.35) (.355) (2.05)
n 22 22 14 12 46 35
R2 .151 .017 .048 .177 .004 .028
notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
***, **, *; significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively
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C. Appendix Chapter 4
C.1. Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Table C.1.: Chapter 4 - Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Democracy overall 0.332246 0.328692 0 1 N = 400
between 0.197039 0.115 1 n = 20
within 0.266577 -0.20275 1.017246 T = 20
Autocracy overall 0.334746 0.296249 0 1 N = 400
between 0.13727 0 0.534 n = 20
within 0.264231 -0.19925 0.930663 T = 20
Constraints overall 0.408285 0.324914 0 1 N = 400
on the Executive between 0.184884 0.141667 1 n = 20
within 0.270213 -0.15672 1.149951 T = 20
Family overall 0.17665 0.113929 0.01 0.62 N = 400
Farms between 0.071893 0.062 0.34 n = 20
within 0.089762 -0.07435 0.46965 T = 20
Oil and gas overall 0.1375 0.344806 0 1 N = 400
discoveries between 0.169267 0 0.45 n = 20
within 0.302662 -0.3125 1.0375 T = 20
Trade with overall 0.1573601 .1547945 .0000836 .645317 N = 400
Britain between .1586171 .0000836 .645317 n = 20
within 0 .1573601 .1573601 T = 20
British overall 0.356444 0.24639 0.009175 0.871568 N = 320
Investments in between 0.254073 0.009175 0.871568 n = 16
Latin America within 0 0.356444 0.356444 T = 20
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This appendix offers definitions and sources for the data used for the empirical anal-
ysis of the evolution of Latin American political institutions in Chapter 4. Table C.1
provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used.
The variables for institutions, democracy, autocracy and constraints on the executive
power, are from Marshall and Gurr [2013]. This data set consists of six component
measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive
authority, and political competition. It covers all major, independent states, currently
167 countries over the period 1800-2012.
As measure of inequality, I use the percentage of family farms from the “Vanhanen Index
of Power Resources” [Vanhanen, 2003]. This covers the period 1850-2000. Family farms
are distinguished from large farms cultivated mainly by hired workers. However, family
farms are not dependent on the actual size of the farm which varies with the type of
product and the agricultural technology being used.
The percentage of family farms capture the degree of concentration and therefore in-
equality in the ownership of land. The variable for the discovery of oil and natural
gas is based on the dataset PETRODATA [Lujala et al., 2007]. This dataset includes
890 onshore and 383 offshore locations with geographic coordinates and information on
the first oil or gas discovery and production year. Based on this dataset, I created the
variable for the discovery of natural resources.
The British influence in Latin America is considered using measures of British invest-
ments in Latin America in the period 1905-1911 and trade with Britain in the period
1898-1906. Investments are from Paish [1909]. These are expressed in British Sterling.
These investments were mainly based on government loans. Considering the differences
in population and dimensions among countries, I have divided this variable by the av-
erage government revenue in the same period. The data for the government revenue
is from the “Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive” (CNTS) [Banks and Wilson,
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2013]. This data is expressed in US dollars, therefore, British investments are con-
verted in US dollars using US$4.85=GBP£1 as exchange rate (during late 19th and
early 20th centuries, many countries adopted the gold standard, as consequence, con-
version rates between different currencies was fixed and determined by the respective
gold standard).
Trade is from the “Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign
Countries and British Possessions”. This is given by a country’s exports to Britain
in a given year divided by the total exports of that country. Total exports are also
from CNTS [Banks and Wilson, 2013]. Trade is also expressed in US dollars following
the same procedure than before. The CNTS contains data for over 200 states from
1815 onwards (excluding the periods 1974-1918 and 1940-1945) for a number of social
indicators.
Table C.2 summarises variables definitions and sources.
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Table C.2.: Chapter 4 - Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
Democracy An eleven category scale, from 0 to 10, with a
higher score indicating more democracy. Points
are awarded on three dimensions: competitiveness
on political participation, competitiveness of ex-
ecutive recruitment, and constraints on chief ex-
ecutive. This has been re-scaled to 0-1. Variable
described in Gurr [1999].
Marshall and Gurr
[2013]
Autocracy An eleven category scale, from 0 to 10, with a
higher score indicating more autocracy. This has
been re-scaled to 0-1. Variable described in Gurr
[1999]
Marshall and Gurr
[2013]
Constraint on Exec-
utive
A seven category scale, from 1 to 7, with a higher
score indicating more constraints. This has been
re-scaled to 0-1. Variable described in Gurr [1999]
Marshall and Gurr
[2013]
Family Farms The area of family farms as a percentage of the
total area of holdings. A family farm employs no
more than four people including family members
and the family owns and cultivates the land. The
data set is reported in averages for each decade.
For this study, we use five-years average, therefore
the data has been considered twice (e.g. for the
periods 1990-1995 and 1995-2000, I use the data
reported for 1990s.
[Vanhanen, 2003]
Oil and Natural gas
discoveries
This variable assumes the value of 1 if there was
a discovery of oil or natural gas in that period of
time, otherwise it is equal to 0. This variable has
been created based in PETRODATA, and from
several other sources (for the missing years).
[Lujala et al.,
2007], and au-
thor’s elaboration
British Investments
in Latin America
Average of British investments in Latin American
countries in the period 1905-1911, divided by the
country’s average government revenue. The value
is expressed in US$
Paish [1909] and
Banks and Wilson
[2013]
Latin American
trade with Britain
Average of British imports from Latin American
economies in the period 1898-1906, divided by to-
tal country’s exports. The value is expressed in
US$
Statistical Office
[1906] and Banks
and Wilson [2013]
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C.2. GLS Analysis
This section offers the GLS estimators of equations (4.1) and (4.2) in Chapter 4. Ta-
bles C.3 and C.4 show these estimates without dealing with endogeneity problems. The
results are very similar to the ones in tables 4.2 and 4.3. In particular, we observe that
inequality is related to institutions (inequality affects institutions but institutions also
affect the levels of inequality). The discovery of natural resources negatively affects
institutions. In this case there is the negative effect on family farms is statistically
significant. The effects of British indirect rule are very similar to the ones explained in
Chapter 4, and this is the case also for the variables for natural resource endowment
during the colonial times (mineral centres and sugar suitability). In these specifications,
early European settlements and the size of pre-colonial population are statistically sig-
nificant, however, these have the opposite sign compared to the theories from Acemoglu
et al. [2001] or Mahoney [2010], therefore, we can still reject these theories for the Latin
American case.
Tables C.5 and C.6 show the results using the lag of the endogenous variables as re-
gressors. The results are very similar to the ones previously described. As explained
in Section 4.2, this may be due to the fact that our endogenous variables (institutions
and inequality) are characterised by high persistence over time, therefore using their
lagged levels could be poor instruments in this case. Nonetheless, the results show in
this section confirm most of the previous findings.
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